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ABSTRACT 
 
Guatemala is one of only three countries in America which urban population is smaller than the 
rural one.  United Nations estimates that in the coming years the economic structure of the 
country will change to an urban country.  This situation triggers the need of an enhanced 
understanding of the role of market size, income distribution, regional disparities, and regional 
economic growth with respect to the ways in which they condition the economic growth of a 
nation.    Given such framework, the study pretends to explore some economic conditions of the 
regions of Guatemala that may influence decision making of workers and firms when moving 
between regions.  The theoretical topics in the research involve the utilization of wage equations 
and the endogenous growth theory.  In the first case, the purpose is to evaluate two issues: the 
spatial distribution of the wages in Guatemala through the potential market of new economic 
geography (NEG), and the influence of the local labor conditions on the determination of the 
wage rates in the regions through the wage curve.  Regarding the endogenous growth theory, it 
is presented an analysis of the influence of public capital on productivity and production of 
non-agricultural firms located in different municipalities of the country.  The research includes 
an analysis of the influence of neighboring effects of their economic conditions as regards labor 
market and public investment, a situation that very few papers have explored (Palombi and 
Fingleton, 2013).  In order to accomplishing such tasks, the research is divided in two parts.  The 
first part, which is concentrated on the analysis of wage equations, uses spatial pooled cross 
sectional data for 2006 and 2011 including information at individual and regional level for the 
estimation of both wage equations.  Thus, about the NEG wage equation, there are two outputs 
to underline.  One is that the model demonstrates not only that the metropolitan area has the 
higher market access, but as time passes such market is enlarged further; and second, the 
estimates of market access are statistically significant and too small, meaning that market access 
is not enough to explain the spatial distribution of wages, and hence the economic regional 
imbalances of the country. As regard the wage curve, the results reveal that both local and 
neighboring labor market conditions (unemployment and underemployment) exert important 
and negative influence on the wage determination in each region in Guatemala.  Thus, 
differences in wages across the regions can be explained by labor condition of their locales.  
With respect to the second part of the research, the endogenous growth theory, the purpose is to 
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analyze the relationship between public investment and economic performance of 
municipalities in Guatemala. In order to accomplish such a task, the paper uses a panel data in 
two econometric models based on the endogenous growth model. The first model uses a Cobb-
Douglas production function which is a widely accepted by the academia and researchers to 
calculate productivity. The second model uses the multilevel analysis to estimate the effects of 
public investment on production. Since the estimations follow the endogenous growth model, 
the methodology includes the variables of human capital, research and development and 
weighted neighbor public investment to test the positive spillover effects. The results show that 
there is some evidence that public investment have positive influence on the economic 
performance in the municipalities under study. These results assert that productivity and 
production are positively influenced by the public investment. Also, it shows that a locale is 
positively influenced by neighbor public investment when it belongs to the metropolitan area, 
and negatively influenced when it belongs to the non-metropolitan area.  Finally, the research 
shows that the economic inequality between economic agents and places are responsible of the 
migratory process within the country, which is pursued by people with the motivation of 
reducing their economic gap related to the difference between their own economic and social 
position and that of people in other wealthier places.  However, it is happening that as a 
consequence, economic conditions are getting worse in all regions of the country, including in 
the metropolitan area, while authorities are not weighting such issue.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Developing countries are characterized by high, and increasing, rates of urbanization that are 
result of domestic rural-to-urban migration.  The urbanization process presents enormous 
planning challenges because it has been accompanied by changes in the social and economic 
structure of these countries.  In a general sense, the high rate of urbanization has triggered the 
need to undertake regional studies.  There is a particular need for an enhanced understanding 
of the role of market size, income distribution, regional disparities, and regional economic 
growth with respect to the ways in which they condition the economic growth of a nation.  In 
most countries, regions are differentiated from each other in terms of their natural, social and 
economic resources that, combined with migration, provide a source of increasing regional 
disparities (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000).  The focus of this dissertation is rooted in attempts to 
assess how regional disparities come into being and persist in Guatemala as it is one of only 
three countries in America which urban population is smaller than the one from rural area, and 
it is projected that in the coming years the population in the urban area of Guatemala will reach 
the 50% of the total population (United Nations, 2012). This can be achieved by understanding 
the different economic conditions that economic agents, particularly workers and firms, face in 
various regions of the country. 
The study pretends to explore some economic conditions of the regions of Guatemala 
that may influence decision making of workers and firms when moving between regions. It is 
presumed that people involved in internal migration search for places where the economic 
development is highest, meaning that people will move to locales where the opportunity for 
doing business and obtaining better jobs is greater.  In fact, the survey of living standard 
conditions of Guatemala (ENCOVI, 2006) reveals that the metropolitan area is absorbing large 
flows of internal migration at a high rate; however, as shown later, people in the metropolitan 
area are suffering from a process of impoverishing.  Consequently, in this research it is assumed 
that internal migration is involved in a circular cumulative causation of impoverishment in 
which the regional economic inequality pushes economic agents out of less advantaged regions 
to search for better living standards within the country. The destination target is usually the 
metropolitan area, and based on the information of ENCOVI 2006 and 2011, one can deduce 
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that such an area is not able to absorb the increasing labor force fed by the flows of internal 
migration because the level of production are relative low to the levels of labor supply, leading 
into underemployment and low wages.  As a result, the crowded metropolitan area begins to 
suffer from deteriorating economic conditions attached to a systematic impoverishment that 
further deepens the economic inequality in the country.  The former argument is true, but it is 
not the complete picture by any means.  It is important to recognize that the information is very 
limited to two years of analysis, and the phenomena described above may represent only short 
term process of adjustment.  Brechling (1973) argues that the interregional migration of labor 
force may have an important role in stabilizing the aggregated economy as regions that 
experience higher economic growth tend to pull labor, creating a very tight local labor markets. 
However, this is testable only for long term equilibrium. 
A question to address here is which incentives or factors do economic agents pursue 
when contemplating moving between regions or markets?  Clearly the question aims to study 
the decision of location and investment of household and firms. As a household, one would 
search for better labor market conditions including better wages, and hence better living 
standards.  As a firm, one would search for better conditions that favor the production and 
selling of their goods and services.  This encompasses market size, infrastructure for adequate 
economy of scales, and network externalities.   Accordingly, this research has as objective the 
analysis of labor market and public investment in infrastructure as they represent important 
economic conditions of the country that contribute to an understanding of the dynamics and 
trajectories of regional economies. 
First, labor market conditions play an important role in conducting the process of 
location decision of economic agents; for instance, wage rates may incentive neighboring 
population to move into the local market, or they would discourage local workers, inducing 
them to find new jobs in other labor markets that may enhance their economic living standards. 
Thus, it is important to consider regional interdependence because a single regional labor 
market does not react independently, often regional labor markets depend on the economic 
behavior of other markets.  The new economic geography of Krugman (1991) provides an 
example of how the economic conditions of neighbors can influence the decision to move 
between regions when comparing trade costs, prices and incomes from different regions, and 
how they can shape business opportunities and wages.  Hence, when analyzing labor markets, 
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attention should not be focused only the local level.  Influences on local market conditions can 
originate in other regions, with the implication that economic agents may base their decisions 
(for example, to move or to stay) on both local conditions and conditions in neighboring 
regions.    
Inevitably internal migration creates impact at origin and destination locales.  ENCOVI 
(2006) reveals that the second most important reason for moving from one region to another 
within Guatemala is due to labor opportunities; therefore, people leaving their locales would 
induce structural changes in the labor market where they belong originally as well as in the new 
one where they will be settling.  These structural changes are reflected in changes of 
unemployment, underemployment and wages.  For instance, the metropolitan area is the most 
developed one, and it is receiving the 42% of the immigrants (ENCOVI, 2006) which creates 
economic and social pressure to the status quo of the region by overcrowding it and increasing 
the labor supply, which may end with decreases of wages, or unemployment.  The neoclassical 
explanation to such situation is represented by Harris and Todaro (1970), who argues that 
internal migration tend to decrease as much as wages tend to equilibrate across the regions.  As 
described in chapter 2 of this research, wages in Guatemala are indeed adjusting, and they are 
doing it with substantial decreases in real terms.  This is because the markets in the regions are 
not capable of matching production and consumption, and hence decent jobs and labor supply.   
Thus, internal migration triggers a chain of economic effects that initially can be 
manifested in the labor market, and then extended, via classical general equilibrium 
mechanisms, to the entire economy.  In order to capture such a decision-making process, the 
research focus of this analysis concerns the role of wages as an incentive factor to the migration 
process. In that sense, in this research is proposed to use wage equations to provide two sources 
of analysis.  The first, represented by the new economic geography (NEG), seeks to evaluate 
and discuss the conditions that drive people to migrate between regions.  This aims to evaluate 
if a geographic pattern of economic development influences the spatial distribution of wages 
that justifies the internal migration.  The second mechanism, the Blanchflower and Oswald 
wage curve, focuses on providing an evaluation and description of given local labor market 
conditions.  This aims to analyze a possible monopolistic power pattern in the process of wage 
determination due to changes in the labor supply of the regions. As mentioned before, it is 
important to recognize the interregional linkages of the economic conditions, so both 
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mechanisms offer the opportunity of analyzing the influence of the labor conditions of 
neighboring regions on local economic agents. 
Second, public infrastructure is part of the economic conditions that characterize the 
regions of Guatemala.  It covers market failures that the private sector is unwilling or unable to 
correct, for instance, sewers, roads, water, etc.  Thus, public investment in infrastructure 
generates positive externalities to the private sector, enhancing the productivity of the firms as 
well as the well-being of households.  Aschauer (1989) shows evidence that public capital is 
highly correlated to the economic growth of the locales, meaning that public infrastructure is a 
key factor in the regional disparities.  Locales benefited with more public capital stock present 
better conditions to firms for producing their goods and services.  This is because public capital 
provides positive external economies that complement the production costs through the 
provision of proper roads, water, sewers, which firms may use for their commercial benefits.  In 
addition, there is a discussion in literature about the correlation between public capital and 
economic growth.  Some authors (Boarnet, 1998; Holtz, 1994) underline that such correlation 
exists because prosperous places tend to demand more public capital because they are in the 
disposition of afford it, while poorer places don’t have such economic capacity.  In spite of this 
efforts, empirical evidence (for a list of papers see Romp and de Haan, 2007) shows that public 
capital enhances productivity of the firms, and hence the economic growth of the places.  
In Guatemala, public capital is assigned through governmental transfers, in which 
central government provides a budgetary assignment to the municipalities of the country, while 
population is not charged for any additional tax.  Therefore, it is expected that public capital 
improves in part their economic development.  Given such context, this research seeks to 
analyze the relationship between public investment and economic performance of firms in the 
different municipalities of Guatemala, in which economic performance is measured through 
productivity and production at the firm level.  This budgetary assignment has been criticized by 
the civil society of Guatemala because the decision of where to invest has been based on 
political conventions, and hence the impact on the economic performance is likely to be 
inefficient leading to aggravate economic disparities in terms of public infrastructure.  Some of 
the implications are that people is pushed from the regions where the public capital stock is 
scarce, and tend to search for new places that provide better opportunities for establishing a 
business, creating in this way another form of regional disparity.  
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Moreover, adopting the two above objectives in the Guatemalan case provides a 
different perspective than traditional research done there that extends beyond the national and 
dualist delimitations found in previous research (Alejos, 2003; Adams, 2005; Vasquez, 2011).  
The application of wage equations for Guatemala is relevant because they reveal how 
differential wages represent opportunities to move towards economic prosperity on the 
countrywide, regional and individual levels. Consequently, the results of this type of research 
may contribute to the set of information policy makers might wish to review when elaborating 
policy instruments addressing issues such as regional disparities.  In addition, this type of 
research helps bridge the gap in the literature regarding applications of empirical research 
between developed and developing countries.  
In 2001 the congress of the Republic of Guatemala approved the law of social 
development (Article 42-2001) that contemplates the creation of the social development policy 
for Guatemala. It aims to strength the access to health, education, employment & migration, 
disaster risk, and social communication, which are considered as key to the development of the 
country.  In spite if this effort, the issue of internal migration is not considered as a part of a 
public agenda. “[In Guatemala], the situation of internal migration is still a pending issue on the 
public agenda, this must be strengthened, as currently there is limited information about its 
characteristics and development [process]” (SEGEPLAN, 2012). Therefore, this research is 
relevant for planners because it allows for the mapping of a social or economic system that 
linking structures and agents.  It provides an overview of the conditions and performance of the 
society as a whole, in which regional disparities are in increasing rate. (World Bank, 2009) Since 
no public policy has been elaborated and executed to deal with the internal migration, the study 
would aid in the consideration of the options for influencing a public policy agenda.  The 
results presented below in this paper will provide of planners with the ability to understand 
that changes in the economic conditions across regions may result in movements of agents and 
how these movements may contribute both positively and negatively to national development 
goals.  Davidoff and Reiner (1962) believe that understanding the status quo of society should 
be of central interest for planners who desire to propose meaningful policy recommendations.  
This includes comprehension of efficiency, rational action, market orientation, and the 
allocation of resources.  Therefore, the research provides a pragmatic view of such elements that 
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are represented by the economic situation of Guatemala, including labor markets and their 
economic drivers.  
The structure of this dissertation proposal is as follows. In addition to the current 
chapter, this paper contains four additional chapters, and the conclusion. Guatemala is used as 
case study because there is little research regarding Guatemala’s regional economies.  Thus, 
Chapter 2 presents a description of the economic background of the country. It provides a 
synopsis of national and regional economic context, in which is exposed that in spite of enjoying 
a healthy macroeconomic stability in the country, the economic growth is not enough to provide 
decent living standards conditions of the people.   
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of wage equations.  It describes four 
models that have featured prominently in the study of labor migration and wages.  The 
discussion begins with a description of the Harris and Todaro model, whose objective is to 
explain rural-urban migration.  One mainstay of this model involves the positive relationship 
between income expectations and unemployment levels.  Harris and Todaro (1970) construct a 
labor supply model where wages and unemployment rate have a positive relationship. They 
assume that skilled workers are scarce, and hence have power when negotiating their wages. If 
labor market conditions deteriorate, workers tend to migrate to urban areas. For this reason, 
firms tend to keep workers by increasing their wages.  
The second model discussed is the New Economic Geography wage equation. This wage 
equation is derived from the “core-periphery model” proposed by Krugman (1989). This model 
will be used for the purpose of study the spatial distribution of wages in Guatemala through the 
market access, where market access represents, in Harris’ spirit (1954), the summation of 
markets accessible to a point. The fundamental assumption is that all external markets have a 
substantial effect on local wages. The evidence has revealed that wages will be higher at the 
economic center and lower at the periphery.   
The third model refers to the notion of a wage curve. This is referred as an empirical law 
of economics where the objective is to study the relationship between wages and 
unemployment levels.  Contrary to the argument made by the Harris and Todaro model, this 
theory explains that unemployment has a negative effect on wages, i.e., the higher the 
unemployment in a local market, the lower the wages become. Firms use such labor conditions 
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to create a threat against workers in order to reduce their salaries. Also, this section briefly 
discusses the significance of the wage curve in a developing country, where unemployment is 
not a relevant indicator as underemployment to describe the labor conditions that shape the 
wage curve.  
Finally, the fourth model is the Mortensen and Pissarides model.  It explains that in any 
labor market, firms and workers will face search frictions.  Firms and workers will incur costs in 
attempting to match a job position with the labor resources that are available.  The cost can be 
represented in monetary terms or time; when referring to time, the amount of time in an 
unemployment status is affected by the reservation wage and labor market tightness. It is not 
their objective to analyze the relationship between the unemployment rate and wages; however, 
it is expected that lower wages will be observed when the unemployment rate is high as will be 
discussed later. 
Chapter 4 includes the research questions, methodology, and estimates the wage 
equations in Guatemala. In this chapter I only include the NEG wage equation and the wage 
curve, while the Mortensen and Pissarides model is left for future research due to limitations on 
the available data. About the NEG wage equation, there are two outputs to underline.  One is 
that the model demonstrates not only that the metropolitan area has the higher market access, 
but as time passes such market is enlarged further; and second, the estimates of market access 
are statistically significant and too small, meaning that market access is not enough to explain 
the spatial distribution of wages, and hence the economic regional imbalances of the country. 
As regard the wage curve, the results reveal that both local and neighboring labor market 
conditions (unemployment and underemployment) exert important and negative influence on 
the wage determination in each region in Guatemala.  Thus, differences in wages across the 
regions can be explained by labor condition of their locales.   
In addition, chapter 5 presents a study of the economic performance of the regions in 
Guatemala. The objective of this chapter is to provide an empirical evaluation of the regional 
economic conditions of the country. The intention of it is to provide a benchmark study in 
which the results of the wage equations can be associated with the economic performance of the 
country as a whole. The chapter includes an analysis of the relationship between public 
investment and economic performance of firms in 72 municipalities in Guatemala.  It also 
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includes the influence of the spatial spillovers produced by public investments in neighboring 
municipalities. The results show that there is evidence that public investment exerts a positive 
influence on economic performance in the municipalities by stimulating productivity and 
production of the firms in the regions.  It also shows that a locale is positively influenced by 
neighboring municipalities’ public capital when it is invested in a metropolitan area, and is 
negatively influenced when it is invested in a non-metropolitan area. 
Finally, chapter 6 contains the final discussion and conclusion of the research. 
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Chapter 2: Economic background of Guatemala 
The current chapter describes the economic background of Guatemala.  In order to better 
understand the present economic situation of the country, it is appropriate to provide a brief 
synopsis of the issues that have led the current Guatemalan context.  
The most influential event on the social and economic development of the country was 
the civil war that occurred from 1960-1996.  Although the current project does not intend to 
discuss this event at length, the war has had a profound impact on the process of economic and 
social development of Guatemala.  The war divided the economic history of the country in three 
stages: the period before the civil war (1960), the period during the civil war (1960-1996), and 
the period after the civil war.  
Pre-war, Guatemala was known as an agricultural country—one in which Spaniard 
descendants and US companies created a system of forced labor (Galeano, 1978).  This situation 
produced, in part, the first civil revolution that included a series of social movements that led to 
the creation of the agrarian and labor reforms of the country in 1952.  During this period, many 
US companies were expelled from the country, causing international complaints that motivated, 
through international pressure, the annulment of the agrarian reforms (Palma, 2008).  This 
action became one of the factors that led to the outbreak of the civil war in 1960. 
 During the period of war, due to a lack of certainty and absent the security necessary for 
private investment in the rural areas, Guatemala was essentially divided into two great regions 
according to the economic interests of that time: the metropolitan area and the rest of the 
country; in was in the latter area where the war took place. This division resulted in an 
economic and social polarization of the country’s resources that produced entrenched poverty 
in non-urban regions that can be traced to three primary causes.  First, the non-metropolitan 
areas, with very few exceptions such as Quetzaltenango (the second important city), were 
dedicated exclusively to the production of agriculture products, and basically this was the 
unique interregional linkage with the metropolitan area as there was no internal free mobility of 
workers due to the political pressure of the moment.  Secondly, the investment of public capital 
in infrastructure greatly benefited metropolitan area. It left most of the remaining municipalities 
without adequate infrastructure for encouraging the allocation of private investment in their 
locales. This includes the lack of roads for internal trade, that furthermore continues to restrict 
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some remote rural communities from access to the rest of the country (IFAD, 2012).  Finally, 
human capital deteriorated steeply in regions where the war took place: the non-metropolitan 
areas. Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) argue that the Guatemalan civil war had a long-term 
and strongly negative impact on the education of children in the rural areas.  As a result, the 
current accumulated human capital of the country lacks adequate preparation for the adoption 
of either the high or medium technology that could drive efficiency and efficacy in the methods 
of production employed, especially in the non-metropolitan area.  
The aftermath of the civil war created a new economic and social structure in which 
spatial differences in terms of development and economic growth become more apparent (as 
will be shown later); however, the regions of the country are more interconnected than they 
were during the war with greater market access and far fewer restrictions.  The following 
sections describe the post-war economic situation since the beginning of the 2000’s as a period 
after which social and economic statistics began to be more readily available (INE, 2006).  
 
2.1 The present economic context of Guatemala 
In the Central American context, when comparing the GDP in constant prices of 2005, 
Guatemala is the country with the largest economy in 2011 (SECMCA, 2014)1.  It is 1.3 times 
larger than Costa Rica—the next largest economy (see figure 1).  Guatemala’s population is 
about 15 million people, also the largest among Central American countries (ECLAC, 2012).  
Accordingly, its GDP per capita ranks third after Costa Rica and El Salvador (ECLAC, 2014).  In 
terms of income inequality, Guatemala is also the most unequal country in Central America, 
reflecting in part a lack of social inclusion in the population.  UNDP (2013) ranks Guatemala in 
the position 119 in the world in terms of income inequality. When combined with the human 
development index, the country drops to rank 133 in terms of human capital, based on factors 
such a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living for 
countries worldwide (UNDP, 2013). 
                                                     
1 Executive Secretariat of Central American Monetary Council. 
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Figure 1. Central America: Total Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
Constant prices in millions of US Dollars                
Source: ECLAC 
 
In the national context, over the last thirty years the real gross domestic product of 
Guatemala increased at an average annual rate of 3.1%.  Also, since 1996 Guatemala has enjoyed 
of macroeconomic stability that is characterized by a stable GDP growth, low inflation, stable 
exchange rate, and a small fiscal deficit. (See table 1)  After 2001, BANGUAT (2014) data 
indicates that this behavior is driven mostly by the economic growth of the services industry 
that includes commerce, banking, and transportation.  The same data indicate stagnation in the 
agriculture and manufacturing industries over the last decade.  The final consumption in the 
country grew at an annual average rate of 3.7% in the period of 2001 to 2012, representing also 
the 96% of the total real GDP in the same period. Gross fixed capital in Guatemala, which 
represents 15% of the GDP, grew on average 1.8% annually over the same period. Imports and 
exports each grew at an average annual rate of 2.5% during the 2001-2012 period; in this regard, 
international trade of Guatemala is characterized by having negative net exports, which 
represent 11.8% of the total real GDP.  The country relies heavily on the export of agricultural 
goods—such as coffee, sugar, bananas, and cardamom—and also on the export of 
manufacturing goods—like textile fibers, textiles, and clothing (maquila). The most commonly 
imported goods are fabricated metal products and machinery, oil derivatives, and chemical 
products.  Overall, the economic growth of Guatemala strongly depends on international 
markets (BANGUAT, 2012).  Two key factors influenced the economy during this period: the 
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expansion of the international market of Guatemala in 2006 as a result of entering fully into the 
CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America free trade agreement); and the collapse of 
the US and European financial markets in 2007-2008 that by 2009 had extended to rest of the 
world. (BANGUAT, 2008 and 2009)   
 
Figure 2. Annual Growth of Real GDP of Guatemala 
Years: 1981-2013 
              Source: Banco de Guatemala 
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             Table 1. Some macroeconomic indicators 1996-2013 
Year 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
Inflation 
rate (%) 
Active* 
interest 
rate (%) 
Passive* 
interest 
rate (%) 
Fiscal 
Deficit as 
GDP (%) 
Exchange 
rate 
Variation (%) 
1996 2.8 10.85 22.4 11.0 -0.1 4.83 
1997 4.1 7.13 16.4 6.4 -0.6 -0.45 
1998 4.6 7.48 17.9 7.2 -2.0 5.45 
1999 3.7 4.92 20.6 11.3 -2.7 15.50 
2000 2.5 5.08 20.1 11.0 -1.9 5.12 
2001 2.4 8.91 17.9 8.5 -2.1 1.23 
2002 3.9 6.33 16.2 6.9 -1.1 -0.47 
2003 2.5 5.85 14.1 4.5 -2.6 1.52 
2004 3.2 9.23 13.5 4.5 -1.1 0.09 
2005 3.3 8.57 12.7 4.6 -1.7 -3.95 
2006 5.4 5.79 12.9 4.8 -1.9 -0.41 
2007 6.3 8.75 12.9 4.9 -1.4 0.94 
2008 3.3 9.4 13.8 5.5 -1.6 -1.50 
2009 0.5 -0.28 13.6 5.6 -3.1 8.01 
2010 2.9 5.39 13.3 5.3 -3.3 -1.33 
2011 4.2 6.2 13.5 5.2 -2.8 -3.38 
2012 3.0 3.45 13.5 5.4 -2.4 0.62 
2013 3.5 4.39 13.7 5.5 -2.1 0.32 
                  Source: Banco de Guatemala (BANGUAT) 
* According to IMF and Banco de Guatemala, the active interest rate refers to the lending rate that banks charge to the 
short and medium financing needs of the private sector. The passive interest is the deposit interest rate paid by 
commercial or similar banks for saving deposits. 
 
 
In the regional (sub-national) context, Guatemala is divided into eight regions, 22 
departments, and 336 municipalities.  The densest place is the department of Guatemala, where 
the capital city of the country is located.  Figures 3 and 4 show how the densities of the 
population were distributed across the municipalities of the country, in 2001 and 2010.  There is 
no significant difference between them, with the exception of two areas: the north side of region 
VI, where the second most important city of the country (Quetzaltenango) is located; and the 
second area corresponding to the surrounding municipalities of the metropolitan area (region 
I). Both regions report more significant concentrations of people in 2010 as compared with 2001 
(INE, 2012). Focusing on production in the regions, the agriculture industry predominates in all 
regions, with the exception only of the metropolitan area (region I), while the manufacturing 
industry is primarily concentrated in regions I and V (BANGUAT, 2011).  
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Figure 3. Population Density 2001 
In log terms 
      Source: INE 2012 
 
Figure 4. Population Density 2010 
    In log terms 
    Source: INE 2012 
 
 
 
2.2 Description of labor market in Guatemala 
 
INE of Guatemala reported that out of a population of 15.4 million people, 9.7 million were of 
working age (i.e., 15 years old and above), of which only 5.9 million people were members of 
the economically active population (EAP)— that is, those actively working or looking for a job.  
Over the last four years, the average unemployment rate (open unemployment over EAP) was 
3.4% (see Figure 5).  However, this rate obscures a reality of the labor market in Guatemala: as 
in many other developing countries, the labor market is segmented into two sectors, the formal 
and the informal.  According to INE (2013), informal employment accounts for more than 69% 
of the total employment in Guatemala, and is defined as the segment of the population 
characterized by those working under impoverished labor conditions, including the absence of 
legal contracts, low wages, a lack of social security coverage, and low productivity. 
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 Figure 5. National unemployment rate and real economic growth (GDP %)   
 Note: The years 2005-2009 contain estimations of unemployment rate elaborated by Lopez (2011). 
 Source: Unemployment rate 2002-2004, 2010-2013 from INE; Unemployment rate 2005-2009 from Lopez (2011);  
 and real GDP: Banco de Guatemala. 
 
The labor market in Guatemala is also characterized by a minimum wage policy that 
aims to provide a minimum standard of living for workers.  This policy also serves as a 
benchmark variable for indexing wages for the rest of the country.  The constitution of 
Guatemala (Article 102 f) establishes that the government must convene periodic meetings to 
revise the minimum wage.  These meetings are conducted by the National Commission of 
Salary, an organization that includes representatives of the central government, two 
autonomous institutions of the state, a representative of employers at the industry level, and a 
representative of union labor.  The collective agreements are usually enforced by the 
government, but when this does not occur, or the enforcement is weak, wages are determined 
with some level of flexibility, but are usually below minimum wage.  
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     Figure 6. Real hourly minimum wage in Guatemala and observed wage  
      In US dollars and per economic sector.  
       Source: Banco de Guatemala and INE.  
 
Figure 6 shows the minimum wage in Guatemala for the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors in real terms and in US dollars.  On average, both sectors grew about 8% 
from 2006 to 2011, but this change contrasts with what workers actually received in the field.  
INE reports that the real hourly wages workers received in exchange for their labor decreased 
from US$0.50 in 2006 to US$0.39 in 2011, a decrease of about 11 cents per hour. Although there 
is no documentation about the reasons of the reduction of the real hourly wages in Guatemala, 
the International Labour Organization -ILO- explains, through the Global Wage Report 2010-
2011, that most of the countries in the world experienced decline in wage growth during the 
period of crisis in 2007 and post-crisis (2008-2009). According to ILO, the reduction of real 
salaries is associated to the decline in the growth of labor productivity (measured as GDP per 
person employed). This is explained through the fact that most of firms were not able to 
increase their production due to the crisis at that time since sales were low, and as a 
consequence firms were not able to pay higher salaries.  
Table 2 shows that employment in the manufacturing industry is mostly concentrated in 
the region I, followed by regions VI and V.  With respect to numbers per industry and per 
region (Table 3), the agriculture sector is predominant in all regions, accounting for 47% on 
average.   Services accounts for of 37% of total employment on average across all regions. 
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                     Table 2. Distribution of occupation of the Industries across regions 
Region Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
I 0.04 0.39 0.40 
II 0.06 0.01 0.02 
III 0.05 0.04 0.06 
IV 0.08 0.03 0.05 
V 0.19 0.17 0.13 
VI 0.32 0.28 0.28 
VII 0.20 0.05 0.06 
VIII 0.06 0.01 0.01 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                      Source: INE (ENCOVI, 2011) 
. 
 
                   Table 3. Distribution of occupation of the industries per region 
Region Agriculture Manufacturing Services Total 
I 0.05 0.30 0.65 1.00 
II 0.65 0.10 0.25 1.00 
III 0.35 0.17 0.48 1.00 
IV 0.51 0.12 0.37 1.00 
V 0.42 0.23 0.35 1.00 
VI 0.38 0.20 0.42 1.00 
VII 0.66 0.10 0.24 1.00 
VIII 0.71 0.07 0.22 1.00 
                     Source: INE (ENCOVI, 2011) 
 
 
Table 4 reveals that the average real hourly wages decreased from 2006 to 2011 by 
almost 21% on average in all regions.  The metropolitan area (Region I) and Regions III and VIII 
were least affected, with 14.5%, 8.6% and 8.6% reductions, respectively; while the most affected 
are regions II and VII with real wage reductions of 35.7% and 41.3%, respectively. According to 
the ILO’s argument presented before, the reduction of the real wage may respond to reductions 
of production. In this context, in 2010, the production of the agriculture industry (predominant 
in almost all regions) reported a reduction as a consequence of the combination of two natural 
factors that destroyed good part of the production; the tropical storm Agatha -through it 
constant and heavy raining- and the activity of the Pacaya volcano -through the ejection of 
debris and ashes. (BANGUAT, 2011) Those natural events affected negatively most the 
productivity of workers in such industry, which represents the 47% of the occupation of the 
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workers in Guatemala leading to the deterioration of wages of the agriculture industry. Also, 
from 2008 to 2010, the industry of construction registered a decrease in its production in real 
terms of about 16% per year, which remarked the post-crisis period lived in the country as a 
result of the international crisis in 2007 discussed above.  The former are punctual descriptions 
of the elements that impacted negatively the real wages; however, for the rest of the period 
under analysis and for the rest of industries, the statistics show a different scenario where the 
production reported by BANGUAT (2012), and prices (reported by INE, 2012) increased at 
higher rate than the growth of nominal wages reported in ENCOVI 2006 and 2011; in fact in the 
period 2006-2011 nominal wages increased 9% in total, the real GDP has an accumulated 
growth of 18%, and prices registered a total accumulated increase of 32%. Thus, wages are 
affected not only by those negative factors described before, but by the inability (or inflexibility) 
to fit with the economic growth of their regions.   
 
                                    Table 4. Average real hourly wages per region. 
                                    In US dollars 
                                    Years 2006 and 2011 
Region 2006 2011 Change in % 
Region I  0.64   0.54  -14.5% 
Region II  0.51   0.33  -35.7% 
Region III  0.47   0.43  -8.6% 
Region IV  0.39   0.31  -20.3% 
Region V  0.55   0.44  -19.2% 
Region VI  0.50   0.37  -24.9% 
Region VII  0.52   0.30  -41.3% 
Region VIII  0.47   0.43  -8.6% 
                                       Source: INE, 2012 (ENCOVI 2006, 2011) 
 
In addition, the spatial distribution of wages for 2006 and 2011 are shown in figures 7 
and 8.  The wages are normalized with the average of real wages of Region I, indicating that all 
regions’ real wages are below the average wages of the metropolitan area; however, Region IV 
is the furthest behind in both years, 2006 and 2011, while Regions II and VII showed a 
deterioration of their average of wages compared to those in the metropolitan area in 2011. As 
regards the region IV, this is characterized for being a poor region where most of the dwellers 
are Ladinos and live under subsistence conditions, the technology applied to the production 
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process is limited and most of the economic activity is dedicated to agriculture. (SEGEPLAN, 
2012) The Region II and VII have mostly indigenous population, where a big portion of them 
live under self-sufficiency conditions. (IDIES, 2012) The most important economic activity is the 
production of beans and corn, and very few people dedicate to the manufacturing industry to 
produce candies and agro-manufacturing2 goods. (SEGEPLAN, 2012) Therefore, wages in those 
regions are more susceptible to local labor conditions in which very few people is privileged for 
having a “decent job”3; thus, one may assume that unfair wages are imposed by employers, 
while the existence of high competition for few decent jobs positions are underlying their labor 
markets. 
 
 
Figure 7. Spatial distribution of average real wages 
in Guatemala. Year: 2006 
Source: Own elaboration with ENCOVI-2006 data. 
 
Figure 8. Spatial distribution of average real wages 
in Guatemala. Year: 2011 
Source: Own elaboration with ENCOVI-2011 data. 
 
 
As regards the unemployment rate reported by INE, the average of all of the regions 
reported an increase of 0.6 percentage points, increasing from 2.8% in 2006 to 3.2% in 2011.    
                                                     
2 The agro-manufacturing industry dedicates to transform agricultural goods into finished commodities for market, for 
instance canned food and coffee mill. 
3 Decent job is referred as the job position inside the formal sector, which includes besides the wage other economic 
benefits. 
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           Figure 9. Unemployment Rate per region.  
            Year 2006.  
Source: Own elaboration with ENCOVI-2006 data. 
 
Figure 10. Unemployment Rate per region.  
Year 2011.  
Source: Own elaboration with ENCOVI-2011 data. 
 
From 2006 to 2011, the unemployment rate in Regions II and VI increased by two 
percentage points, even as other parts of the country registered almost no increase.  However, 
by 2011 the regions with the highest unemployment rates were Regions I, II and VI, which had 
values of 4.9%, 4.4% and 4.3%, respectively; the other regions registered an average 
unemployment rate of 2.7%.  It is important to notice that besides the Region I (the metropolitan 
area), Region VI is the second densest region of the country, and the second most populated 
region; while Region II has the second most populated department on the country (Alta 
Verapaz). These facts suggest some degree of tightness in their markets, which may play an 
important role in their wage determination as seen next chapters. 
 Concerning the underemployment rate, ENCOVI 2006 and 2011 report that on national 
average, this labor market condition is of 58% and 67%, respectively.  The most important 
characteristic is that underemployment has increased systematically in all regions.  This 
situation has been spurred by the increases of regions I and V as they reported the largest 
increases with changes of 0.15 and 0.16 percentage points, respectively.  Finally, the regions of 
VI and VII  are the ones with highest underemployment as these regions are characterized for 
being one of the most poorest areas of the country. 
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           Figure 11. Underemployment Rate per region.  
            Year 2006.  
Source: Own elaboration with ENCOVI-2006 data. 
 
Figure 12. Underemployment Rate per region.  
Year 2011.  
Source: Own elaboration with ENCOVI-2011 data. 
 
 
2.3 Migration, poverty and education Guatemala 
Guatemala is a lower-middle-income country with high social and economic inequality.  It has a 
Gini coefficient of 53.7, rating it one of the most unequal countries in the world (World Bank, 
2012). At a national level, in 2011, INE reports that more than 62% of the population lives below 
the poverty line (see figure 13). Also, ENCOVI-2011 reveals that in terms of income distribution, 
the bottom 20% of the population earned on average US$35 per month in 2011, while the 
highest 20% reported average earnings of US$714 per month, more than twenty times higher 
than that of the lower group.  
Some studies (Bruni et al., 2009; Adams, 2005; Vasquez, 2011) have approached this issue 
by considering different segments of the population: i.e., by ethnic, gender, and regional 
groups. As regards ethnic inequality, there are four official cultures—Maya, Garífuna, Xinka 
and Ladino—that in turn are divided into 25 ethno-linguistic groups.  Twenty-three of these 
groups are of Mayan origin, representing about 40% of the total population (INE, 2012).  In this 
context, Adams (2005) and Vasquez (2011) show that such social differentiation in terms of 
wage differentials is most pronounced between the Ladino population and the rest of the 
population. Bruni et al. (2009) shows that the income inequality between both groups decreased 
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from 2000 to 2006, but that the differential is still large: in average and in real terms, indigenous 
workers earn 41% less than Ladinos. 
Regarding the inequality by gender groups, the wage gap between men and women is 
lower.  However, Bruni et al. (2009) explain this result is biased by arguing that women with 
lower levels of schooling tend to stay at home, while men with lower education tend to work 
outside the home at lower wages.  Thus, the wage differentials include the comparison between 
women with higher schooling levels (who earn better wages) and all men (including lower 
wage earners). Of course, this analysis is not arguing if women have the same opportunity of 
obtaining a job, but this is left out of context by the moment.  
Regarding regional differences, ENCOVI-2011 reveals that most regions have a total 
poverty rate greater than 50%, excepting regions I (17%) and V (47%). The poverty is primarily 
focused in both the north and northwest regions with more than 70% of people living in 
poverty; further, the southwest region of the country exhibits a poverty rate of more than 55% 
(ENCOVI-2011). As explained earlier, such conditions are a result of the aftermath of the civil 
war, during which period children were deprived of adequate education, and after which a lack 
of effective education policy practices produced poor educational quality and coverage among 
the same populations.   
Also, such spatial differences have led to internal migration.  In Guatemala, there is not 
enough statistical evidence to definitively determine internal migration figures (SEGEPLAN, 
2012) as the last census of population and housing was taken in 2002.  Nonetheless, post-2002, 
the two surveys of living standard measurement study (ENCOVI) have been conducted by 
authorities (2006 and 2011), and they can provide some indication of internal migration.  Table 5 
presents a construction of the distribution of internal migration by destination: Region I is by far 
the most important destination chosen by immigrants, and it receives more than 49% of the total 
migration flow.  This is confirmed by the revision of the 2011 world urbanization prospect, 
elaborated by the United Nations, which concluded that Guatemala has one of Latin America’s 
highest projected rates of urban growth, and is expected to see more than 50% of the population 
in urban areas before 2015.  This revelation positions Guatemala, nowadays, as one of only three 
Latin America countries that currently have less than 50% of the population living in urban 
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areas (United Nations, 2012).  ENCOVI (2011) reveals that out of the seven reasons4 for moving 
between departments, labor migration is second in importance, as people seek better job 
opportunities, better wages, and better labor conditions.  In general, the referenced reasons may 
correspond to the poverty conditions people have to deal with while living in the different 
regions.   
Table 5. Internal migration: the distribution of the internal 
migration by destination in percentage. Year 2011   
Region Department Distribution (%) 
Region I Guatemala 48.3% 
Region II Baja Verapaz 1.2% 
Region II Alta Verapaz 2.5% 
Region III El Progreso 3.3% 
Region III Izabal 5.8% 
Region III Zacapa NR 
Region III Chiquimula 2.1% 
Region IV Santa Rosa 1.7% 
Region IV Jalapa 1.2% 
Region IV Jutiapa 0.4% 
Region V Sacatepéquez 2.9% 
Region V Chimaltenango 2.5% 
Region V Escuintla 6.6% 
Region VI Sololá 0.4% 
Region VI Totonicapán 0.4% 
Region VI Quetzaltenango 6.2% 
Region VI Suchitepéquez 1.2% 
Region VI Retalhuleu NR 
Region VI San Marcos 1.7% 
Region VII Huehuetenango 2.5% 
Region VII El Quiche 2.1% 
Region VIII Petén 7.0% 
Total 
 
100.0% 
NR: No record of in-migration flows in 2011. 
Source: INE (ENCOVI, 2011) 
     
 
                                                     
4 ENCOVI 2011 presents eight answers in its survey to explain the reasons of the internal migration across departments. 
People answered in the following structure: 1) Labor reasons, 18%; 2) Studies, 3%; 3) Familiar reasons, 44%; 4) Health, 1%; 5) 
Marriage, 11%; 6) Housing, 11%; 7) Violence 6%; and 8) other, 6%.   
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                Figure 13. Percentage of total poverty by department in 2011.  
                 Source: Graph elaborated by INE (ENCOVI, 2011). 
Another characteristic of the Guatemalan economy is a dependency on remittances. 
There are an estimated 1.1 million Guatemalans living in other countries (Caballeros, 2013); the 
money they send home each year has represented about 10% of the GDP of Guatemala since 
2002 (BANGUAT, 2014).  Funkhouser and Perez (1998) state that there are three effects one can 
expect to see on those receiving such remittances: more people will abandon the labor force, 
women (spouses of migrants) will increasingly participate in the labor market, and 
unemployment will have less effect on the wage rates in regions where remittances are greater, 
as people will be less concerned about their incomes.  Hence, remittances can be considered to 
be the reservation wage of the beneficiaries, who will have the opportunity to decide the length 
of time they prefer to spend not participating in the labor force or the amount of time they want 
to take to look for a desirable job. There are an estimated 3.5 million people receiving the 
benefits of such remittances (Dalmasso, 2005), and, as a consequence, whether the rest of the 
other social and economic conditions of the places are kept constant, then the open 
unemployment and the informal sector have the potential to be reduced (Funkhouser, 1997a). 
In sum, the labor market of Guatemala is characterized by having low open 
unemployment but very high participation rate of labor in the informal sector.  As in many 
developing countries, Guatemala does not have an unemployment benefits policy, meaning that 
workers are forced to accept improper labor conditions to maintain subsistence, or in the best 
cases, workers would complement their income through remittances.  Furthermore, most 
regions report having lower wages than in the metropolitan area (Region I) that, according to 
some studies, is a consequence from workers having an inadequate education.  The wage 
25 
 
differentials incentivize people to migrate to the metropolitan area as reported in ENCOVI-
2011.  Consequently, Region I is the most important destination for internal migration, where 
population density is greater and the unemployment rate is the higher.  Therefore, people take 
the risk of moving toward the metropolitan area despite not being certain of getting a job, yet 
there is an expectation of having more opportunities for obtaining a job or doing business.   
Finally, the low productivity of the country, the inflexibility of wages during prosperous 
years, the economic and social inequality of the regions, and the informal sector delivers a 
framework to study in the present paper. Explicitly, this context creates expectations about role 
of the regional economic inequalities on the internal migration in the country, where the 
metropolitan area represents the place with more opportunities for people for doing business or 
for obtaining better jobs.  Also, the local labor conditions may influence the wage determination 
in which firms have relative power given by the combination of the predominant labor 
informality in the regions and the very low number of job positions of decent jobs. Thus, such 
conditions make workers -with the desire of having a decent job- to accept deplorable level of 
wages. Given these arguments, this research aims, as general objective, to provide an evaluation 
of them, in which Chapter 4 offers the theoretical background that explains each of the elements 
of the present context that gives later the foundations of the research inquiries in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 3:   Wage equations and spatial implications 
Wage equations may be characterized as partial equilibrium models intended to represent the 
relationship between labor and wages.  The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the 
most relevant wage equation formulations that can promote the understanding, in different 
dimensions of analysis, of the motivations of economic agents (workers and firms) to move 
between regions due to differences in labor market conditions.  The models discussed are the 
Harris and Todaro model, the NEG wage equation, the wage curve of Blanchflower and 
Oswald, and the Mortensen and Pissarides model.  They are the most influential models in 
literature of wage equations that link migration and labor conditions.  
3.1 The Harris and Todaro Model 
Harris and Todaro (1970) seek to evaluate rural-to-urban migration patterns in response to 
economic incentives. They argue that, despite having positive marginal product in agriculture 
in developing countries, people still move to cities where unemployment is higher. The authors 
assert that there is a positive relationship between wages and unemployment levels, a 
phenomenon that can be justified by the compensation differentials idea.  A higher wage in the 
urban area will compensate for the risk of not obtaining a job in the city. Thus, in seeking an 
explanation for, they decide to discard neoclassic assumptions, such as full employment and 
wage-price flexibility.  Their work also assumes the existence of a minimum urban wage, which 
is expected to be higher than agricultural wages. The former is an incentive for the labor force to 
move into such area, and will result in excess supply labor.  Forces of the market then operate, 
tending to adjust wages downward until they are equal to the agricultural sector.  Such 
equilibrium is a result of migration flows that manifests itself in urban population 
concentrations and higher urban unemployment.   
This seminal model considers the study of the migration of workers within an economic 
system with two sectors, urban and rural.  These sectors are differentiated by the type of final 
production, technology and wage determination.  The model uses a Cobb-Douglas production 
function for both sectors - agriculture and manufacturing goods. 
𝑌𝑎 = 𝐴𝑎𝐿𝑎
𝛼  (1)  
 
𝑌𝑚 = 𝐴𝑚𝐿𝑚
𝛽
 (2)  
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 In equations (1) and (2), 𝑌𝑎  and 𝑌𝑚 are the production levels of the agricultural goods 
and manufacturing goods, respectively; 𝐿𝑎  and 𝐿𝑚 represent the units of labor from each sector; 
and, 𝐴𝑎 > 0  and 𝐴𝑚 > 0 are parametric constants. Both produced goods and labor belong in 
their respective perfectly competitive markets.  However, when referring to wages, one segment 
of the urban wages are institutionally determined by the minimum wage, while rural wages are 
flexible and are determined by the marginal productivity of labor. 
𝑤𝑎 = 𝛼𝐴𝑎𝐿𝑎
𝛼−1𝑝 (3)  
𝑤𝑚 = 𝛽𝐴𝑚𝐿𝑚
𝛽−1
 (4)  
 
Equations (3) and (4) contain 𝑤𝑎  and 𝑤𝑚, which represent the real wage in the 
agriculture sector (relative to manufacturing goods), and the minimum wage in the urban 
sector.  In addition, 𝑝 is the relative price of the agricultural good that it is determined by the 
following expression: 
𝑝 = 𝜌 (
𝑌𝑚
𝑌𝑎
)
𝛾
 (5)  
Here,  𝜌 > 0 and 𝛾 > 0  are parametric constants, in which 𝛾  represents the price 
elasticity with respect of the ratio  
𝑌𝑚
𝑌𝑎
.  Finally, the total labor in the economy (𝐿) is constant 
during the period of analysis.  Labor in manufacturing (𝐿𝑚) is smaller than the total population 
in the urban area (𝐿𝑢), while labor in agriculture sector (𝐿𝑎) is fully employed.  Thus: 
𝐿𝑎 + 𝐿𝑢 = 𝐿,      where 𝐿𝑢 > 𝐿𝑚 (6)  
 
In order to obtain the short run equilibrium, equation (4) can be rearranged to generate 
the employment level in the manufacturing sector, as expressed in equation (7); in turn, this is 
incorporated into equation (2) in order to obtain the production level of the manufacturing 
sector (equation 8). 
𝐿𝑚 = (
𝛽𝐴𝑚
𝑤𝑚
)
1
1−𝛽
  (7)  
𝑌𝑚 = 𝐴𝑚
1
1−𝛽
(
𝛽
𝑤𝑚
)
𝛽
1−𝛽
 (8)  
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In order to obtain agricultural production, equation (6) is rearranged and incorporated 
into equation (1) as follows:  
𝐿𝑎 = 𝐿 − 𝐿𝑢 (9)  
𝑌𝑎 = 𝐴𝑎(𝐿 − 𝐿𝑢)
𝛼 (10)  
 
As noted earlier, equation (5) represents the relative price of agricultural goods in 
manufacturing terms.  This relationship can be understood using the terms of trade between the 
sectors, and by incorporating it into the new production equations (8 and 10), the trade is 
determined as follows: 
𝑝 = 𝜌
(
 
 𝐴𝑚
1
1−𝛽
(
𝛽
𝑤𝑚
)
𝛽
1−𝛽
𝐴𝑎(𝐿 − 𝐿𝑢)𝛼
)
 
 
𝛾
 (11)  
Equation (11) is used, together with equation (3) and (9), to obtain the wage equation for 
the rural sector in manufacturing terms:  
𝑤𝑎 = 𝛼𝜌𝐴𝑎
1−𝛾𝐴𝑚
𝛾
1−𝛽
(
𝛽
𝑤𝑚
)
𝛽𝛾
1−𝛽
(𝐿 − 𝐿𝑢)
𝛼(1−𝛾)−1  (12)  
 
The expression (12) is the short-run equilibrium.  It indicates that the rural wage reacts 
to shocks in the urban sector that, in turn, motivates people to move across sectors and hence 
regions.  In order for migration to flow from the rural to the urban area two situations need to 
occur; first, the difference between the wages of urban and rural sectors must be positive 
(𝑤𝑚 > 𝑤𝑎), and secondly, people make predictions before moving by considering an expected 
[minimum] urban wage (𝑤𝑢
𝑒).  Thus, over the long run, Harris and Todaro assert that the 
equilibrium condition is found when it satisfies the equality between the expected [minimum] 
urban wage and the rural wage (𝑤𝑢
𝑒 = 𝑤𝑎).  In the literature, the former expression is known as 
the Harris-Todaro condition.  For the expected urban wage, the authors define it as: 
𝑤𝑢
𝑒 =
𝐿𝑚
𝐿𝑢
𝑤𝑚 (13)  
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where the ratio 
𝐿𝑚
𝐿𝑢
  is the probability that a worker living in the urban sectors obtains a 
job in this sector.  The authors add that when this equilibrium condition is reached, the 
proportion of the population in the urban area is 𝑙∗ = 𝐿𝑢
∗ /𝐿, and this can be found by integrating 
equations (12) and (13) on the Harris-Todaro condition as follows: 
𝐿𝑚
𝐿𝑢
𝑤𝑚 − 𝛼𝜌𝐴𝑎
1−𝛾𝐴𝑚
𝛾
1−𝛽
(
𝛽
𝑤𝑚
)
𝛽𝛾
1−𝛽
(𝐿 − 𝐿𝑢)
𝛼(1−𝛾)−1 = 0 (14)  
 
Finally, the authors argue that in order to guarantee the stability of the equilibrium 
condition, the following mechanism (function 𝜓) must be accomplished:   
𝐿𝑢 = 𝜓(𝑤𝑢
𝑒 −𝑤𝑎),              𝜓
′ > 0,                𝜓(0) = 0 (15)  
 
In sum, the decision to migrate depends on expected rather than actual urban-rural 
wage differential, which in turn depends on the probability to find a job in the urban area. As it 
is proved in many papers (see Todaro, 1980), there is an apparent paradox in the migration 
rationale in developing countries. The higher the expected wage differential, the more people is 
attracted to the urban area, and hence the greater the unemployment in such places. This is a 
result of a temporal saturation of labor market in which suppliers, mostly unskilled migrants, 
struggle for finding a job in the city. Consequently, unfortunate workers are forced to supply 
their labor to part time jobs, which in most of the cases the conditions are squalid due to the lack 
of labor benefits such as social security insurance, unhealthy environments, low wages, etc. 
These elements characterize the informal sector, which is highly present in developing 
countries. (Baltagi et al., 2012; Ramos et al., 2010) Therefore, the decision of moving must include 
not only the expected wage differential between urban and rural areas or the probability of 
finding a new job in the urban area, but the probability of being hired or working in the 
informal sector.  
The temporal saturation of the labor market is induced by the job creation in the urban 
area; Harris and Todaro (1970) point out that once a new job position is open in the urban area, 
this will induce to more than one worker in the rural area to emigrate. This brings policy 
implications, for instance this assertion can be proved as seen in chapter 5 of this research, 
where is stated that in Guatemala, the policy of public infrastructure investment is bias toward 
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the most developed municipalities of the country, in which the metropolitan area is the most 
favored. This situation incentives people and firms to move into such an area, which may 
induce to create new jobs positions, which in turn influences again the internal migration, and 
so on. Thus, regional inequalities in job creation may bring saturation in the labor supply, but if 
the labor market is not ready to receive it, then the original job creation will trigger more urban 
unemployment or more informal labor; so “the solution to urban unemployment would not be 
urban employment creation” (Fields, 2007).  Alternatively, a policy of rural development aimed 
to increase rural wages would help to reduce the rural-urban migration. Fields (2007) shows 
through the empirical evidence in Kenya that an increase of minimum wages in the rural area in 
this country led to reduce the flows of migration to the urban areas, and hence it helped to 
reduce the unemployment; however, such type of policy action does not provide similar results 
in other countries. For instance, in Guatemala the minimum wage has been in frequently review 
by the authorities each year, dictating increases for both sectors the agriculture and non-
agriculture.  The wage differential between both minimum wages is zero (see figure 6 in chapter 
2), and one should expect to observe some reductions in the flows of internal migration, 
something that in reality is not happening5. United Nations (2012) argues that Guatemala is one 
of the countries with the highest rate of urbanization in Latin America. Thus, any policy 
mechanism such as the minimum wage should be accompanied by the strengthened of the state 
institutions of the country.  
  
3.2 Krugman’s Wage Equation 
The roots of the new economic geography (NEG) reflect the relationship between nominal 
wages in a monopolistically competitive sector and some measure of market access or market 
potential.  Krugman, who was inspired by the Dixit and Stiglitz model (1977), developed this 
theory based on transportation costs, manufacturing sector location, and demand for 
manufactured goods.  The theoretical assumptions of the model are based on the pecuniary 
externalities reflected in imperfect equilibrium, increasing returns and monopolistic 
competition.  This model is considered to be a full general-equilibrium model in the sense that it 
is the price system that plays the crucial task of equilibrating agents’ decisions.  In addition, the 
                                                     
5 The central government in Guatemala is in charge of enforcing minimum wages, and may be failing for not having strict 
monitoring controls.  
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geographical distributions of population, demand and supply of goods and services are 
considered to be endogenous, meaning that such elements create a platform that helps 
determine the location decisions that agents make during the production process or investment 
decisions that, in turn, allow for the prediction of agglomeration or the divergence processes. 
The model essentially predicts that concentration will occur if a combination of increasing 
returns to scale and low transportation costs coexist.  
Indeed, the new economic geography (NEG) is an appealing theory for explaining 
spatial variations in economic development.  Its origins are to be found in rival theories that 
may account for spatial variations with the purpose of offering explanations for economic 
growth.  One of the most representative mainstream approaches is the neoclassical theory, and 
it is based on three assumptions.  First, the level of technology is assumed to be given and 
exogenously determined.  Secondly, the production function shows constant returns to scale 
with a given technology. Thirdly, the production factors have diminishing marginal products.  
Given these assumptions, the neoclassical theory indicates that economic growth eventually 
converges in a steady state.  Nonetheless, this theory has been criticized because there is not 
enough empirical evidence to substantiate the theoretical results.  Besides, the theory cannot 
explain why a region with similar socioeconomic characteristics to other regions, grows at a 
different rate (McCallum, 1996).  In addition, Krugman (1998) states that while neoclassical 
theory insists upon relying on the invisible-hand, the NEG postulates that “spatial structure 
emerges from invisible hand processes.”  
A second contending theory, the endogenous growth theory, changes the neoclassical 
paradigm by incorporating elements that are potentially responsible, at least in part, for the 
economic development of a region.  These elements are local resources that are potentially 
usable in a production process, such as human capital, technology and research and 
development.  Some of the representative authors of the theory are Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988).  They promote, through microeconomic foundations, the importance of the role of 
human capital in the transmission of knowledge and innovations through the spillover effects 
that, in turn, lead to the economic development process.  The rationale for this process requires 
workforce skills that rely on the allocation of local resources for transmitting the information in 
a tacit format across space.  The most important implication of the last argument is that some 
form of knowledge is transmitted through human capital in the region, implying that the more 
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the [linked] human capital in the region there is, the greater the transmission of knowledge, and 
the greater the influence on the economic development process.  Indeed, knowledge is not only 
a tacit force; it can also be materialized in technological innovations. Some authors (e.g., 
Alexiadis, 2013) believe that incorporating the spatial dimension in endogenous growth models 
leads to the emergence of a new tradition: the new economic geography.  
NEG theory provides a new dimension for understanding economic geography and 
location issues.  It provides a possible explanation for location decisions made by economic 
agents, as well as the economic growth of a region, by taking into account the heterogeneity of 
space, people and firms (Ottaviano, 2011).  In fact, some authors have defined that NEG model 
as the first successful attempt at explaining why similar regions do not register equal economic 
development.  In this sense, Ottaviano (2002) mentions that among the contributions NEG has 
provided, one can find the enlightenment regarding the importance of the notion of space by 
harmonizing the concepts of market proximity and production concentration.  NEG can explain 
such a relationship through the localized pecuniary externalities expressed in terms of the 
increasing returns to scale, trade costs, and monopolistic competition that prevail in each 
region. (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2001)  
NEG highlights the relative importance of the heterogeneity of space, and it provides 
explanation for the formation and self-enforcement of the spatial structure of the economy. As 
regards to heterogeneity, there are characteristics that go beyond the pecuniary externalities and 
they may represent restrictions on the circulation of the economic agents between locations; 
example would be, natural resources, proximity to natural means of communication, and 
climate.   There are other elements as well, such as the social and political conditions of the 
regions that include culture and education.  It is also important to consider the basic public 
infrastructure of the location that allows for the communication with other regions.  
As regards the spatial structure of the economy, the foundations of the NEG prove that 
the spatial concentration of economic activity is a consequence of the predominance of the 
market expansion effect over the market crowding effect.  This is what Ottaviano (2001) refers 
as the agglomeration process.  Baldwin, et al. (2003) explain the rationale of this process in three 
stages.  First, when the migration of workers and firms between regions respond to the forces of 
agglomeration, in which the process is known as market potential or the market access effect.  
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Economic agents respond to the initial economic conditions of the regions, that is, the region 
with higher wages and lower transportation cost will create an incentive for the economic 
agents of other regions to move into it.  The result is that the production of industrial goods is 
spurred and new jobs are created; this results in the reduction of the industrial price index and 
the cost of living in the centripetal-region.  This latter result corresponds to the second stage that 
is a self-reinforcing process where the cost of living is low because of the previously enhanced 
economic conditions. This condition attracts more firms and workers if other economic 
conditions, at least, remain unchanged.  The above discussion is clearly biased toward 
explaining the accumulation process that the stronger economic region will undergo during the 
agglomeration process.  However, the NEG model provides an explanation for the opposite 
effects.  The constant inflow of new migrant workers and firms will eventually create a 
congestion of economic agents in the region, and this situation brings about a higher level of 
competition among them.  The third stage involves a reduction of the profits of the firms.  Once 
market experiments produce such a reduction, the solution for survival involves reducing 
wages that also involves a reduction of relative wages with respect to other regions.  This will 
create an incentive for economic agents to look for another region that provides better economic 
conditions, a situation Baldwin, et al. (2003) call the market-crowding effect. 
3.2.1    The “NEG” wage equation and the market potential 
Prior to Krugman’s model, the formulation of the concept of market access, or market potential, 
was introduced by Harris (1954).  He defined it as the summation of markets accessible to a 
point discounted by their distances to the point.  It is an index that represents the possibilities of 
a firm or industry to serve a market from any given location.  Harris emphasizes the importance 
of manufacturing location in the United States in the agglomeration process. The model did not 
acquire widespread recognition due to its lack of microeconomic foundations, something that 
Krugman provided much later, in 1991.  
The Krugman’s model, typically referred to as the NEG model, involves two sectors and 
two regions. The sectors considered are the competitive sector (C) and the monopolistically 
competitive sector (M).  Finally, it is assumed that the monopolistic sector has transportation 
costs, whereas zero trade costs are assumed in the competitive sector.  The first assumption is 
that consumer preferences exhibit identical Cobb-Douglas functional forms, in which (𝛼) is the 
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expenditure share on manufactured goods, M is the quantity of manufacturing varieties, and C 
is a composite of the rest of the non-agricultural goods.  Thus, the utility function is defined as 
follows: 
𝑈(𝑀, 𝐶) = 𝑀𝛼𝐶(1−𝛼),       0 < 𝛼 < 1 (16)  
 
The variable M in equation (16) is a construction of a CES (constant elasticity of 
substitution) sub-utility function (see equation 17), where 𝑚(𝑘) represents the consumption of 
variety ‘𝑘’ of the manufactured goods, σ is the parameter of elasticity substitution between any 
pair of individual manufactured goods. 
𝑀 = [∑𝑚(𝑘)
(𝜎−1)
𝜎  
𝑁
𝑘=1
]
𝜎
(𝜎−1)
 
= [∑𝑚(𝑘)
1
𝜇 
𝑁
𝑘=1
]
𝜇 
 (17)  
 
 The theoretical model has two factors of production: the manufacturing labor (𝐿𝑀) and 
the rest of the non-agricultural labor (𝐿𝐶), and both are distributed in J regions (j = 1, 2… J). For 
manufacturing labor, there are increasing returns to scale, and these are represented through 
fixed and marginal costs (see equation 18).  In addition, the production of (𝐶) comes about 
under constant returns to scale.  Therefore, it is assumed that units of labor are set equal to 
production.  Thus: 
𝐿𝑀𝑗𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑄𝑀𝑗𝑘 (18)  
𝐿𝐶𝑗 = 𝑄𝐶𝑗 (19)  
 
An additional assumption is that trade among regions occurs under an iceberg transport 
cost function, meaning that a portion of the good that is shipped will not arrive at the 
destination locale, and this portion will vary depending on the nature of the good and the 
distance that the good is transported.  In equation (20),  𝑑𝑖𝑗   is the distance between 
locales  𝑖  and  𝑗, and 𝜏 the unit transport cost, which is assumed to be one. 
𝑇𝑖𝑗 = (𝜏𝑑𝑖𝑗)
−2 (20)  
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Workers have an incentive to move into other regions when their real wages are less 
than those found in the locale to which they want to move.  This flow of migration stops when 
real wages are equal in all regions.  In equation (21), 𝑊 is the nominal wage, while 𝐺 is set as the 
price index for manufactures. 
𝑊𝑖
𝐺𝑖
𝜇 =
𝑊𝑗
𝐺𝑗
𝜇 (21)  
 
The Krugman model suggests that the geographical distribution of industry influences 
real wages.  This implies that linkages among economic agents are responsible for the spatial 
concentration of workers and firms.  For instance, when concentrations of firms occur, the 
manufacturing good price declines; in turn, this is reflected in an increase in real wages.  This 
situation induces mobile workers to move to the region where real wages are higher -- this is 
the forward linkage effect.  On the other hand, locales with high numbers of workers are the 
center of attraction for firms.  A region with an abundance of labor is perceived by firms to be 
an attractive production site, with workers being rewarded with higher wages (backward 
linkages).  The forces of attraction explained above are considered to be the self-reinforced 
mechanism of spatial concentration.  In Myrdal’s rationale, this is the mechanism of circular and 
cumulative causation.  
In order to appreciate the nature of the general equilibrium model, let equation (22) be 
the price index of the manufacturing sector, where 𝜆  represents the share of the varieties on the 
manufacturing sector in region  𝑖.  This equation depends on the wages of the sector (𝑤𝑖) and on 
the transportation or trade costs of the sector (𝑇𝑖𝑗), and both of these variables are influenced by 
the elasticity of substitution (𝜎).   
𝐺𝑗
𝑀 = [∑𝜆𝑖(𝑤𝑖
𝑀𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑀)
1−𝜎
𝑅
𝑖=1
]
1
1−𝜎
 (22)  
 
Therefore, in equilibrium, the wage rate is represented as follows: 
𝑤𝑗
𝑀 = [∑𝑌𝑖
𝑅
𝑖=1
(𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑀)
1−𝜎
(𝐺𝑖
𝑀)
𝜎−1
]
(1/𝜎)
= (𝑃𝑀)
1
𝜎 (23)  
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Equation (23) is the so-called nominal wage equation, and it represents the short-run 
equilibrium of wages driven by the entry and exit of firms, which causes firms to have zero 
profits.  This equation explains the function of the market access or market potential concept, 
which is positively related to the level of income (𝑌) and negatively related to the price indexes 
(𝐺) of the surrounding regions that are weighted by the decreasing function of the 
transportation costs (𝑇𝑖𝑗).  Prices and transportation costs are influenced by the elasticity of 
substitution (𝜎) between the varieties (through the price index) and regions (through the 
transport cost).   
Krugman (1991) proposed that the wage equation is part of the new economic 
geography’s core.  The essence of the statement highlights the relationship between market 
access and wages, in which the first variable was proven in empirical research to be the driver 
of wage variations (Baldwin, 2003; Head and Mayer, 2004).  Some authors argue for caution in 
the evaluation of both variables.  First, Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) claimed that empirical 
research should not be used to test such relationships by comparing the NEG model against 
alternative models of agglomeration. Instead, they should complement their results.  Secondly, 
Fingleton (2011) mentions that spatial scales matter, and NEG will not always have enough 
explanatory power to describe economic behavior within countries or at low levels of regional 
aggregation.  The justification for this can be found in Redding and Venables (2004), who 
explain that the market access or market potential effect is constant over short distances, and 
thus cannot explain abrupt changes in wage rates.  Despite such caveats, this theory is used as a 
means of measuring the forces of attraction of the agglomeration patterns in Guatemala.  The 
former statements pose some warning in the expectation of the results of this paper; however, 
there is a need to use NEG to analyze the geographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 
Guatemala because the model can capture such particularities, and has the advantage of 
capturing the heterogeneity of the places.  
 
3.3 The Wage Curve 
The wage curve hypothesis is referred to as the negative relationship between local 
unemployment and wages.  Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1994, 1995, and 2005) proposed the 
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existence of an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and wages.  This idea 
contradicts the neoclassical literature about the labor supply function, which argues the 
existence of the opposite relationship, such as the model from Harris and Todaro (1970) that 
established it.  In order to provide a theoretical basis, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) 
examined non-competitive labor market behavior, including efficiency wages and bargaining 
models.  Afterwards, multiple researchers tested the wage curve hypothesis for different 
regions and countries. The general conclusion is that a relationship between both variables 
exists and is negative (Nijkamp and Poot, 2005).  
The wage curve hypothesis empirically proved that the best way to support its 
downward shape curve is by using non-competitive labor theories.  The counterargument says 
that if a labor market was competitive, the inequality and the regional economic divergence 
should be a transitional phenomenon.  Thus, one can argue that the former would be true if 
factor mobility and interregional trade diminished personal and spatial differences over the 
long run, but the empirical evidence shows the contrary (Blanchflower, 2000; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1994, 2005; Card, 1995).  Therefore, local market structure determines the conditions in 
which firms and workers interact with each other.  For instance, under monopsonistic or 
oligopsonistic competition, firms enjoy free entry to participate in competition, but such 
initiation comes with some constraints including start-up costs, recruitment and training.  On 
the other hand, workers face job search costs, commuting costs, and migration costs.  Longhi, et 
al. (2004) explain that in such labor markets, one expects to observe wages and unemployment 
being inversely related because either bargaining power or a unilateral wage set-up is imposed 
that is strengthened by the forces of agglomeration (Sato, 2000).  
The wage curve (Figure 14) is a relationship between local unemployment and wages.  
Blanchflower and Oswald proposed in 1990 that wages are a decreasing convex function of the 
unemployment rate.  Since then, many studies have attempted to prove such a relationship.  
The first group of studies shows that there is an elasticity of about -0.1 in each of over 40 
countries (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005).  This means that a worker can expect to earn 1% 
less in real terms when the unemployment rate increases by 10%, with all other factors 
remaining constant.  The former is a set of the empirical results that provide evidence that wage 
curve theory is indeed possible.  Thus, for the precise and stable results across this group of 
studies on the topic, the proposal became popular among scholars, and was known as the 
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empirical “law” of wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990, 1994, 1995, 2005; Card, 1995; 
Baltagi and Blien, 1998; Buettner, 1999; Nijkamp and Poot, 2005; Longhi, et al., 2006; Baltagi, et 
al., 2010).  The second generation of research did not focus on the particular elasticity of -0.1, but 
rather on the proof that the wage curve was indeed a negative relationship between paid 
salaries and unemployment in a particular region or nation.  Those studies suggest the existence 
of evidence showing imperfect competitive wage determination where firms are not wage 
takers, but rather determine wages based on the local unemployment level.  In simpler words: 
“A worker who is employed in an area of high unemployment earns less than an identical 
individual who works in a region with low joblessness.” (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994)   
 
 
Figure 14. An illustration of the wage curve 
 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) argue that through an examination of the results it is 
possible to assert that every country has its own wage curve.  This argument was not 
challenged because there were very few cases (Albaek, et al., 1999; Lucifora and Origo, 1999; 
Patridge and Rickman, 1997) that presented results that contradicted the significance and slope 
of the wage curve.  The wage curve hypothesis seems to be generally accepted, but most 
research does not address social or regional differences within countries.  For example, Card 
(1995) points out that the elasticity of the wage curve is quite different among different 
population groups, such as males and females, poorly-educated and highly- educated people, 
urban and rural areas, unskilled and skilled people, and younger and older people.   
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When the wage curve notion was initially presented, the authors considered it to be a 
break with traditional macroeconomics analysis because it uses microeconomics tools and data 
to answer a macroeconomic question (Card, 1995).  This led to a debate about what the wage 
curve really is, and why it is usually confused with, and compared to other labor theories.  For 
instance, the wage curve is not a Phillips curve.  The Phillips curve is a negative relationship 
between the rate of change of wages and current unemployment rate, while the wage curve 
measures the level of wages against the unemployment rate (Montuenga & Ramos, 2005). 
Another case is that the wage curve is not a labor supply function; the debate arises in 
discussing why unemployment, in the short run, is considered to be part of the labor supply. 
Therefore, when considering the short run, unemployment and employment are almost mirror 
images, and the curve would be almost the same, while exhibiting an upward-sloping function. 
The foundation of the labor supply function rest on the compensating differentials proposed 
originally by Adams Smith.  This theory argues that over the long run, labor markets may 
experience different unemployment rates.  The former suggests that workers are prone to move 
to where the labor conditions are better.  Hence, in equilibrium, employers belonging to a 
market with deteriorating conditions will adjust wages by increasing them in order to provide 
an incentive for workers to remain there.  The last argument responds to the hypothesis of 
compensating differentials.  The first authors in formalize such argument are Harris and Todaro 
(1970) and Hall (1970).  
Thus, the wage curve hypothesis appears to contradict the theory of compensating 
differentials.  However, it is important to recognize the existence of fundamental differences 
between both approaches.  First, the wage curve – as seen in subsequent paragraphs - uses fixed 
effects to capture the permanent level of unemployment of a given labor market.  The result is 
that the wage curve concerns the effect of contemporaneous unemployment on wages, while 
the compensating differentials concern the effect of expected unemployment on wages. 
Townsend (2005) adds that such configurations can influence the negative relationship between 
wages and contemporaneous unemployment rate, as well as have a positive relationship with 
respect to expected unemployment.   
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3.3.1  Representation of the Wage curve 
The Mincerian equation was originally formulated to capture the determinants of earnings, 
including human capital characteristics such as education, skills and experience (Mincer, 1974).  
This is the most common approach when estimating the wage curve, when unemployment rate 
is added to the Mincerian wage.  Equation (24) illustrates this proposition, where 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡  is the 
wage of the person “i” observed in the labor market “r” in the period “t”; 𝑈𝑟𝑡  is the 
unemployment rate of the labor market “r” at the time “t”; 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡  is a set of characteristics of the 
individual “i”, which includes information about experience, education, race, gender, etc.; 
𝑓𝑟 and 𝑔𝑡  are fixed effects for each labor market and time periods, respectively and finally, the 
error term 𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡.  
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡) = 𝛽 ln(𝑈𝑟𝑡) + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝑓𝑟 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡 (24)  
 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) define the labor market as an economic sector or as a 
geographical space.  Thus, 𝛽 is the elasticity that defines the wage curve in a particular labor 
market “r,” has been empirically determined to have a value near to -0.1. 
3.3.2  Problems with the Blanchflower and Oswald approach 
Despite its popularity, the model has some drawbacks.  The first drawback is the simultaneity 
bias.  The discussion centers on causality between wages and unemployment, which in turn 
leads to a bias estimation. The theory argues that unemployment inversely determines wages. 
However, the contrary can be depicted within the supply and demand framework, which 
discusses that high wages generate an excess supply of labor, and hence leads to a rise of 
unemployment.  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) address this problem by using instrument 
variables such as weather, industry mix, lagged unemployment, spending, etc.  Their 
conclusion is that the wage curve elasticities obtained with these variables are very similar to 
the one used in equation (24), and hence the variable of unemployment can be used as an 
exogenous one.  
Another problem is the common-group effects.  The argument focuses on the fact that 
the unemployment rate is a more aggregated variable than individual wages.  For that reason, 
the statistical significance tends to be overestimated (Moulton, 1986).  In that sense, individuals 
can share a component of the variance that cannot be attributed to the variables of 
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unemployment or the set of individual characteristics.  Therefore two things can be expected:  
one, a positive correlation between error components and individuals in same market, and, two, 
the standard error of the estimation of the elasticity of unemployment will be too small.  
The solution to this problem is to consider an econometric estimation of the average of 
wages of the labor market (𝑤𝑟𝑡) against the unemployment rate of the labor market (𝑈𝑟𝑡) and 
some control variables (𝑋𝑟𝑡) (See equation (25)).  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) evaluate this 
approach compared with the one from equation (24) and obtained similar results. 
ln(𝑤𝑟𝑡) = 𝛽 ln(𝑈𝑟𝑡) + 𝛿𝑋𝑟𝑡 + 𝑓𝑟 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡 (25)  
 
A third concern to discuss is the form in which wages are measured, particularly the 
way in which Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) measured the wage curve for the U.S.  In this 
regard, the authors use information represented by annual earnings to analyze the elasticity of 
the wage curve.  This produces an analysis of the above explanatory variables not against 
wages, but rather against the hours/year and earnings/hour.  Therefore, there is no certainty 
about estimates of the elasticity of the wage curve because it could respond to the measure of 
either or both earnings and hours of work; in other words, rather than finding the wage curve, 
they may have found the hours curve. (Card, 1995)   
3.3.3  Foundation of the negative slope: Three models of the labor market 
The mainstays of the wage curve hypothesis were originally constructed using three theories in 
cases where the higher regional unemployment rate depresses regional wages.  These models 
are the labor contract model, the bargaining model, and the efficiency wage model. 
 
3.3.3.1  Labor contract model 
This model asserts that workers are paid under competitive conditions.  The explanation is 
based on research by Baily (1977) and Azariadis (1975). They state that a contractual 
relationship between firms and workers is the optimal way to deal with immobility and product 
market uncertainty.  In principle, this mechanism maximizes the joint welfare of employer and 
employees pertaining to the contract curve model with an upward slope involving wages and 
employment.  However, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) argue that the curve is a construction 
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of a quasi-supply curve, in which is assumed to have risk-adverse employees and neutral-risk 
firms whose behavior explains the negative slope. For instance, as regards non-pecuniary 
characteristics, the authors argue that the utility of dwellers is determined by the combination 
of wages and non-pecuniary (leisure) benefits.  Firms in regions with better non-pecuniary 
conditions tend to pay lower wages because they know people are content with the conditions 
that the locale provides (Roback, 1982), besides the authors assume that government is paying 
benefits to laid-off people. Dwellers are consequently less motivated to take the job.  On the 
contrary, firms in locales where living conditions are unpleasant tend to pay higher wages, so 
more people are disposed to seek work.  Therefore, each locale represents a point in the 
distribution of wages and unemployment that ends up creating the shape of a negatively sloped 
curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994, page 47).  
In spite of this argument, the contractual model is the weakest to explain the wage curve 
because there is not empirical evidence of causality between wages and unemployment (Card, 
1995). The relationship between wages and unemployment is not causal, and both variables are 
interdependent because wages can induce unemployment or vice versa based on the 
neoclassical idea; for instance, different regions have different social and economic conditions, 
and for that reason experience economic booms or slumps at different times (Chung and 
Hewings, 2014). Thus, under economic booms, firms maximize their profits that are restricted 
by their employees’ minimum requirements.  However, such maximization will be influenced 
by the probability of experiencing economic demand shocks in the locale where firms are 
situated, that is, during an economic boom period, a firm will hire as many workers as it 
requires.  During an economic slump period, firms will reduce their labor requirements.   
 
3.3.3.2  Bargaining model 
The bargaining model comes explains the condition in certain regions and countries where 
firms’ profits are shared with workers.  This assertion has two implications: there is a positive 
partial correlation between wages and profit sharing per employee, and there is a negative 
partial correlation between wages and unemployment (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994).  The 
model suggests that workers surrounded by a high degree of unemployment are not in any 
position to demand a larger share of the surplus of the firm.  This is the case due to the 
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uncertainty that workers face when searching for a new job after being dismissed, and this can 
discourage workers from demanding more from employers (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994); 
therefore, the higher the level of unemployment in the region, the lower the wage rate.  
A bargaining model is a process of a bilateral wage determination.  It includes three 
components: a second-best wage or salary in case negotiations break down, the bargaining 
power of employees, and the profit-sharing rights that workers may have in a given firm.  The 
key argument that supports the existence of a decreasing relationship between wages and 
unemployment rests on the second-best wage.  The authors explain that this alternative form of 
pay is an income expectation determined by the current wage (𝑤0), the benefits in the event that 
workers become jobless (b), and on the unemployment level (𝑈). The second best wage (𝑎) is 
represented as: 
𝑎 = 𝑏(𝑈) + 𝑤0(1 − 𝑈) = 𝑤0 +𝑈(𝑏 − 𝑤0) (26)  
 
The unemployment condition usually makes a job search more complicated, and leads 
workers to accept the second best pay.  However, one can argue that union workers have better 
opportunities than individual workers because unions have stronger bargaining power that 
may create a counter-balancing force during negotiations.  As regards the shape of the wage 
curve, employees with greater profit-sharing in a firm tend to experience a smaller 
unemployment elasticity of wages, which implies a steeper wage curve than in a locale with 
fewer unions.  Townsend (2005) adds that regions with more union workers are less susceptible 
to contemporaneous unemployment because the agreements reached between workers and 
employers usually last an average of three years.  The mathematical representation of this 
approach follows the functional form presented by Menil (1971), which is a Nash bargaining 
model:  
𝑤𝑟 ≅ 𝑎 +
𝜂
1 − 𝜂
.
𝜋
𝑛
 (27)  
 
The wage equation above indicates that the bargained wage 𝑤𝑟  is determined by the 
three components explained above. First, by the second best wage (𝑎), in cases where no 
agreement is reached, by the bargaining power of workers (𝜂), and by the share of profits that 
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workers have in the firm.  As a result, this type of model exhibits a negative relationship 
between wages and the unemployment level as 𝑤𝑟
′(𝑈) < 0. 
3.3.3.3 Efficiency wage model 
The third approach of the wage curve is the efficiency wage.  This model asserts that firms 
unilaterally set salaries based on the workers’ productivity, while the natural response of the 
worker is whether or not to shirk work based on this wage.  The authors based their work on 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), who assume that workers tend to shirk because it increases their 
utility by getting the same pay with less effort on the job.  Under the assumption that firms are 
unable to accurately monitor worker performance, firms assign a premium wage rate to prevent 
workers from shirking.  The former implies that firms are free to pay or punish workers with 
higher or lower wages depending on the quality of their work.  Following this rationale, the 
authors add that during times of high unemployment, firms are free to apply severe economic 
punishment by reducing wage rates or by firing workers caught shirking.  This set of conditions 
opens the possibility that firms adjust wage rates downward because economic conditions make 
the search for a new job more difficult.  Therefore, high unemployment rates decrease the 
expected utility to be derived from shirking, which in equilibrium is the same utility as non-
shirking. Finally, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) conclude that the asymmetric information 
problem shapes the wage curve, and regions with firms with better developed controls over 
monitoring and supervision will experience less legible wage curves.  
𝑤𝑟 = 𝑒𝑟 + 𝑏𝑟 +
𝛾𝑟𝑒𝑟
(1 − 𝛾𝑟)[1 − 𝛼𝑟(𝑈𝑟)]
 (28)  
 
Equation (28) corresponds to the wage equation in region r and its determinants under 
the efficiency wage approach.  Let  𝑤𝑟 be the wage, 𝑒𝑟 which is the level of disutility from work-
effort,  𝑏𝑟 is the benefit obtained from being unemployed; the probability of being detected and 
fired is (1 − 𝛾𝑟) < 1; and 𝛼𝑟(𝑈𝑟) is the probability of finding a new job is a function of the 
unemployment rate, and these have the necessary conditions for being both a convex and 
decreasing functional form (𝛼𝑟
′ (𝑈𝑟) < 0,   𝛼𝑟
′′(𝑈𝑟) < 0).  This kind of wage equation indicates the 
above argument in which firms must pay premium wages in order to prevent shirking.  
However, it decreases in the presence of a higher unemployment rate that can be explained 
using the struggle a worker might face for finding a new job in the labor market. 
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3.3.4 The wage curve analysis for a developing country 
The wage curve aims to demonstrate that labor conditions influence the wage determination. 
The unemployment is the indicator that serves as proxy to demonstrate such argument, and as 
explained before the results in many researches for many countries in different periods of time 
confirm such assertion. Even in few studied cases of developing countries, their results show 
that unemployment helps to shape the labor market conditions that influence negatively the 
wage determination.  
However, the unemployment rate in developing countries such as Guatemala does not 
reveal properly the labor conditions of the country as the standard convention of the definition 
of unemployment contemplates two conditions: that people does not have a job, and they must 
be actively seeking for a job. The problem with such convention is that many people in 
developing countries are actually working in part time jobs that are characterized for having 
deplorable conditions, such as the informal sector. Fields (2011) confirms such argument by 
explaining that unemployment rates in developing countries are lower than in the developed 
ones, 4.4% and 8.4% in average respectively (International Labor Organization's –ILO-, 2011), 
and that such indicator is a poor measure of the labor market distress.  For instance, as 
explained in Chapter 2, the unemployment rate in Guatemala is of about 3.4% in average during 
the last four years, but this indicator shows only one part of the labor conditions under which 
people is employed. In Guatemala the 69% of workers belongs to the informal sector, meaning 
that the worker benefits -such as steady and secure wage, social protection, and minimum labor 
standards- are not guaranteed. These are also undesirable labor market conditions as the 
unemployment, which may influence the wage determination. These conditions and the 
absence of public unemployment benefits in the country give people with no access to a decent 
job two options: to be unemployed (and receive zero income), or to be employed in the informal 
sector. 
People that is already working may not want to leave their jobs if the outside labor 
conditions are deplorable. Those who have decent job may not want to bear the risk of losing it 
for an informal job, and people in the informal sector may not want to leave the current one for 
a worse job. Though in the latest scenario, workers are more prone to pursue a better options, 
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and hence are more inclined to bear a risk in case premium wages experiences a significantly 
decrease in their current job.   
Although there is no consensus on a unique definition of the informal sector, one of the 
origins is explained by Harris and Todaro (1970), who explicate that the informal sector surges 
as a source of temporal employment for those people immigrating from the rural area and that 
do not find a decent job. Nowadays, some authors (Loayza, 1996; Ihrig and Moe, 2004; Prado, 
2011) have approached the issue through fiscal analysis, in which people in the informal sector 
is part of an economy that is not taxed, others (Maloney, 2004) define it in a more broad 
framework by considering the informal sector as the part of the economy that escapes the 
government regulations in general; others define the sector in a simplistic and unclear way by 
defining the informality as the casual jobs, temporary jobs, unpaid jobs, subsistence agriculture, 
multiple job holding.  However, the agreement is that the employment in the informal sector is 
often characterized by poor working conditions, poor pay and the absence of any labor 
standards for workers. ILO suggests that one way of measuring labor informality is through the 
underemployment, which comprises underutilized workers in terms of productivity capacity or 
duration of work. So, ILO defines two types of underemployment: the visible and non-visible 
underemployment. The visible underemployment is characterized by the insufficient hours of 
work (because he needs to work more hours) that an individual experiences during a specific 
period of reference. The non-visible underemployment is the insufficient hourly income of a 
worker, or is the misuse of occupational skills reflected in an inadequate productivity that 
causes imbalance between labor and other factors of production. 
The intention in the present paper is not to measure the informal sector because it 
requires deeper understanding of other elements no considered here; however, to estimate a 
proxy by following the ILO’s suggestion allows providing a better picture of the labor 
conditions of Guatemala.  Therefore, going back to the wage curve analysis in which the labor 
conditions influence the wage determination, it is important to consider in the analysis of a 
developing country an element such as the underemployment because it represents a threat 
against the status of the workers. As a consequence, it is expected to observe a higher wage 
curve than using the standard analysis since the levels of underemployment are considerable 
higher than the unemployment rate.   
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Finally, the shadow or hidden unemployment is another labor market condition that 
may influence the wage determination in the market. It is defined as the unemployed people 
with the desired of working but is not actively searching it. (Gastwirth, 1973; Mincer, 1973)  The 
shadow unemployment include discouraged workers -individuals that wishes to work, but are 
not looking for one because they believe that is not available at a desired wage-, teenager, 
students, and homemakers. They will incorporate to the labor force only if someone offers a job 
position with a specific desired wage.  
Under the wage curve rationale, shadow unemployment would represent a real threat 
against the workers only if people is visible within the labor market, i.e. if these people is not 
actively competing for a job position then firms would not be aware of their interest or 
existence. Also, shadow unemployment may not represent a good instrument for explaining the 
changes in wages because of the problem of causality between the explained and explanatory 
variables. Thus, one way of the causality is that wages respond to the influence of 
unemployment which in turn responds to the fluctuations of the shadow unemployment. The 
size of the labor force can be affected by the inclusion of new workers that were belonging to 
the economically inactive population or labor reserve, and hence affect the unemployment rates. 
The other way of causality refers the shadow unemployment definition per se. The wage rate is 
the responsible of encouraging people to go back to the labor force, and hence the size of the 
labor force will change only if wages change. 
    
3.4 The Mortensen and Pissarides Model 
In principle, the basis of this theoretical labor market rests on recognition of the existence of 
search friction in labor markets.  Search friction is understood as the mobility costs (monetary or 
non-monetary) that firms and workers face when trying to fill positions by firing and hiring 
workers, or the time it takes to find a job, respectively (Zenou, 2009).  The former argument has 
other implications. For instance, some vacancies will be filled by unemployed job seekers, and 
both variables can grow at the same rate.  In a mathematical manner, this situation is 
understood as a case of a constant return to scale function in a “matching function” (Pissarides, 
1979).   
𝑀 = 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉) (29)  
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The above expression represents the number of jobs (M) created during a specific period 
of time.  It will depend on both the number of unemployed people seeking jobs (U), and the 
number of job vacancies (V).  This model uses a microeconomic foundation to explain 
aggregated variables, such as unemployment.  Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) explain that this 
model requires information from four sources in the labor market.  First, aggregated data on job 
vacancies and unemployment, which are used to check their relationship known as the 
Beveridge curve.  Secondly, information derived from aggregated data on the flows of 
unemployment and employment for an economy, which is particularly important for 
conducting an analysis of a labor market of a specific economic sector (e.g. manufacturing). 
Thirdly, it uses information about a labor market during a specific time period, and for either 
time-series or panel data.  Fourthly, it requires information about transitions between 
unemployment to employment on the worker level. 
It is important to understand how labor frictions work. They provide arguments that 
partially help explain the relationship between unemployment and wages in local labor 
markets.  In other words, this model helps us understand why workers accept or refuse jobs, 
and why firms offer job vacancies under certain conditions.  Workers and firms make decisions 
based on social and economic conditions in their locales such as unemployment benefits, 
imperfect information, heterogeneity within locales, opportunity of mobility, and congestion. 
The former suggest that both individual and locale factors play a role in determining the 
decision to accept or reject a job offer during the matching process.  In addition, the model can 
take into account other elements that play an important role in the matching process, such as 
technological advances.  They have demonstrated to society that virtual places (in informatics) 
can generate matches because they are fast, cheap and useful for advertising purposes for 
workers and firms. 
The research literature on search theory has sought to understand the dispersion of 
equilibrium wages, i.e., if workers have the same productive skills, why they do they fail to 
obtain the same earnings?  On the other hand, there is a need to understand how labor-market 
tightness (the number of offers over unemployed workers) determines the matching process 
between workers and firms. The former explains how the matching process is carried out 
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through a division of the surplus between firms and workers.  This theoretical contribution is 
found in the work of Pissarides (1985), Pissarides and Mortensen (1994, 1999), and Burdett-
Mortensen (1998), and their work involves the simplification of the search problem in a general 
equilibrium framework derived from the “Diamond paradox” (see Albrecht, 2011). 
This model was designed to facilitate understanding of the equilibrium or “natural” rate 
of unemployment (Albrecht, 2011).  The model has two sides, the workers and firms.  One 
assumes a continuum of workers that is uniformly distributed along the interval [0,1], and each 
worker has preferences represented by: 
𝐸0∑(
1
1 + 𝑟
)
𝑡
𝑐𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
 (30)  
 
where 𝑐𝑡    is consumption and  𝑟 is the discount rate that is greater than zero.  Workers 
are assumed to have linear utility over the consumption of a homogenous good, making them 
risk neutral under circumstances of uncertainty.  Workers are employed or unemployed.  In the 
first case, workers receive a payment of w for their services in a firm, and are not searching for a 
new job during the same period t.  In the second case, when workers are not working at the 
beginning of the period t, they receive a payment of b, the unemployment benefit.  It is expected 
that they will receive job offers that they are free to accept or reject. 
The second part of the market is populated by an infinite mass of risk-neutral firms that 
have preferences that are reflected in the expression (31), where 𝜋𝑡  represents a firm’s profits, 
and 𝑥𝑡  denotes any disutility experienced due to posting a vacancy during period t. 
𝐸0∑(
1
1 + 𝑟
)
𝑡
(𝜋𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0
 (31)  
  
The model requires a series of assumptions, such as firms discounting future income at 
the same rate as workers do, a firm is a job, all firms have the same productivity, a firm is also 
an input (entrepreneurship), a firm and a worker produce y units of homogeneous output 
during a period of time t, and that  𝑦 > 𝑏 > 0  . 
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Workers and firms do not match immediately, and frictions occur in a labor market 
when finding or posting a job.  Let the number of unemployed workers be (𝑢𝑡), and a portion of 
the number of job vacancies (𝑣𝑡) in a period t.  Allow the number of matches be 𝑚𝑡  which 
responds to the matching function  𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚(𝑢𝑡, 𝑣𝑡).  This is a continuous and increasing function 
in 𝑢𝑡  and 𝑣𝑡, it is concave and homogeneous of degree 1.  Also, 𝑚(𝑢𝑡, 0) = 𝑚(0, 𝑣𝑡) = 0 for all 
𝑢𝑡 , 𝑣𝑡 ≥ 0.  In addition, define the rate  
𝑣𝑡
𝑢𝑡
 as  𝜃𝑡 , which is the labor-market tightness.  Hence, the 
probability that an individual unemployed worker is matched with a job vacancy in period t is 
given by  
𝑚(𝑢𝑡,𝑣𝑡)
𝑢𝑡
= 𝑚(1,
𝑣𝑡
𝑢𝑡
) = 𝑚(1, 𝜃𝑡) ; and the probability that a firm will match a posted-
vacancy with a worker is  
𝑚(𝑢𝑡,𝑣𝑡)
𝑣𝑡
= 𝑚(
𝑢𝑡
𝑣𝑡
, 1) = 𝑚 (
1
𝜃𝑡
, 1).  Therefore, when labor-market tightness 
is quite restrictive, the chance of a firm matching a posted vacancy is higher, 
i.e.,  lim𝜃→0𝑚(
1
𝜃
, 1) = 1.  On the other hand, when labor-market tightness is non-restrictive with 
regard to job offers, the chance of an unemployed worker of finding a job is high, 
say  lim𝜃→∞𝑚(1, 𝜃) = 1 . 
Once workers and firms meet, they set up a contract for a period t, at the end of which, 
the worker has the probability  𝛿  of being separated from the firm.  If the firm fails to make any 
matches, it will incur a cost of k for each period until it obtains a match.  Finally, any firm that 
does not post any vacancies and finds no matches will receive zero utility.  
In the steady state equilibrium, the mass of unemployed workers and the mass of firms 
that post vacancies in every period t are represented as  𝑢𝑡 = 𝑢  and  𝑣𝑡 = 𝑣 ,  respectively.  In 
addition, the model considers two flows of movement of workers between unemployment and 
employment.  From unemployment to employment, there is an endogenous flow rate of the 
labor-market tightness  𝛼(𝜃) =
𝑚(𝑢𝑡,𝑣𝑡)
𝑢𝑡
= 𝑚(1, 𝜃𝑡) ,  and in the opposite direction there is an 
exogenous flow rate of job separation  𝛿 .  The former implies that in the steady state the 
unemployment rate is determined as follows: 
𝛼(𝜃)𝑢 = 𝛿(1 − 𝑢)     →       𝑢 =
𝛿
𝛿 + 𝛼(𝜃)
 (32)  
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The above expression (32) shows the relationship in equilibrium (unique) between job 
vacancies and unemployment.  Pissarides (2000a) argues that this is the first key equation in the 
model.  It is known as the Beveridge Curve. 
Following the steady state condition, once there is a match of workers negotiating a 
wage w for their services with the firms, and those firms obtain profits from their services, the 
process is known as job creation.  So, allow the value of the match to a worker obtaining a wage 
w 𝑏𝑒  𝑊(𝑤),  and the value of the match to a firm paying the wage w 𝑏𝑒  𝐽(𝑦 − 𝑤).   As regards 
those workers who remain unemployed, U denotes their value for maintaining their status quo.  
V represents the value to a firm of posting a vacancy.  Therefore, workers and firms will reach 
an agreement at some wage w if their surplus from the match exceeds or is equal to zero (their 
values are denoted as 𝑊(𝑤) − 𝑈 ≥ 0  and  𝐽(𝑦 − 𝑤) − 𝑉 ≥ 0  , respectively).  The total surplus 
from the matching is then represented as the sum of the individual surpluses (𝑊(𝑤) +
𝐽(𝑦 − 𝑤) − 𝑈 − 𝑉), providing the basis of the determination of the equilibrium wage under the 
Nash Bargaining model (Pissarides, 2000) as follows: 
 
𝑤 = arg max
𝑤′
[𝑊(𝑤′) − 𝑈]
𝛼
 [𝐽(𝑦 − 𝑤′) − 𝑉]
1−𝛼
  
 
(33)  
 
Subject to           
  
𝑊(𝑤′) − 𝑈 ≥ 0 
𝐽(𝑦 − 𝑤′) − 𝑉 ≥ 0 
Here  𝛼  is a parameter that measures the worker’s power in the bargaining process, and 
has a range  0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1.  The authors argued that the goal of this optimization is not to solve an 
individual agent problem, but rather to obtain an outcome from a bargaining process between 
workers and firms.  Thus, the optimal outcomes require two steps.  First, the discounted values 
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(at rate r) of  𝑊(𝑤)  , 𝐽(𝑦 − 𝑤) , 𝑈 and 𝑉 are obtained.  These can be obtained using some 
mathematical strategies:6  
𝑟𝑊(𝑤) = 𝑤 + 𝛿[𝑈 −𝑊(𝑤)] 
𝑟𝐽(𝑦 − 𝑤) = 𝑦 −𝑤 + 𝛿[𝑉 − 𝐽(𝑦 − 𝑤)] 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 +𝑚(1, 𝜃)(𝑊 − 𝑈) 
𝑟𝑉 = −𝑘 +𝑚(
1
𝜃
, 1) (𝐽 − 𝑉) where 𝑈 −𝑊(𝑤) is capital loss associated with returning to 
unemployment. 
𝑉 − 𝐽(𝑦 − 𝑤) is the capital loss for having a job position be a vacancy. 
(𝑊 − 𝑈) is the expected gain when the worker is hired by a firm. 
(𝐽 − 𝑉) is the surplus obtained from the matching process 
In the second step, the steady state firms have a value  𝑉 = 0  because they are 
indifferent between the alternatives having a zero value on  𝐽  , and posting a vacancy.  Thus, the 
new total surplus is: 
𝑆 =  𝑊 + 𝐽 − 𝑈 (34)  
 
In addition, the maximization problem above yields: 
𝛼[𝐽(𝑦 − 𝑤) − 𝑉] − (1 − 𝛼)[𝑊(𝑤) − 𝑈] = 0 
 
(35)  
 
The two equations above lead to the conclusion that with Nash Bargaining the workers and 
firms will obtain a constant fraction  𝛼  and (1 − 𝛼), respectively, from the total surplus.  
Consequently, solving the variables generates the following values: 
The total surplus,    𝑆 =
𝑘
(1−𝛼)𝑚(
1
𝜃
,1)
 
(36)  
The wage curve,    𝑤 = 𝑦 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)(1 − 𝛼)𝑆 
                                                     
6 It requires the use of Bellman equations.  See Pissarides (2000) 
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(37)  
The worker value when employed,     𝑊 =
𝑤+𝛿𝛼𝑆
𝑟
 
(38)  
 
The worker value when unemployed,  𝑈 =
𝑤+(𝛿−𝑟)𝛼𝑆
𝑟
 
(39)  
Once a job is created, a firm’s production continues until a negative idiosyncratic shock 
hits the firm.  As a consequence, such an occurrence decreases the firm’s value  𝐽(𝑦 − 𝑤)  until 
the job position is terminated, and the worker moves from being employed to being 
unemployed; the former is known as job destruction. 
As regards the notions job creation and job destruction, the reasoning can be expanded 
into the job chain approach. Persky et al. (2004) argues that job creation can be originated from 
job positions that are already occupied for a worker, i.e. if a worker move into a new job 
position, the space he is leaving attracts other workers from other jobs, and so on down with 
other workers. The authors mention that such chain is broken when a job position is occupied 
by someone who was previously unemployed, or by someone that is immigrant and is looking 
for a job. This notion serves as platform to understand the linkages between labor markets from 
different regions. For instance, a potential case where employment from suburban areas can 
initiate a job chain and breaks down in the inner city: a person who is traveling many miles to 
his work may want to find a job near to his house (say in suburbs) looking to reduce 
transportation costs, and once he gets the job and accept it, his old job position will be open for 
someone else that is working and looking for a new job, this last position will be available for 
someone else until is filled by an unemployed or immigrant, which is when the chain breaks. 
Thus, when looking into the immigrants’ case, it is possible to argue that people moving from 
other regions will not necessarily join the unemployed labor force as stated in the Todaro 
paradox.  
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3.5 Wage Equations and multi-markets  
This section highlights the importance of recognizing markets as economic spaces or regions, 
while also emphasizing how they are economically interrelated.  Earlier discussion centered on 
how workers and firms react to labor market conditions within their region, including the 
driving forces that motivate workers and firms to move between places, and how wages are set.  
Existing research focuses on wage equations, so it is important to consider regional 
interrelations in a country that go beyond differentiating between rural-urban or core-periphery 
areas, and to include effects of neighboring areas.  Very few papers have explored these issues 
(Longhi et al, 2006; Palombi and Fingleton, 2013); fewer still have analyzed them in developing 
countries (Baltagi et al., 2012).   
Longhi et al. (2006) evaluate the performance of the wage curve by considering the 
geography of labor markets.  They point out that if the wage curve is analyzed from the 
efficiency wage angle, the changes of wage will depend on the costs of geographical labor 
mobility.  Such costs can be high, and may discourage workers from seeking more suitable 
employment in other regions, where they would have to commute daily, or to migrate entirely. 
This condition gives monopsonic power to the employers to determine wages, as explained 
above.  Further, Longhi et al. (2006) mention that locales surrounded by regions with higher 
wages tend to lose local workers to these higher-wage-paying regions; thus, employers with 
monopsonic power will have to increase their wages to either retain their workers or to attract 
more employees, if necessary.  The authors also add the findings of Buettner (1999) with regard 
to unemployment in neighboring regions.  Buettner (1999) finds that the unemployment rate of 
neighboring regions diminishes workers’ capacity of negotiation, becoming a potential threat to 
these workers as markets tighten.   From the econometric point of view, Longhi et al. (2006) 
found that the sum of the local and neighboring effects is greater than the elasticity estimated in 
a model without spatial considerations, so ignoring the spatial configuration may produce 
misleading results.  Longhi et al. (2006) show that the results obtained from the wage curve in 
more isolated places are stronger than in agglomerated regions.  This is justified by the mobility 
costs associated with job search, which can be higher if the place is located in remote regions. 
Palombi and Fingleton (2013) argue that most of the wage curve literature ignores the 
role of employment conditions of proximate labor markets, such as wages and unemployment 
rates.  As such, it essentially neglects the interactions between regional economies.  Such an 
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oversight raises potential problems of bias estimation of the variables (Baltagi et al., 2012), since 
the unemployment rate of a region is usually spatial correlated in clustered areas (Sato, 2000).  
Thus, Palombi and Fingleton (2013) implement a wage curve functional form in which the 
spatial interaction of wages and unemployment are present, and test it against two other 
alternative earning specifications such as the NEG wage equation and the urban economics 
(UE) model. Both of these are differentiated by the importance attributed to the market linkages; 
that is, NEG focuses on the inter-regional linkages, while the UE is motivated by the intra-
regional linkages.  The conclusion of Palombi and Fingleton (2013) is that the wage curve holds 
as predicted by Blanchflower and Oswald (year) even with a spatial configuration, but when 
compared against the other two models, the wage curve seems to be not superior in statistical 
terms.  It is important to consider this robust result because it proves that the inclusion of 
spatial linkages is not only important, but demonstrates that it is not part of a misspecified 
model. 
Considering spatial linkages in the wage equations helps to clarify the key issues of the 
integration of labor markets.  It is clear that labor markets in the examined regions are 
influenced by the labor conditions of the neighboring regions.  In fact, Manning and Petrongolo 
(2013) ask, “How local are labor markets?” This is because the spatial configuration of a region 
has significant policy implications with respect to effectiveness; for instance, if a labor market is 
very local (i.e., it has a poor interrelation with other markets), then a policy of intervention in 
the labor market will be more effective in the disadvantaged places; on the other hand, if the 
labor market of a region is highly linked with those of its neighbors, then intervening in the 
underprivileged region may produce negative results in the economy, including the migration 
of workers from advantaged places.  Thus, the understanding of the spatial linkages of the labor 
markets provides a map of the performance of wages and incidence of unemployment in 
regions, which in turn gives intervention policies the opportunity to be more meaningful and 
efficient.  
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Chapter 4: Wage equations and Guatemalan applications 
 
4.1 Hypothesis of the research 
As mentioned before, the regions in Guatemala are economically different when looking at the 
distribution of occupations by industry, unemployment rates, and wages.  Likewise, there exists 
a pattern of wage concentration in the country, in which the metropolitan area concentrates the 
highest wages as it has the most competitive labor market of the country, and hence motivates 
to migrate into such an area because of better economic incentives. It is argued that this 
occurrence will persist as the metropolitan area is primarily dedicated to the services and 
manufacturing industries, implying that skilled labor will prefer to work in such a region, even 
as the area reports also the highest rates of unemployment.  In addition, underemployment is 
present in all regions, and it is more relevant than unemployment as shown before.  This 
situation opens the scenario for an additional analysis based on the underemployment, which is 
the latent variable not contemplated in previous researches for the Guatemalan case and other 
developing countries, when trying to explain the labor market conditions for wage 
determination.  This description provides the characterization of the labor market in Guatemala, 
in which they play an important role in shaping the patterns of wage distribution and wage 
determination; hence, two hypotheses can be drawn.  
Regarding the flows of internal migration, it is discussed that labor market conditions   
may play an important role in attracting workers into specific areas, mainly into the 
metropolitan area.  Assuming that wages and job opportunity are the incentives for economic 
agents to move across regions in Guatemala, the first hypothesis is that the economic 
development of the locales, represented by the market access of the new economic geography 
(NEG) analysis, explains the spatial wage distribution in Guatemala during 2006-2011, and 
hence the flows of migration based on labor incentives.  Through this statement, I explore 
whether it is possible to unveil some pattern of country-wide wage distribution that responds to 
the elements of transportation costs, imperfect competition, and increasing returns.  Based on 
the economic description of Guatemala in chapter 2, one can expect that the incentives of the 
flows of internal migration are driven by the economic advantage that metropolitan areas have 
over other regions of the country in terms of wages, infrastructure, transportation costs, etc.  
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Therefore, we expect to observe an association between the economic development of a locale 
represented by an index of market access and wages.  This premise is sustained by the 
argument that agglomeration effects of the core region on the rest of the country provide a 
possible explanation for the decision of economic agents to move due to income, prices, and 
trade costs.  If the results reveal that NEG influences the spatial wage distribution, then it will 
be capable of providing essential tools that definitively explain indirectly the internal migration 
in Guatemala. 
On the other hand, the descriptive analysis presented in chapter 2 reveals not only that 
wages differ across regions, but that real wages in all regions are declining. It is assumed that 
the environment created by the local and neighboring labor market conditions have a strong 
influence on the wage determination in each Guatemalan region during 2006-2011.  This 
statement assumes that firms have monopsony power in the regions to recruit workers as firms 
are in position of determining wage rates based on the labor market conditions.  Unlike what 
has been argued by Blanchflower and Oswald regarding the negative relationship between 
unemployment and wages, the present statement includes the evaluation of the roll of the 
underemployment over wages to test not only that unemployment is responsible in part of the 
low wages, but that underemployment (which may represent in part the informal sector of 
employment) may constitute a greater threat against workers in the country.   
Hence, formally, the second hypothesis is that wages in developing countries, such as in 
Guatemala, are more prone to be affected by the underemployment rather than unemployment 
during 2006-2011.  Furthermore, regions are not territorially large in Guatemala, and workers 
may also respond to labor market conditions of the neighboring regions which, as described in 
chapter 3, may reinforce the influence of local market conditions.   
Analysis of such a statement provides the necessary tools for spatially comprehending 
the labor market of Guatemala; furthermore, it complements traditional research on the 
country’s labor market when looking into regional linkages.  This claim tests a modified version 
of the Blanchflower and Oswald wage curve, and extends it into spatial analysis. The 
importance of the second hypothesis rests on the claim done by Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2005), who states that the wage curve exists in almost every country.  However, the implicit 
question rests on the international comparison of the labor market conditions, i.e. are them the 
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same in all countries? In Guatemala, unemployment may not be that relevant as there exist 
great participation of labor in the underemployment, and great level of poverty.  This is an 
exercise that will give the opportunity to extend the theory of wage curve beyond the analysis 
of the effects of unemployment.  Also, on the side of the spatial analysis, few authors have 
addressed such topic within this theory, which highlights even more the results for policy 
implications.  
Each hypothesis is tested under a different methodology; their results are discussed in 
the following sections.  
 
4.2 NEG wage equation 
The NEG wage equation is estimated under a pooled cross section approach containing 
variables in log terms. This equation explains that wage rates depend on market potential 
(equation 40).  The incorporation of such variables uses the methodology proposed by Fingleton 
(2009), Head and Mayer (2005), and Redding and Venables (2004), in which labor efficiency 
becomes part of the mechanism of association. Thus, the rationale for the model takes four 
assumptions into account.   
First, the efficiency of the workers is an important factor in the process of production. 
Second, technology is assumed to be homogeneous across regions.  The skills of the workers 
thus make a difference in production levels, meaning that productivity is more efficient where 
labor is more skilled.  The extended model of the wage equation is shown in equation (41), and 
contains the new variable that describes the efficiency A for region i. 
 
ln𝑤𝑖
𝑀 =
1
𝜎
ln 𝑃𝑖 (40)  
ln𝑤𝑖
𝑀 =
1
𝜎
ln 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑖 (41)  
 
Third, having an efficient labor force depends on the level of education and on the 
public capital stock endowed in each region.  Fourth, there are spillover effects.  The level of 
efficiency in a given region is influenced by the variables of human capital and public capital 
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endowed in other regions.  These characteristics are exhibited in equation (42), where X 
represents the vectors of variables that contain information about the locale that influence labor 
efficiency; W represents the spatial matrix that explains the neighbor spillover effect upon the 
region under analysis; finally, the vector ε represents the random shocks generated by other 
variables not included in the model. 
𝑙𝑛𝐴 = 𝜌𝑊𝑙𝑛𝐴 + 𝑋𝑏 + 𝜀 
𝜀 ~ 𝑁(0, Ω2) 
ln 𝐴 = (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1(𝑋𝑏 + 𝜀) 
(42)  
 
As mentioned above, the underlying assumption in this paper is that human capital 
(HC) and public investment (PK) variables are determinants of the level of labor efficiency, and, 
hence, for the level of wage rates within the regions.  Thus, higher levels of human capital lead 
to higher levels of labor efficiency.  In addition, the greater the public capital stock, the better 
the conditions for labor to perform, resulting in higher efficiency.  The equation (42), therefore, 
has the vector of X that contains such variables.  The weight matrix has a dimension of (R×R), 
and this captures the regional interaction for the R regions in the system.  The degree of 
interaction within the W matrix is denoted by (𝑤𝑖𝑗). This will be zero when two regions do not 
interact, or when the comparative analysis of one region is made with respect to the same 
region (𝑖 = 𝑗).  In addition, the value of (𝑤𝑖𝑗) will be non-zero when two regions interact.  In 
this paper, the contiguity matrix, the queen matrix, and the inverse distance matrix are 
considered to check the robustness of the regression.  
Equation (43) represents the incorporation of equation (42) into equation (41), the 
measurement error is 𝜏, and for the sake of simplicity we assume that   
1
𝜎
= 𝑎; thus, the 
theoretical base model is represented as follows: 
ln𝑤𝑀 = 𝑎 ln𝑃 + (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1(𝑋𝑏 + 𝜀) + 𝜏 
𝜏 ~ 𝑁(0, Π2) 
(43)  
 
For the sake of convenience in the elaboration of the nested models, and using 
Fingleton’s modeling (2006, 2008, 2009), equation (43) is pre-multiplied by (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊). This 
procedure provides the option of proposing different models to help promote robustness in the 
results.    
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(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊) ln𝑤 = (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)𝑎 ln𝑃 + (𝑋𝑏 + 𝜀) + (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)𝜏 
ln𝑤 = 𝜌𝑊 ln𝑤 + 𝑎1(ln𝑃 − 𝜌𝑊 ln𝑃) + (𝑋𝑏 + 𝜀) + (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)𝜏 
 
(44)  
Equation 44 contemplates the estimation of the parameter  𝜌  by following Fingleton’s 
strategy used in his 2006 and 2009 papers, the objective of which is to accommodate the 
endogeneity of the spatial lag of wages (𝑊 ln𝑤). The process includes an iterative routine of 
estimations that initiates with  𝜌 = 𝜌1 which helps to estimate (ln 𝑃 − 𝜌1𝑊 ln𝑃); the model is 
then regressed to obtain a new  𝜌 = 𝜌2 , which is used to recalculate (ln 𝑃 − 𝜌2𝑊 ln𝑃) the 
complete model and to obtain  𝜌 = 𝜌3, and to continue the iteration until  𝜌𝑖 − 𝜌𝑖−1 < 0.00001. 
Finally, the variables of 𝑋 are substituted for human capital 𝐻𝐾 (education attainment) and 
public capital 𝑃𝐾 (infrastructure), and for the simplicity of the model, the moving average of the 
errors is dropped. The models to be run are represented in table 6: 
 
Table 6. Nested models 
 Assumption Model 
I) Full model 
ln 𝑤 = 𝜌𝑊 ln𝑤 + 𝑎1(ln𝑃 − 𝜌𝑊 ln𝑃) + 
(+𝑎0 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐾 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐾 + 𝑎4𝑊𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐾 + 𝑎5𝑊𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐾) + 𝜀 
II) 
Without HK and PK 
spillover effect  
ln 𝑤 = 𝜌𝑊 ln𝑤 + 𝑎1(ln𝑃 − 𝜌𝑊 ln𝑃) + (𝑎0 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐾 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐾) + 𝜀 
III) 
Public Capital has no 
influence 
ln𝑤 = 𝜌𝑊 ln𝑤 + 𝑎1(ln𝑃 − 𝜌𝑊 ln𝑃) + (𝑎0 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐾) + 𝜀 
IV) 
PK has not influence 
and spillover effect 
from market potential 
is removed 
ln𝑤 = 𝑎1 ln 𝑃 + (𝑎0 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐾) + 𝜀 
 
V) 
No spillover effects at 
all 
ln𝑤 = 𝑎1 ln 𝑃 + (𝑎0 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐾 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐾) + 𝜀 
 
VI) 
Exogenous spatial 
lags in HK and PK 
ln𝑤 = 𝑎1 ln 𝑃 + (𝑎0 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐾 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐾 + 𝑎4𝑊𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐾 + 𝑎5𝑊𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐾) + 𝜀 
VII) 
Exogenous spatial lag 
only in HK 
ln 𝑤 = 𝑎1 ln 𝑃 + (𝑎0 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐾 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐾 + 𝑎4𝑊𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐾) + 𝜀 
VIII) 
Simple market 
potential 
ln𝑤 = 𝑎1 ln 𝑃 + (𝑎0) + 𝜀 
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4.2.1 Data for NEG equation  
This paper uses data from approximately 23,947 individuals (people) belonging to 22 
departments in Guatemala for two years.  Such information comes from the two living standard 
surveys (ENCOVI) of 2006 and 2011. These surveys provide information on wages at the 
individual level educational attainment, demography, and labor market indicators that help to 
construct the unemployment and underemployment rate per department. Table 7 shows the 
summary statistics of the data used in this research. Regarding nominal wages, people reported 
the wages earned per month and hours worked in the last week; this information serves to 
construct the hourly wages by assuming that the months have on average 4.2 weeks. The real 
hourly wage is obtained by deflating the nominal hourly wage by the consumer price index of 
each region that is reported by INE for each year. 
 “Education level” is represented by seven dummy variables that correspond to no-
education, kindergarten, elementary education, middle school, high school, undergraduate, and 
graduate studies.  The “Ethnic” variable refers to the distinction between indigenous peoples 
and Ladinos.  The “Social Security” variable indicates whether the worker has some affiliation 
to the social security institute of Guatemala (IGSS). This variable serves only to distinguish who 
is not in the informal sector, though it does not actually reveal the real labor market structure. 
“Gender” represents the distinction between men and women. In addition to the information in 
the table, it is considered the use of 12 industry dummy variables such as agriculture, mines, 
manufacturing, electricity, construction, commerce, transportation and communications, 
banking services, government, education, health care, and other. Likewise, workers are 
distinguished by 9 occupational categories: public sector employee, private sector employee, 
day laborer, domestic employee, non-agricultural self-employee, agricultural self-employee, 
non-agricultural employer or master, agricultural employer or master, and unpaid family 
worker. 
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                      Table 7. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Year Mean Stand. Dev. N 
     Nominal wage 2006 5.7528 3.1555 11721 
  2011 6.3569 3.1052 12227 
Regional CPI 2006 156.2748 3.1555 8 
  2011 212.2310 3.1052 8 
Population 2006   13,018,759  
    2011   14,713,763    
Public Capital 2006        469,081        492,282  22 
  2011        570,728        618,894  22 
Education level 2006 3.1114 1.2981 11721 
  2011 3.1129 1.3023 12227 
Age 2006 31.1364 13.6391 11721 
  2011 31.8576 13.7174 12227 
Ethnic 2006 0.6861 0.4641 11721 
  2011 0.6536 0.4758 12227 
Social Security 2006 0.3231 0.4677 11721 
  2011 0.2458 0.4305 12227 
Gender 2006            8,567  0.4435 11721 
  2011            9,022  0.4398 12227 
Unemployment 2006 0.0175 0.0082 22 
  2011 0.0353 0.0101 22 
Underemployment 2006 0.5760 0.0963 22 
 
2011 0.6789 0.0627 22 
     Moran's test 
 
Neighboring wage 
 
  
2006 2011 
 
Wage 
2006 0.5946*** 
  2011 
 
0.6454*** 
           
Source: ENCOVI 2006 and 2011, INE 2013 
  1) Wages are nominal and it is hourly. 
   2) CPI base year: 2000. 
    3) Education refers to the level reached. 
  4) Ethnic: 0 for indigenous and 1 for Ladinos. 
  5) Social security: 0 don’t have, 1 have social security. 
  6) Gender 0 for woman and 1 for man.  
7) Unemployment and underemployment per department. 
 ***  Significant at 1% 
   
 
 
The market potential is constructed using equation 23, and compares the use of income, 
prices for each department, and the transportation costs between departments. The variable of 
income is included in the set of information provided by ENCOVI; prices are those used in the 
estimation of real wages described above; for transportation or trade costs, this paper assumes 
that costs correlate with distances (Hanson, 2001; Brakman, et al., 2004).  Thus, there are two 
scenarios to consider.  First, when measuring the distances between departments, the costs are 
estimated by assuming that they increase with the distance between departments i and j.  
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Second, distances within departments are taken to be zero. The parameter sigma in the final 
estimation of the market access is set to 6.25 as suggested by earlier literature in Fingleton and 
Longhi (2013).  
For the public capital stock, the estimate is based on the amount of money spent by 
every municipality for roads, sewers, water, electricity production, and other kinds of 
infrastructure that complement the process of the production of firms, or which complement the 
level of utility or satisfaction of the inhabitants in each municipality.  This information was 
obtained from the INE, and was transformed on a perpetual inventory basis, standardized 
according to the population of each municipality and deflated using regional price indexes to 
obtain data in real terms.   
 
4.2.2  Results 
Tables 8 and 9 show the first group of estimates of the wage equation of the NEG model. They 
include the results of equation (43), and assume that the parameter rho is zero in obtaining a 
baseline model. The estimates are obtained from pooled cross section models with the control 
variables of public capital, schooling, age, ethnic group, social security and gender; they also 
include dummy variables for industry and category of occupation, department, and time fix 
effects. The difference between both tables of estimations consists in the inclusion of 
neighboring effects of public capital and real hourly wages. Both tables report that all estimates 
are statistically significant, showing consistent results across the nested models.  
Although the estimates of market access are statistically significant—on average across the eight 
nested models the elasticity is of about 0.02 in table 8 and 0.004 in table 9—these estimates are 
considerably lower when comparing them against findings in other developing countries such 
as in Brazil with elasticities of above 0.3 (Vasconcelos et al., 2007) and 0.15 (Monteiro, 2006); and 
in the Spanish case, for which Lopez et al. (2008) report an elasticity of about 0.08. The results in 
the present paper can be interpreted as follows: from column 1 of table 8, if market access 
increases on average 1%, the individual wages will be on average in 0.04% higher; from in 
column 1 table 9, if market access increases on average 1%, the individual wages will increase 
on average 0.01%. Thus, these results seem to explain the spatial distribution of wages in 
Guatemala, though poorly. As for the control variables, in column 7 of table 8, all of them are 
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statistically significant and report the expected sign. For instance, for every level of schooling 
reached by the worker, wages are reported to be 19.2% higher on average. The experience of 
workers that is represented by their age has positive effect on wages, but diminishing as years 
pass. Women earn 18.0% less than men. Those with social security earn on average 26.7% more 
than those who do not have such a social benefit. Ladinos earn 9.90% more than indigenous 
workers. Finally, when controlling for public capital, for every 1% of increase on this 
expenditure, the individual wages are 0.049% higher.  When the model control for region fixed 
effect, the estimate of market access becomes smaller and negative, while the rest of control 
variables continue to be consistent as before.  
 
Table 8. Market Access: without neighboring influence  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         Market Access 0.044 *** 0.04 *** 0.021 *** 0.02 *** 0.013 *** 0.017 *** 0.018 *** -0.007 ** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Dummy (Time) 
 
-0.142 *** -0.177 *** -0.174 *** -0.151 *** -0.151 *** -0.126 *** -0.124 *** 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
Public Capital 
  
0.04 *** 0.046 *** 0.04 *** 0.046 *** 0.049 *** -0.032 * 
   
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019) 
Schooling 
  
0.347 *** 0.323 *** 0.26 *** 0.263 *** 0.192 *** 0.182 *** 
   
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age 
  
3.54 *** 3.518 *** 2.882 *** 2.985 *** 2.617 *** 2.646 *** 
   
(0.121) (0.12) (0.116) (0.114) (0.111) (0.108) 
Age2 
  
-0.474 *** -0.473 *** -0.388 *** -0.405 *** -0.355 *** -0.361 *** 
   
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Ethnic 
   
0.14 *** 0.1 *** 0.103 *** 0.099 *** 0.063 *** 
    
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Social security 
    
0.337 *** 0.333 *** 0.267 *** 0.242 *** 
     
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Gender 
     
0.215 *** 0.18 *** 0.185 *** 
      
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Region fixed effect no no no no no no no yes 
Dummy (Industry) no no no no no no yes yes 
Dummy (Occupation) no no no no no no yes yes 
                  
Observations  23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00  
F 924.363 652.417 1058.44 975.215 1167.875 1178.138 530.664 326.089 
Prob > P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-Squared 0.037 0.052 0.21 0.222 0.281 0.307 0.357 0.386 
                  
Standard errors in parentheses 
        Note: In logarithm terms. 
        * p<.1,* * p<.05,* ** p<.01 
        . 
 
Furthermore, table 9 shows similar behaviors in the same estimates described above, but 
neither public capital nor neighboring public capital are consistently significant. Neighboring 
wages have a positive and strong influence on local individual wages. When the average of 
wages in neighboring regions increases by 1%, the local individual wages report an increase in 
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average of 0.97%, which suggests a strong spatial correlation that can be confirmed in the in the 
spatial Moran-test described above. However, the inclusion of neighboring variables may 
introduce a source of endogeneity in a least squared model, so table 10 presents estimates with 
the iterative model proposed by Fingleton (2006 and 2009) from equation 44. One of the goals 
here is to have a complete setting of variables explaining the behavior of individual wages 
through the consideration of neighboring wages while accommodating the endogeneity 
influence. Therefore, the expression (ln 𝑃 − 𝜌𝑊 ln𝑃) referred in the strategy (table 6) is 
interpreted as the market access.  
 
 
Table 9. Market Access: with neighboring influence  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         Market Access 0.012 *** 0.009 *** 0.003  0.003 ** 0.000 0.003 * 0.004 ** -0.005  
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Neighboring wage 1.194 *** 1.541 *** 1.233 *** 1.139 *** 0.929 *** 0.928 *** 0.976 *** 0.808 *** 
 
(0.027) (0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.173) 
Public Capital 
 
-0.015 ** -0.01  -0.016  -0.026  -0.043 *** -0.031 * -0.025  
  
(0.007) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.02) 
Dummy (Time) 
 
0.139 *** 0.061 *** 0.042 *** 0.021 ** 0.018 * 0.054 *** 0.046  
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.036) 
Neighboring Public Capital 
  
0.004  0.022  0.042 * 0.078 *** 0.062 *** -0.092  
   
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.14) 
Schooling 
  
0.318 *** 0.312 *** 0.256 *** 0.259 *** 0.188 *** 0.182 *** 
   
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age 
  
3.435 *** 3.436 *** 2.864 *** 2.968 *** 2.611 *** 2.642 *** 
   
(0.118) (0.117) (0.114) (0.112) (0.109) (0.108) 
Age2 
  
-0.463 *** -0.463 *** -0.387 *** -0.404 *** -0.356 *** -0.36 *** 
   
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Ethnic 
   
0.046 *** 0.027 *** 0.03 *** 0.025 *** 0.062 *** 
    
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Social security 
    
0.311 *** 0.307 *** 0.24 *** 0.242 *** 
     
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Gender 
     
0.218 *** 0.178 *** 0.185 *** 
      
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Region fixed effect no no no no No no no yes 
Dummy (Industry) no no no no No no yes yes 
Dummy (Occupation) no no no no No no yes yes 
                  
Observations  23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00     2,403.00     2,404.00   23,947.00   23,947.00  
F 1488.929 797.976 997.695 892.014 1026.731 1057.385 539.081 313.381 
Prob > P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-Squared 0.111 0.118 0.25 0.251 0.3 0.327 0.378 0.386 
                  
Standard errors in parentheses 
        Note: In logarithm terms. 
        * p<.1,* * p<.05,* ** p<.01 
        . 
 
Table 10 shows that all estimates are similar to those in table 8 and 9. That is, all 
estimates are statistically significant, and in particular the market access: for every 1% increase 
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of the market access, individual wages will report an increase of 0.004%, a very inelastic value. 
The rest of control variables are very similar to those in tables 8 and 9, respectively.  
 
Table 10. Market Access: Iterative process with neighboring wage influence  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Neighboring wage 1.085 *** 1.037 *** 0.992 *** 0.968 *** 0.000 0.992 *** 0.962 *** 0.99 *** 0.82 *** 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.169) 
Market Access 0.008 *** 0.004 ** 0.004 * 0.003  0.003  0.004 * 0.004 ** 0.004 ** -0.007 * 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Dummy (Time) 0.077 *** 0.06 *** 0.037 *** 0.03 *** 0.019 * 0.046 *** 0.037 *** 0.054 *** 0.05  
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.036) 
Ethnic 0.065 *** 0.034 *** 0.024 *** 0.027 *** 0.03 *** 0.026 *** 0.027 *** 0.024 *** 0.062 *** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Social security 0.416 *** 0.362 *** 0.307 *** 0.307 *** 0.307 *** 0.288 *** 0.228 *** 0.24 *** 0.242 *** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Gender 0.208 *** 0.219 *** 0.216 *** 0.216 *** 0.218 *** 0.201 *** 0.182 *** 0.178 *** 0.185 *** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Schooling 
 
0.229 *** 0.26 *** 0.26 *** 0.259 *** 0.214 *** 0.205 *** 0.188 *** 0.182 *** 
  
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age 
  
2.968 *** 2.968 *** 2.969 *** 2.737 *** 2.729 *** 2.611 *** 2.641 *** 
   
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.11) (0.11) (0.109) (0.108) 
Age2 
  
-0.403 *** -0.403 *** -0.404 *** -0.372 *** -0.371 *** -0.356 *** -0.36 *** 
   
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Public Capital 
   
0.01 * -0.045 *** -0.041 ** -0.034 ** -0.033 ** -0.021  
    
(0.006) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.02) 
Neighboring Public Capital 
    
0.085 *** 0.074 *** 0.073 *** 0.07 *** -0.11  
     
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.14) 
Region fixed effect no no no no no no no no yes 
Dummy (Industry) no no no no no yes no yes yes 
Dummy (Occupation) no no no no no no yes yes yes 
                    
Observations 
 
23,947.00  
 
23,947.00  
 
23,947.00  
   
2,403.00  
   
2,404.00  
   
2,414.00  
 
23,947.00  
 
23,947.00  
 
23,947.00  
F 1291.358 1361.441 1289.843 1161.284 1057.253 611.152 832.393 538.978 313.422 
Prob > P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-Squared 0.245 0.285 0.327 0.327 0.327 0.36 0.358 0.378 0.386 
                    
Standard errors in parentheses 
         Note: In logarithm terms. 
         * p<.1,* * p<.05,* ** p<.01 
          
. 
Table 11 shows the results of the spatial panel data, and it is delimited to the department 
and 2 years of information. The objective of including such a model is to control for the spatial 
spillover. The model includes the variables of public capital, neighboring public capital, 
schooling, unemployment, and underemployment. Overall, the results which are represented 
by the direct and indirect impacts show that market access is negative and statistically not 
significant; thus, it is not possible to provide an interpretation of the estimate. The control 
variables such as public capital, neighboring public capital, and schooling in column 2 show 
that their direct impacts are 0.32, -0.65 and 1.38, while the indirect impact is only significant in 
the schooling when reporting an impact of 1.54. 
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Table 11. Spatial panel data 
 
Estimates 1 2 3 4 
     Market Access 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Public Capital 0.18* 0.152** 0.164** 0.165** 
 
(0.088) (0.055) (0.056) (0.054) 
Schooling 0.975*** 0.653*** 0.73*** 0.722*** 
 
(0.145) (0.124) (0.131) (0.12) 
Neighboring Public Capital -0.278* -0.307*** -0.314*** -0.286** 
 
(0.13) (0.085) (0.089) (0.089) 
Unemployment 
  
-0.015. 
 
   
(0.009) 
 Underemployment 
   
-0.32***
    
(0.059) 
     Impacts 1 2 3 4 
     Market Access 
    Direct 0.006 -0.009 -0.012 -0.004
Indirect 0.004 -0.01 -0.011 -0.003 
Public Capital 
    Direct 0.33* 0.321*** 0.327*** 0.278*** 
Indirect 0.242 0.359 0.307 0.158 
Schooling 
    Direct 1.787*** 1.378*** 1.454*** 1.22*** 
Indirect 1.312 1.542* 1.367 0.692 
Neighboring Public Capital 
   Direct -0.51* -0.648*** -0.626*** -0.483*** 
Indirect -0.374 -0.725 -0.588 -0.274 
Unemployment 
    Direct 
  
-0.031* 
 Indirect 
  
-0.029 
 Underemployment 
    Direct 
   
-0.54*** 
Indirect 
   
-0.306 
        
. 
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
The purpose of using the NEG wage equation is to test whether or not the market access in 
Guatemala influences the spatial distribution of wages. Almost all specifications presented 
above show that the market access estimates are statistically significant but very small, meaning 
that any variation will have little impact on wages. This result is not congruent with empirical 
literature regarding other countries, as most of them report elasticities in a range between 0.1 
and 0.85. (Some empirical evidence: Brakman et al., 2004; Fomchenko, 2008; Vansconcelos, et al., 
2007) 
Therefore, the results show that in Guatemala, wages do not respond to the market 
access of the regions, implying that economic development of the locales in terms of 
opportunity of job and business do not necessarily represent better real wages. In contrast, the 
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other control variables that identify the economic and demographic characteristics of the 
population such as schooling level, ethnic group, age, gender, affiliation to social security, 
industry, profession are statistically significant and show the expected sign. The effects of the 
variables of public capital and neighboring public capital cannot be concluded under this 
analysis because it shows disgruntled signs; thus, depending on the specification of the model, 
it can exert a positive or negative influence on real hourly wages. This situation will be 
discussed in the next chapter.   
 To emphasize that market access is not having a strong effect on real hourly wages does 
not imply that it is irrelevant for policy implications. In fact, it shows that the economic growth 
of the regions within Guatemala are not associated to the individual benefits of the workers; 
indeed this was anticipated earlier in this paper when looking into the figures 2, 7 and 8, which 
show reductions of the real wages in certain regions even while the country is experiencing 
economic growth. The implication is that during the period between 2006 and 2011, prices 
increased at a higher rate than the nominal income in the different regions of the country. This 
may occur for an excess of labor supply in Guatemala.  Many people are looking for decent jobs, 
which are very limited in Guatemala; thus an excess of labor supply induces wages to be low as 
forces of the labor market adjust them. Consequently, people who do not find a decent job have 
to look for short term solutions while continuing to pursue their desired position; this can mean 
be working for fewer hours than desired due to a dearth of  jobs, or it can mean working for a 
salary that is lower than the minimum legal wage. These short term solutions disclose part of 
the structure of the labor market in Guatemala, which gives firms the power of wage 
determination over the workers. As a result, wages tend to be as low as firms want to pay, 
which induces the low rate of increase of the observed nominal wages in the period under 
analysis. 
Another factor to discuss is the effect of internal migration. Market access in 
metropolitan areas is significantly greater than in any other region within the country, making 
them attractive places to do business because of the economies of scale; therefore, one would 
expect to observe a higher demand of workers than any other place. This expectation 
incentivizes workers from other regions to move into the metropolitan areas, which translates 
into the high levels of immigration as reported in the ENCOVI’s 2006 and 2011.  So, the demand 
of workers is easily fulfilled in the metropolitan area because the supply is greater than the 
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demand, and those without a decent job will end up being underemployed, implying lower 
wages.  Hence, market access does not represent a good measure of the spatial distribution of 
wages in Guatemala because the excess of labor supply in the country overrides the potential 
benefits that any region would enjoy from its economic growth.  
Market access can be interpreted as the economic prosperity of a place derived from the 
job and business opportunities that arise from increasing return of scales, lower transportation 
costs, and proper income. Therefore, the policy implication is derived from the fact that 
economic prosperity is not reflected in wages due to the excess of labor supply. It can be then 
inferred that the problem in metropolitan area is a consequence of the internal migration, while 
in the other regions the problem is a result of low production in the non-agriculture sectors. 
Thus, the efforts must be focused on the balance of labor allocation by incentivizing the 
production in the regions outside the metropolitan area. People in those regions have very few 
job opportunities in the non-agriculture sectors and are forced to accept underemployment or to 
move to another place. Consequently, this effort would help to reduce the massive process of 
internal migration, which would improve the labor situation in the metropolitan areas.   
Thus, while market access explains very little of the spatial wage distribution, it does 
explain some of the incentives of the flow of internal migration, as market access is most likely 
to represent a better place for production and labor markets in terms of economies of scale and 
job opportunities. To prove this argument it is necessary to leave open a new area for future 
research, requiring the collection of data on internal migration and analyzing it against the 
market access.  
 
4.3 Wage curve 
The wage curve follows the traditional specifications explained in the literature of the previous 
chapter. This includes a Mincerian wage equation expanded by the unemployment rate.  The 
specification is later altered by including the spatial interactions with other labor markets.  The 
first form of estimation occurs on the individual level, and is specified in log form as follows: 
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑈𝑖𝑟𝑡) +∑𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑗=2
+ 𝑓𝑟 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡 
where  𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎
2) 
(45)  
70 
 
 
The extended wage equation with spatial interaction becomes: 
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑈𝑖𝑟𝑡) + 𝜃(𝑊 ∗ ln (𝑈𝑗𝑟𝑡)) +∑𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑗=2
+ 𝑓𝑟 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡 
where  𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) 
 
(46)  
 
The subscripts i, r, and t stand for individual, region, and year, respectively. The 
dependent variable ln(𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡) refers to the log of the wage in real terms; ln(𝑈𝑖𝑟𝑡) is the log of the 
annual unemployment rate of the region where the individual resides; ln(𝑈𝑗𝑟𝑡) is the average 
unemployment rate of the neighbor regions j where the individual “i” does not reside. The set 
of variables in  𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡  contains the control variables such as schooling level and ethnic group of the 
individual, the industry in which he or she works, and his/her occupation; it also includes fixed 
effects for region and year (𝑓𝑟, 𝑔𝑡). The equation also includes the stock of infrastructure of the 
region where the individual works. Finally, 𝑊 is the spatial weight matrix which captures the 
spatial interaction of the regions. 
As noted, one critique of the former functional form is that it contains observations of 
different (individual and regional) levels of aggregation, which leads to the problem of bias 
estimation of the standard errors.  In order to solve this problem, Blanchard and Oswald (2005) 
recommend using a second form of estimation based on regional mean regression. Unlike the 
previous form, this takes the average of the wages and individual characteristics of the 
observed individuals.  This is another robust test of the results where the problems of 
estimation of the standard errors are smoothed.   By following such recommendations, the new 
models are presented in the equations 47 and 48, which can be represented in a panel data. 
ln(𝑤𝑟𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑈𝑟𝑡) +∑𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑟𝑡
𝑗=2
+ 𝑓𝑟 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡 
where  𝑒𝑟𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎
2) 
(47)  
 
ln(𝑤𝑟𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑈𝑟𝑡) + 𝜌(𝑊 ∗ ln(𝑤𝑟𝑡)) + 𝜃(𝑊 ∗ ln (𝑈𝑟𝑡)) +∑𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑟𝑡
𝑗=2
+ 𝑓𝑟 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡 
where  𝜀𝑟𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) 
(48)  
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In addition to this modification, the paper also uses a multilevel model (see chapter 5 for 
its theoretical explanation).  This model is an extension that allows the inclusion of at least two 
levels of aggregation, usually individual data level and regional data.  This kind of model 
makes it possible to reduce the bias problem of overestimation of the parameters, while keeping 
the original complete database.  One further advantage of this model is that it captures two 
levels of standard errors which allow us to understand the real effect of the regional and 
individual variables. The expression is as follows.    
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡) = 𝛾0,0,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑈𝑟𝑡) + 𝜌(𝑊 ∗ ln(𝑤𝑟𝑡)) + 𝜃(𝑊 ∗ ln(𝑈𝑟𝑡)) + 𝑣𝑟,𝑡 + 
∑𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑗=2
+ 𝑓𝑟 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑢0,𝑟,𝑡 
 
where  𝜀𝑟𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜀
2),  and  𝜎𝜀
2 = 𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2 
 
(49)  
 
In equation (50), the expression 𝜎𝜀
2 = 𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2  represents the sum of the within-group 
and between-group variances of production.  This information makes it possible to estimate the 
intra-class correlation that provides a better visualization of the incidence of every level of 
aggregation variable on the results of the model. 
𝜌 =
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2 
 
(50)  
 
4.3.1 Data about wage curve 
As in section 4.2, the data is obtained from ENCOVI 2006 and 2011 provided by INE. The 
information of wages, unemployment and underemployment are the same as described before, 
but with the addition of shadow unemployment (See Table 7).  
4.3.2 Results 
The estimation of the wage curve is based on the Guatemala Living Standard Measurement 
Study of 2006 and 2011, and it is estimated through the Mincerian wage equation augmented 
with local and neighboring unemployment under a pooled-cross section analysis. Later the 
wage curve is tested against alternative wage curve models where the variable of 
unemployment rate is substituted by rates of shadow unemployment and underemployment 
72 
 
for obtaining a robust result of the role of the local labor market conditions as an important 
factor in the process of wage determination. Again, the set of results are described below, while 
the discussion of their implications are covered at the end of this section.  
The results presented in Table 12 are estimates obtained from a least squares method 
with fixed effects on time and region.  There are six nested models, from which the full model is 
represented in column 6.  The econometric representation of this table is shown in equation (45), 
and includes regional unemployment, gender, age, affiliation to social security, and schooling.  
It also includes three dummy variables: the industry where people work, the profession or type 
of position they hold in the industry where they work, and the ethnic group, for differentiating 
the effects between Ladinos and indigenous people. 
All nested models include the logarithms of unemployment rate.  The estimates are 
statistically significant and reflect a negative influence of unemployment on individual wages in 
their regional labor markets.  The former suggests that the wage curve exists in Guatemala, and 
the value found in the full model is about -0.04.  The former means that when holding the rest 
of the control variables constant, for every 1% of increase in the unemployment rate, the 
average wages will be 0.04% lower. 
The values of the control variables are statistically significant, showing the expected 
signs based on previous empirical literature.  For instance, when controlling for gender, male 
salaries are about 18.5% higher than female salaries.  Age as an experience indicator is positive, 
statistically significant, and diminishing.  After controlling for social security, the models show 
that workers with such benefits earn in average 24.3% more than workers without.  This 
variable serves to discriminate between workers from the formal and informal sectors. (Ramos 
and Saranac, 2010; Baltagi et al., 2012; Gunther and Laune, 2012.)  With respect to schooling, the 
higher the level of schooling, the higher the wages. For every extra level of school education 
reached, wages are on average 18.2% higher than the average wages earned by people with one 
lower level of education.  Finally, the group of people that identifies themselves as Ladinos earn 
6.3% more than the rest of people in average. In addition, models from columns four to six in 
Table 12 control for dummy variables of industry and profession.  
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Table 12. Wage curve: without neighboring influence  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       Unemployment -0.047 *** -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.047 *** -0.043 *** -0.038 ** 
 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Dummy (Time) -0.119 *** -0.121 *** -0.102 *** -0.097 *** -0.103 *** -0.095 *** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Gender 
 
0.225 *** 0.224 *** 0.209 *** 0.189 *** 0.185 *** 
  
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age 
 
-0.225 *** 2.996 *** 2.775 *** 2.771 *** 2.651 *** 
  
(0.008) (0.112) (0.11) (0.11) (0.108) 
Age2 
 
4.674 *** -0.407 *** -0.378 *** -0.377 *** -0.362 *** 
  
(0.118) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Social security 
  
0.313 *** 0.29 *** 0.231 *** 0.243 *** 
   
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Schooling 
  
0.26 *** 0.208 *** 0.2 *** 0.182 *** 
   
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ethnic 
   
0.066 *** 0.065 *** 0.063 *** 
    
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Dummy (Industry) no no no yes no yes 
Dummy (Occupation) no no no no yes yes 
              
Observations  23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00  
F 144.689 247.153 425.658 346.604 403.956 333.205 
Prob > P 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-Squared 0.122 0.212 0.333 0.367 0.365 0.385 
              
Standard errors in parentheses 
      Note: In logarithm terms. 
      * p<.1,* * p<.05,* ** p<.01 
      . 
 
Table 13 contains the results for the equation (46).  Unlike the previous table of results, 
this one includes the neighboring regions’ influence on the unemployment rate over the 
individual wages in the local labor market.  Overall, the results are not very different from those 
presented in table 12. The wage curve reports an elasticity value of -0.0365.  When checking for 
the average influence of the unemployment rate of neighboring regions, under the full model 
the estimate is statistically significant and negative (-0.0346), meaning that for every 1% of 
increase of the difference between the neighboring unemployment rate and the local market, the 
local individual wages will be on average 3.49% lower. This result shows the expected effect on 
wages as suggested by Buettner (1999), Longhi et al. (2006), and Palombi and Fingleton (2013) 
meaning that the neighboring labor conditions may represent a threat against workers when 
determining wages.    
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         Table 13. Wage curve: with neighboring influence 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Unemployment -0.0169* -0.0636*** -0.0618*** -0.0464*** -0.0365*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Neighboring Unemployment -0.0710*** -0.0497*** -0.0381*** -0.0365*** -0.0346*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Gender  0.2157*** 0.2375*** 0.2171*** 0.1997*** 
  (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Age  0.0419*** 0.0339*** 0.0307*** 0.0290*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age^2  -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic  0.2609*** 0.1286*** 0.1264*** 0.1234*** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Schooling   0.1296*** 0.1035*** 0.0913*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Social Security   0.3243*** 0.2990*** 0.2493*** 
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
      
Region and time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Dummy (Industry) no no no yes Yes 
Dummy (Occupation) no no no no yes 
      
AIC 18600.5294 17253.8171 14945.7999 14398.9769 14084.5432 
BIC 18644.3753 17326.8936 15033.4917 14567.0529 14289.1574 
Log lik. -9294.2647 -8616.9085 -7460.9000 -7176.4885 -7014.2716 
Chi-squared 648.9784 2231.9675 5349.3290 6301.6678 6843.8646 
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     Note: In logarithm terms. 
     * p<.1,* * p<.05,* ** p<.01 
      
 
 
                                 Table 14. Wage curve by demographic groups and industry sector  
                                     Ladino and Indigenous group 
Group   2006 2011 
Ladino Manufacturing -0.097* -0.163*** 
  Non-manufacturing -0.116** -0.12** 
Indigenous Manufacturing -0.158** -0.09* 
  Non-manufacturing -0.117** -0.131*** 
Note: In logarithm terms. 
            Models include regional and time fixed effects. 
          + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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                          Table 15. Wage curve by demographic groups and industry sector 
                                                  Men and Women groups 
Group   2006 2011 
Men Manufacturing -0.14*** -0.106** 
  Non-manufacturing -0.125*** -0.121** 
Women Manufacturing -0.15 -0.101* 
  Non-manufacturing -0.103** -0.123** 
Note: In logarithm terms. 
            Models include regional and time fixed effects. 
          + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
. 
 
 When considering the estimations by demographic groups (tables 14 and 15), it is 
possible to show that the wage curve persists in every group with an elasticity very close to -0.1. 
For instance, in 2006, for every 1% of increase in the unemployment rate on average, Ladinos in 
the manufacturing sector experience a negative pressure in their wages of -0.097%, while 
indigenous people have a negative impact in their wages of -0.158%. Considering the results by 
groups of men and women, both results show that the wage curve is represented with 
elasticities of -0.14 and -0.15, respectively in 2006; that is, for every 1% of increase of 
unemployment rate, men will report a decrease in their wages of 0.14% and women of 0.15%. 
 
Shadow unemployment and underemployment 
Turning now to other labor market conditions, the next table of results shows the 
estimation of the effect of shadow unemployment on wages. As mentioned above, shadow 
unemployment is defined as the people unemployed and not looking for a job that may 
incorporate into the labor force only if someone offers them a position. The literature suggests 
that shadow unemployment may not represent a good instrument for explaining the changes in 
wages because of the problem of causality between the explained and explanatory variables; 
i.e., wage levels may induce people to be part of the labor force or not, and potential changes in 
the labor force may induce fluctuations in the wage rates. Although this issue must be carefully 
considered in future study, I present its estimation in table 16 to show how shadow 
unemployment is associated to wages.  The shadow unemployment shows strong and negative 
effects over the average of individual wages. The elasticity is -0.05, meaning that for every 1% of 
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increase in shadow unemployment, the individual wages will be on average 0.05% lower. The 
estimates of the rest of the control variables are the similar to those in the table 13.   
In spite of the results, in this paper it is considered that shadow unemployment does not 
really represent an active threat to current workers in the labor force, as they are not actively 
competing for the same jobs. People experiencing shadow unemployment have high levels of 
wage reservations, meaning that people will take a job only if wages are enough high to satisfy 
their well-being. This does not necessarily represent a labor market condition that puts pressure 
on wages unless the matching process fails due to a low labor supply. Davig and Mustre (2013) 
show that shadow unemployment is most likely to have an impact over the unemployment and 
the underemployment because of the addition of people in the labor force, yet the authors 
remark that the potential effect is usually low.  So, shadow unemployment is unlikely to explain 
the behavior of real hourly wages under the traditional wage curve analysis.  
 
 Table 16. Wage curve: Shadow unemployment 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       Shadow Unemployment -0.093 *** -0.078 *** -0.067 *** -0.059 *** -0.058 *** -0.05 *** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Dummy (Time) -0.168 *** -0.178 *** -0.158 *** -0.142 *** -0.144 *** -0.131 *** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Gender  0.224 *** 0.224 *** 0.208 *** 0.189 *** 0.185 *** 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age  4.662 *** 2.985 *** 2.765 *** 2.763 *** 2.643 *** 
  (0.118) (0.112) (0.11) (0.11) (0.108) 
Age2  -0.662 *** -0.406 *** -0.376 *** -0.376 *** -0.36 *** 
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Social security   0.313 *** 0.29 *** 0.231 *** 0.243 *** 
   (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Schooling   0.259 *** 0.208 *** 0.2 *** 0.182 *** 
   (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ethnic    0.065 *** 0.064 *** 0.062 *** 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Dummy (Industry) no no no yes no yes 
Dummy (Occupation) no no no no yes yes 
              
Observations  23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00      23,947.00 
F 145.532 247.453 425.759 346.749 404.185 333.324 
Prob > P 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-Squared 0.123 0.212 0.333 0.367 0.365 0.386 
              
Standard errors in parentheses 
      Note: In logarithm terms. 
      * p<.1,* * p<.05,* ** p<.01 
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 Table (17) shows underemployment as a labor market condition that represents a threat 
to the determination of individual wages. After controlling for demographic characteristics, the 
elasticities of underemployment are shown to be a statistically significant negative. For instance, 
under the full model in column 6, for every 1% increase of underemployment, the individual 
wages will be on average 0.11% lower. The control variables are very similar to those in the 
previous tables in which the wages of women are 18.5% lower than those of men; those with 
social security have wages 24.2% higher than those without; every upper schooling level 
represents on average wages 18.2% higher; and, finally, Ladinos earn wages 6.2% higher than 
the rest of the ethnic groups.  
 
 
 Table 17. Wage curve: Underemployment 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       Underemployment -0.234 *** -0.137 ** -0.083  -0.089  -0.116 ** -0.109 ** 
 (0.065) (0.062) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) 
Dummy (Time) -0.117 *** -0.146 *** -0.136 *** -0.12 *** -0.118 *** -0.107 *** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Gender  0.224 *** 0.224 *** 0.208 *** 0.189 *** 0.185 *** 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age  4.661 *** 2.985 *** 2.765 *** 2.76 *** 2.641 *** 
  (0.119) (0.112) (0.11) (0.11) (0.108) 
Age2  -0.662 *** -0.406 *** -0.376 *** -0.376 *** -0.36 *** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Social security   0.313 *** 0.289 *** 0.23 *** 0.242 *** 
   (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Schooling   0.26 *** 0.208 *** 0.2 *** 0.182 *** 
   (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ethnic    0.066 *** 0.064 *** 0.062 *** 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Dummy (Industry) no no no yes no yes 
Dummy (Occupation) no no no no yes yes 
       
Observations  23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00 
F 144.987 246.786 424.99 346.329 403.787 333.115 
Prob > P 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-Squared 0.122 0.212 0.332 0.367 0.365 0.385 
              
Standard errors in parentheses 
      Note: In logarithm terms. 
      * p<.1,* * p<.05,* ** p<.01 
      
 
 
 Table (18) shows the effect of the neighboring underemployment on the local individual 
wages.  Almost all estimates of the neighboring underemployment in the nested models are 
negative, though under the full model is not significant. The interpretation of the estimates is 
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for every 1% of increase of the difference of the underemployment rate of the neighbors against 
the local underemployment, the local individual wages will be 0.01% lower. This new model 
results in an increase in the effect of the local underemployment, when reporting an estimate of 
-0.4552 in the full model. 
 
 Table 18. Wage curve: Underemployment and neighboring underemployment 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Underemployment -0.5947*** -0.6132*** -0.5138*** -0.4769*** -0.4552*** 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
Neighboring underemployment 0.0015 -0.0131* -0.0142** -0.0100* -0.0073 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Gender  0.2152*** 0.2237*** 0.1847*** 0.1621*** 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age  0.0392*** 0.0295*** 0.0283*** 0.0267*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age^2  -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic  0.1381*** 0.0392*** 0.0406*** 0.0389*** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Schooling   0.1296*** 0.1165*** 0.1038*** 
   (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Social Security   0.2773*** 0.2755*** 0.2285*** 
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Region and time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Dummy (Industry) no no no yes yes 
Dummy (Occupation) no no no no yes 
      
AIC 21922.6342 20770.2978 17942.2156 17551.3180 17176.6840 
BIC 21967.7869 20845.5522 18032.5209 17724.4032 17379.8709 
Log lik. -10955.317 -10375.149 -8959.1078 -8752.6590 -8561.3420 
Chi-squared 1168.5154 2539.4873 6293.2317 6991.5159 7603.8712 
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     Note: In logarithm terms. 
     * p<.1,* * p<.05,* ** p<.01 
     
 
 
 It can be seen in table 19, wages are affected by the joint influence of department 
unemployment and underemployment.  In the full model, the estimates of the labor market 
conditions are statistically significant and negative when reporting values of -0.027 and -0.132, 
respectively. We observe that underemployment has more relevance than unemployment, and 
provides more meaningful results for a developing country, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Finally, the results and interpretation of the control variables are very similar to those 
in the above tables. 
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Table 19. Wage curve: Unemployment and underemployment 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       Unemployment -0.045 *** -0.042 *** -0.038 *** -0.035 *** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Underemployment -0.297 *** -0.2 *** -0.136 ** -0.128 ** -0.144 ** -0.132 ** 
 (0.068) (0.065) (0.06) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) 
Dummy (Time) -0.088 *** -0.111 *** -0.11 *** -0.113 *** -0.114 *** -0.113 *** 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.03) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Gender  0.224 *** 0.224 *** 0.209 *** 0.189 *** 0.186 *** 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age  4.659 *** 2.984 *** 2.763 *** 2.76 *** 2.639 *** 
  (0.118) (0.112) (0.11) (0.11) (0.108) 
Age2  -0.661 *** -0.405 *** -0.376 *** -0.376 *** -0.36 *** 
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Social security   0.313 *** 0.29 *** 0.23 *** 0.242 *** 
   (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Schooling   0.26 *** 0.208 *** 0.2 *** 0.182 *** 
   (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ethnic    0.065 *** 0.064 *** 0.062 *** 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Dummy (Industry) no no no yes no yes 
Dummy (Occupation) no no no no yes yes 
              
Observations  23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00   23,947.00  
F 139.136 238.364 411.083 338.189 392.523 326.012 
Prob > P 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-Squared 0.122 0.212 0.333 0.367 0.365 0.386 
              
Standard errors in parentheses 
      Note: In logarithm terms. 
      * p<.1,* * p<.05,* ** p<.01 
       
 
 
The estimates in Table 20 correspond to the multilevel model. These results are 
presented in order to provide a robust verification of the results shown in the previous tables 
regarding the wage curve. The elasticities of unemployment, underemployment, and shadow 
unemployment have values of -0.02, -0.20 and 0.06, respectively.  The unemployment and the 
underemployment confirm the negative influence of the undesired labor conditions over the 
wage determination, while the shadow unemployment is positive. With respect to the 
neighboring effect of the labor market conditions, the estimates are not statistically significant, 
implying that they have no meaningful effect under this kind of model.  On the other side, the 
control variables show similar estimates among the three models, which are very similar to 
those in the above tables, and demand the same statistical interpretation. 
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                     Table 20. Wage curve: Multi-level model and three labor market conditions  
 1 2 3 
    
Unemployment -0. 0289*   
𝜌 value 0.000   
Underemployment  -0.2038*  
𝜌 value  0.1101  
Shadow Unemployment   0.0686** 
𝜌 value   0.0097 
Gender 0.2405*** 0.2401*** 0.2402*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age 0.0314*** 0.0313*** 0.0313*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age^2 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic 0.0561*** 0.0560*** 0.0558*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Schooling 0.1284*** 0.1283*** 0.1283*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Social Security 0.2914*** 0.2908*** 0.2916*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Neighborhood unemployment -0.0315   
𝜌 value 0.002   
Neighborhood underemployment  0.092  
𝜌 value  0.0379  
Neighborhood shadow unemployment   -0.1352 
𝜌 value   0.002 
    
Observations 23948 23948 23948 
Log lik. -16063.5802 -16058.8928 -16057.1109 
Chi-squared 8566.2822 8317.6767 8743.9825 
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
         Standard errors in parentheses 
           Note: In logarithm terms. 
          Models include regional and time fixed effects. 
          + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
. 
 
4.3.3 Discussion 
The results reveal that both unemployment and underemployment exert important influence on 
the wage determination in each region in Guatemala, and more relevant is the finding that 
underemployment has more influence on wage determination than unemployment during 
2006-2011.  In addition, the neighboring labor market conditions can also influence the local 
wage rates in negative manner, posing the roll of labor market at regional level in an important 
framework for policy implications.  Hence, it is possible to confirm the second hypothesis of this 
study, meaning that the wage curve exists in Guatemala.  Indeed, it is important to remark that 
the wage curve constructed using the underemployment is more relevant, which highlights the 
importance of the conditions and characteristics of the country, where informality constitutes 
the most conspicuous feature.  In more detail, the wage curve can be appreciated at different 
levels of analysis, that is, at country and regional level, interregional spillovers, and even when 
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splitting the analysis by demographic groups, one can see that the wage curve is still persistent 
for Ladinos, indigenous, women or men to nearly the degree. The results are consistent and 
relatively close to -0.1, as reported in the empirical literature.   
As mentioned above, Guatemala has an average unemployment rate of 3.4%, while 
reporting 69% of the labor force working in the informal sector. The implication is that workers 
and firms are more aware of the existence of underemployment than of unemployment in the 
regions within the country.  Underemployment is seen as the second best option that workers 
have in the absence of decent jobs. Workers experiencing underemployment are constrained to 
accept low wages in the labor market of Guatemala, or to work less time than desired. 
Therefore, the local atmosphere of high underemployment produces uncertainty for workers 
when searching or keeping a job, which when having it, workers have limited empowerment to 
negotiate better wages and working conditions. This happens as firms capitalize on the lack of 
public benefits for unemployed workers, meaning that if a person does not have a job then is 
very probable that this person will not account for any income; thus, people are forced to take 
jobs with low payment or low number of hours of working.  
 With respect to neighboring unemployment and underemployment rates, the idea was 
to understand the role of neighboring labor markets over local wages, which in turn helps to 
understand the linkages and levels of integration between the labor markets within Guatemala. 
Both neighboring unemployment and underemployment have a negative effect on local wages, 
meaning that neighboring labor market conditions diminish workers’ capacity for wage 
negotiation, becoming a potential threat to these workers as markets tighten (Buettner, 1999; 
Longhi et al., 2006; and Palombi and Fingleton, 2013). The implication is related mostly to the 
internal migration of workers. On the one hand, people decide to move because the labor 
market in the origin region is not capable of providing enough jobs or good jobs in the non-
agriculture sector; in case of staying, workers are forced to be underemployed.  Thus, the 
decision to move between labor markets is encouraged by the opportunity for better jobs.  
Receptor regions, as the metropolitan area, are likely to report an increase of labor force, which 
pushes wages down.  So by grabbing the initial and final statements of the above rationale, one 
can conclude that underemployment and unemployment in less developed regions affect wages 
in more developed neighboring regions after workers decide to move, implying a temporal 
process of adjustment of labor forces. On the other hand, the rationale of the effect of 
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underemployment and unemployment that comes from the neighboring developed regions 
have different linkages, fitting better into the rationale of the traditional wage curve due to two 
arguments. First, it is presumed that the internal migration cannot be the mean of transmission 
of the effects of such labor market conditions, as the pattern of the internal migration is moving 
toward the metropolitan area and not vice versa.  Second, more developed regions, such as the 
metropolitan area, represent an extension of the labor market for firms located in the non-
metropolitan area, and hence firms will take advantage of the wage determination when 
observing the process of pauperization in the metropolitan area, and workers that decide to stay 
in their regions are exposed to conditioning that firms can impose on the wage premium.   
  
4.4 Remarks on wage equations 
As mentioned in chapter 3, wage equations are partial equilibrium models that are representing 
the relationship between labor market conditions and wages.  The objective is to show that 
economic conditions of the regions are associated to wages rates in Guatemala, and hence the 
association of both kinds of variables would explain some of the incentives that economic 
agents have when deciding to move across regions. 
It was expected that market access would positively explain the spatial distribution of 
wages as it represents the economic prosperity of regions, i.e. the better economic environment, 
better wages; also, it was expected that labor market conditions, expressed in terms of 
unemployment and underemployment, would influence wage rates in a negative manner, for 
instance the higher the unemployment or the underemployment rate in a region, the lower 
wages.   
The results show that wages are not responsive to market access, meaning that to 
presume that economic growth will automatically bring about increases in average relative 
wages and positive wage equalization would be seriously misplaced. On the other hand, wage 
curve provides explanation of how wages can be determined as it shows that unemployment 
and underemployment have a very important role in the wage determination, which lead to 
worse economic inequalities within and between the regions.   
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At this point, it is convenient to remark the Guatemalan context in the analysis.  The 
finding that wages do not respond to economic development has to be with the high level of 
informality in the labor market, which is characterized for low both productivity and income 
(even lower than the legal minimum wage).  Indeed, the metropolitan area is far developed 
with respect many other regions of the rest of the country, but it has also a great mass of 
informal workers (more than 50% of the labor force, INE 2013).  Thus, the rationale of a positive 
association between wages and prosperity does not have place in this reality.  This is because 
the economic growth of the place is not enough to create new decent jobs and hence to absorb 
the supply of labor.  The former argument is reinforced by the finding of the modified wage 
curve, in which is used the underemployment rather than unemployment.  As explained before, 
the results show a great negative effect of underemployment over wages because there is an 
excess of labor supply, caused by both the natural growth of the population and by the internal 
migration flow.  The immediate implication is the creation of a monopolistic power of wage 
determination that firms acquire due to the labor conditions, which implies obstacles for any 
wage increasing or wage negotiation, or worse off, it implies wage decreasing in real terms as 
shown before.   
As previously mentioned in chapter 2, Guatemala experiences a great economic 
inequality, while in turn the current conditions of the labor market are not allowing alleviating 
such situation as new decent jobs are not created and as wages are not increasing in real terms.  
In this sense, there is not a short run hope in which the economic conditions will improve 
because there is not any economic policy aimed to fix such situation in the country.  Although 
the economic inequality is not related exclusively to wages and jobs, as policy maker, it should 
be at least the first stage aimed to work on it.  Labor market conditions are the key to alleviate 
the macroeconomic situation in Guatemala.  Better supervision on wage determination by the 
authorities should be implemented, as it may allow a fair negotiation of wages, which cannot be 
currently due to the monopolistic power of the firms.  Also, the government should implement 
a strategy of job creation through the monetary or tax incentives, but this strategy should be 
implemented mostly outside the metropolitan area for it will alleviate both the saturation of 
labor supply and it will improve the economic conditions of the rest of the regions.  A very 
particular example of a strategy to follow is to promote the investment in infrastructure in other 
regions, which would make more attractive to capital’s owners to undertake new business and 
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thus to create new jobs.  Finally, the roll of the labor market in Guatemala is determined by the 
gap between supply and demand of jobs, by the low wages, and by the lack of policy 
intervention in which authorities ensure fair deal to workers.   
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Chapter 5: Public investment and its spillover effects on economic performance 
across the regions of Guatemala 
 
The concept of public investment encompasses both financial expenditure and the social and 
physical capital deployed by the central government, local government, and public 
corporations.  The goal of public investment is to cover market failures that the private sector is 
unwilling or unable to correct.  This is done through intervention in public goods, to the benefit 
of the general population. Unlike the private sector, the public sector does not seek to profit 
from its investments; rather, it aims solely to benefit the population through the improvement 
of, among others, health care, education, research, public facilities (e.g., schools and hospitals), 
electricity, roads, and transportation systems.  Thus, one of the important roles of a public entity 
is to support the creation and maintenance of the social and economic growth that helps to 
secure and enhance the welfare of society.  How can it be determined whether public 
investment is accomplishing its role?  How does public investment influence the economic 
performance of a particular locale?  Such broad questions are beyond the scope of this paper, 
and would need to address the entire range of social and physical investments.  Thus, in what 
follows, the concepts of public investment will be restricted to the expenditure of physical 
capital, including the construction and maintenance of roads and basic services such as sewers, 
electricity, and water.  Furthermore, this paper defines economic performance as the change in 
production levels and productivity by firms. 
Economists and planners from different schools of thought have debated the effects of 
public investment.  The topic was first discussed formally twenty years ago, beginning with the 
early works of Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) and Holtz-Eakin (1994).  The issue has focused not only 
on the relationship between public investment and economic performance but also on the 
direction of causation, all without reaching a definite conclusion.  Aschauer (1989) and Munnel 
(1991) argue that public investment positively influences economic growth, while Holtz-Eakin 
(1994) and Boarnet (1998) argue that the higher the level of a locale’s economic development, 
the higher the demand for public investment.  
This paper seeks to analyze the relationship between public investment and economic 
performance of municipalities in Guatemala.  As noted above, in what follows, economic 
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performance is measured through productivity and production at the firm level. Therefore, to 
measure economic performance, defined as productive and production at the firm level, this 
paper uses panel data from two econometric models based on the endogenous growth model.  
The first model uses a Cobb-Douglas production function widely accepted by researchers to 
calculate productivity, and then use it as explained variable.  The second model uses a 
multilevel analysis to estimate the effects of public investment on production.  Since the 
estimations follow from the endogenous growth model, the methodology includes the variables 
of human capital, research and development, and weighted neighbor public investment to test 
for the existence of positive spillover effects. 
Existing studies have rarely focused on developing countries, choosing instead to focus 
on developed countries such as the United States and Europe.  In light of this oversight, this 
paper explores the role that public investment has played in Guatemala, and, more specifically, 
within and between its 78 municipalities.  The contribution of this work is thus threefold.  First, 
it provides a discussion in a new economic dimension, as most of the academic studies of 
Guatemala have been made at the national level.  Second, the paper contributes to the 
discussion of public investment and economic performance in a developing country.  Finally, 
the evaluation of public capital is relevant from a regional policy point of view: it helps to 
explain the role of public capital on productivity and production in municipalities, while 
enhancing the understanding of the role of subnational economies.  These findings will be of 
value in discussions about optimal policies designed to address issues of economic spatial 
inequities in two ways. First, they reveal the effectiveness of public capital distribution between 
municipalities on regional elements of economic growth. Second, they measure the economic 
might of the metropolitan area against the rest of the country.  
This paper provides evidence that public investment has positively influenced 
productivity and production at the municipality level and, hence, economic performance.  The 
positive role of neighboring area’s public investment is especially noticeable when the 
municipalities are part of a metropolitan area.  The findings are negative when neighbors are 
not part of a metropolitan area.  
The current paper is organized as follows.  Section 5.2 presents a brief explanation of the 
economic and social situation in Guatemala.  Section 5.3 provides a review of the theoretical and 
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empirical literature related to the topic.  Section 5.4 describes the data and methodology used to 
measure the impact of public investments on the economic performance of firms.  Finally, 
sections 5.5 and 5.6 offer results and a discussion of the findings of the paper with concluding 
remarks, respectively. 
5.1 Overview of the Guatemalan scenario 
Guatemala is divided into 22 political administrative departments and 334 municipalities. As of 
2014, it has an estimated population of about 15 million.   The country is the largest economy in 
Central America (CMCA, 2010), but has one of the lowest GDP per capita in that region (World 
Bank, 2009) and exhibits substantial welfare inequalities (United Nations Development 
Programme,  UNDP).  The World Bank (2006) estimates that about 51% of Guatemala’s 
population lives in poverty.  It is important to recognize the historical roots of this inequality, 
due to certain social and political issues. The most recent and relevant event was the civil war 
period between 1960-1996.  The war devastated the country and produced incalculable human 
losses, destroyed large portions of the country’s infrastructure, and significantly curtailed 
economic development.  As a result, the lion’s share of the country’s social and physical 
investment programs are concentrated in a small number of areas within the country, resulting 
in a disproportionate spatial allocation of the private and public capital in the nation 
throughout the 36 years of conflict. 
After the war ended and the peace agreements signed, Guatemala faced physical 
deficiencies and significant poverty gaps.  Almost every economic program in the nation since 
the war (see Romero 2010 for a complete list and details of socioeconomic programs for 1985-
2009) was developed for the explicit purpose of reducing the poverty-gap through social 
programs.  The results of such programs are constantly monitored by NGO's and international 
organizations in order to examine their impact on the population (UNDP).  Overall the focus 
has been on improvements of socioeconomic indicators such as malnutrition, illiteracy, and 
poverty. Less attention has been directed to the economic performance of firms at the regional 
or municipal level to see how, for instance, the construction and repair of localties’ 
infrastructure influences firms' productivity and production.  Outside of SEGEPLAN (1999 and 
2000), there is no published literature of such evaluation.  Therefore, analyzing every 
component of the economy is undeniably important, especially in terms of the ability of policy 
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makers to comprehend the country’s economic performance.  Most official economic reports are 
published with a national focus, and it is unknown how this kind of investment has affected the 
economies of the different regions of Guatemala.  The next section presents details of the 
sources of municipal revenue and how they contribute to public investment in infrastructure. 
5.1.1  A glance at the municipalities: 
The municipalities of Guatemala are autonomous state entities whose functions are based on 
congressional decree 12-2002.  The municipalities’ functions include managing water resources; 
sewer and street lighting services; the local and physical administration of the market 
installations; the collection, treatment and disposal of solid waste; the construction and 
maintenance of local and urban roads; the provision of municipal police services; and, 
administration and civil registration.  In addition, the municipal code establishes competencies 
for the authorities who regulate passenger transportation and cargo; the approval of licensing of 
the construction of public and private works; compliance with standards of sanitary control of 
production, marketing, and consumption; the management and administration of municipal 
pharmacies; the development and management of parks, gardens, and recreational areas; and 
the management of preschool and primary education, including literacy programs and bilingual 
education.   
The funding for municipal governments has four sources.  The first includes local 
revenues collected from property taxes and the income tax7.  These also include non-tax 
revenues derived from the property sales and municipal services, services contributions, and 
administrative improvements, including the provision of utilities.  The second source of income 
is the constitutional assignment, a revenue transfer from the central government mandated by 
the Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala (PCRG) of 1985.  This mandate 
represents the obligation of the state to promote decentralization (Article 119 of PCRG).  It also 
responds to the fact that most municipalities are not capable of collecting sufficient taxes to 
fund locally-based programs of regional development.  Article 257 of the PCRG dictates that the 
Central Government must include in the General Budget of Ordinary Revenues of the State a 
10% share of this same budget for the municipalities of the country. Ninety percent of this share 
must be designated to “educational, preventative health, infrastructure and public services 
                                                     
7 This income tax refers to a municipal tax that is charged based on the provisions of the law of municipal ornaments 
(Congressional decree No. 121-96).  
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programs and projects that improve the quality of life of the inhabitants.” The remaining 10% is 
used to finance functioning. 
The third source of municipalities’ revenue derives from the "IVA-PAZ" tax, or “peace 
value added tax.” This is not an extra tax, but rather constitutes one part of the value added tax 
collected by the central government. The income passes to municipalities through annual 
transfers mandated by the Peace Accords of 1996, which promote the reconstruction of the 
country after the war. These funds are to be disbursed by municipalities as follows: 25% goes to 
functioning expenditure and 75% goes to public investment in infrastructure (Congressional 
decree 27-92 reformed). Although the nature of the assignment is clear, its mechanism is not yet 
well-defined. Currently, the transfer process begins with municipalities presenting a project to 
SEGEPLAN. SEGEPLAN then evaluates and prioritizes the projects through the National 
System of Public Investment Projects (SNIP). This accomplishes two objectives: promoting an 
efficient framework that allows for the coordination of public investment expenditure, and 
ensuring national oversight of approved projects. Finally, SEGEPLAN sends their 
considerations to the congress of the republic for the formal authorization of the transfers. 
Ideally, the congress of the republic approves the technical distribution recommended by 
SEGEPLAN, expecting the best results from the monetary assignment. Nonetheless, the 
distribution of the transfers are usually modified based on congress power-politics, an issue not 
discussed in this study. This mechanism is one of the most controversial in Guatemala, and is 
frequently singled out for criticism by political analysts and experts (Palma 2010, Espana 2011, 
and Gramajo 2012). 
The final source of municipal government revenue comes from the vehicle and motor 
circulation tax.  Of the total amount collected by central government, 50% goes to 
municipalities, of which the municipalities have to allocate 97.5% to pavement and sidewalk 
construction with the rest going toward operation expenditures. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Framework 
This paper seeks to analyze the effects of public investment on the performance of firms.  The 
baseline of the economic analysis, and the central argument to be used in this paper, will be 
endogenous growth theory. This theory suggests that structural internal shocks can alter the 
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steady-state of the per capita income in an economy; that is, economic growth is an endogenous 
outcome of an economic system and not a result of outside forces (Romer, 1994).  This paper 
will use this premise to discuss how the usual factors of production (capital and labor) affect the 
output and productivity of the firms.  Furthermore, the discussion of endogeneity suggests the 
inclusion of additional factors as determinants of firms' performance: key factors such as 
research and development and human capital.  Romer (1990) introduces the notion of the 
existence of spillover effects of growth produced by the flow of knowledge into localities as a 
result of the emanating industries’ interactions.  Lucas (1988) notes that human capital works as 
an economic-growth engine because it is the one factor capable of addressing growth and 
prosperity.    
In addition, the initial work of Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990b, 1992), as well as 
recent empirical papers by Bronzini, et al., (2009), Gomez and Fingleton (2011), and others, have 
suggested that physical public investment is also a key factor in determining the private output 
and productivity of firms.  This assertion is justified by the belief that physical investments 
provide better conditions to the community by reducing manufacturing and trade costs to 
consumers and producers.  In consequence, these investments stimulate local consumption by 
encouraging increased production.  Assuming that public resources are locally invested, a 
positive shock to the infrastructure will lead to enhanced prosperity in the area.  This is 
expected to happen when the public capital stock is below the optimal level in a municipality. 
 
5.2.1 Public Investment 
Public investment is assumed to be important for economic growth because it enhances the 
productive apparatus of private firms.  For example, Aschauer (1989) asserts that public 
investment has large positive effects on productivity and economic growth.  Munnell (1992) 
confirms this finding by stating that public capital investments expand the productive capacity 
of a specific locale by increasing and/or improving local resources.  Other authors (Esfahani 
and Ramirez, 2002; Bronzini, 2009) have also stated in empirical papers that public investment 
has improved economic performance in the United States, Europe, and Latin America.  
The rationale for such benefit comes from the assumption of complementarity between 
private and public capital that, in turn, creates a crowd-in effect in the locale.  However, public 
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capital must be invested in infrastructure—such as roads, water systems, sewers, and 
electricity— to have any effect.  Otherwise, an excess of public capital for other purposes will 
create a negative effect or ex post crowd-out effect in the region by increasing taxes or real 
interest rates (when financed through bonds) (Aschauer, 1989a). 
Given the state of Guatemala’s expenditures between 2001 and 2008, it is important to 
determine whether these investments have stimulated economic growth and productivity.  
Some authors have argued that public investment is the key to growth generation for some 
economies.  For instance, Pereira and Roca (2003) argue that public infrastructure investment is 
beneficial for access to regional markets because it creates a network of resources through 
infrastructure installation, which in turn lead to local and regional improvements.  Thus, the 
investment in public capital involves the possibility that an individual municipality may 
experience positive spillover effects from investment in neighboring municipalities.  Gomez and 
Fingleton (2011), and Ezcurra, et al. (2005) point out that spillovers generated by public 
investments are important when analyzing productivity in the private sector during the 
decision-making phase of a plan of production.  Thus, public investment can lead to the 
creation of benefits in the region where the investment was made. The classic example is the 
construction of a road or highway that can reduce the cost to firms that send merchandise from 
the point of production to the points of sale. Overall, this encompasses the improvement of the 
local conditions for production, commerce, transportation, and other factors.    
Boarnet (1998), on the other hand, discusses the possible consequences of negative 
spillover effects.  He suggests that if public investment is productive for a certain place, then it 
will enhance the comparative advantage of such a place relative to others.  The reason behind 
this assertion is the assumption of complementarity between public capital and private capital 
investments.  This effect will be reflected negatively on the neighbor locales through the 
reduction of marginal rates of productivity of their private capital.  This condition, combined 
with limited public investment, generates competition for public investment.  This case has the 
potential to be appraised because of the third source of revenues of municipalities: the yearly 
congress allocation noted above. 
There has been an extensive and inconclusive discussion in the literature about the 
direction of causality, the existence of positive or negative spillovers, and the degree to which 
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the public crows-out or crowds-in private investment.  Some authors have suggested that this 
direction is not as evident as many economists have asserted.  For example, Holtz-Eakin (1994) 
notes that public capital can affect productivity and production, but that it is necessary to 
consider that economic growth can shape the supply of, and demand for, public capital.  He 
adds a caveat, mentioning that already-wealthy regions are likely to spend more on public 
capital, but this does not imply that they are therefore more productive localities. 
 
5.2.2  Human Capital and Research & Development 
Human capital and research & development, represented respectively through the people skills 
and knowledge, are two endogenous factors that contribute to the sustained long-run growth of 
the economy. They are the assets that a place have to produce economic prosperity if both 
factors are combined properly.  
As regards Human capital, empirical evidence shows that it is significantly linked to 
growth of productivity (Romer, 1990) and to economic growth (Mankiw, et al., 1992).  Lucas 
(1988) argues that human capital is one of the engines of growth in an economy through the 
way skill levels affect worker productivity.  Lucas (1988) also suggests that human capital 
makes a difference in terms of prosperity because it is an important asset possessed by each 
individual.  In that sense, disparities in economic prosperity are related to both “where-is” the 
knowledge and “who-has” the knowledge.  “Educated” regions tend to be more prosperous, 
but this depends on both the existing levels of education and on the opportunities to access it.  
This assertion is confirmed by Glaeser (2000), who argues that access to skilled human capital 
incentivizes firms to cluster; consequently, the aggregation of skills in a region may increase 
new ideas for production and productivity, leading to greater prosperity.  Florida (2002) argues 
that these skills come from a “creative class,” consisting of people dedicated to the creation of 
knowledge. 
Mankiw et al. (1992) state that human capital has a vital role in describing the prosperity 
of a locale.  This is because human capital is the primary input in the production function.  Such 
an assertion is echoed by Barro, et al. (1995), Benhabib and Spielged (1994) and Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) who report that human capital plays an important role in prosperity, when other factors 
in economic growth models are controlled for.  One reason is that human capital involves the 
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relative level of education (average schooling in an area); this drives economic growth because 
it increases the ability to adopt existing and new technologies and thereby spur production.  
The quality of human capital is thus an important factor because the level of knowledge that 
workers possess can contribute to the adoption of domestic and foreign innovations by local 
firms.  
Concerning Research & Development (R&D), it is another relevant factor in the 
endogenous growth model because it consists of creating ideas, knowledge, and technical 
processes aimed at enhancing the production of goods and services.  This variable is usually 
accompanied by human capital in the production function to create enhanced technical progress 
and productivity for a firm.  Hence, investment in R&D is highly related to the sustained long-
run growth of an economy (Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Romer, 1990) because the increase in 
productivity may lead to an increase in profits.   
In addition, Romer (1994) argues that efforts and results from investing on R&D are not 
exclusive to a particular firm because ideas and knowledge tend to spill over to other economic 
agents.  R&D usually diffuses through human and industry networks; thus, ideas and 
innovations produce improvements in the productivity of firms in a region.  In fact, Audretsch 
and Feldman (2005) assert that there exists a spatial scope wherein firms benefit from 
knowledge spillovers because tacit and non-rival elements can be transmitted through agents in 
the economy, on an individual-to-individual basis, or through existing backward and forward 
linkages of firms.  Thus, investment in R&D may become a social knowledge that promotes the 
productivity of all firms in a region. In this regard, Schmitz and Musyck (1994) argue that such 
social knowledge is a natural response of an industrial organization constructed by clustered 
firms or firms from a same region, whereas government or government-sponsored institutions 
must support the creation and transmission of innovations through public programs of 
technological development.   
Pioneer discussions around the geographical transmission of knowledge focus its 
attention in the spatial extension that knowledge can reach. Arrow (1962) mentioned that there 
is no reason for imposing a territorial or political border for delimiting the transmission of 
knowledge, which implies that knowledge can flow across space freely because it has non-rival 
use. On the other hand, Jacobs (1969) argues that geography proximity matters in transmitting 
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knowledge because the use or demand of a particular idea or knowledge may change from 
place to place.  Although both authors differ in the spatial extent of the transmission of 
knowledge, both agree in the idea that knowledge is tacit and it can be transmitted between 
people and firms across space.  One of the first mechanisms of analysis of such spatial extent is 
done by Jaffe (1989), who tests the effects of localization of education centers against innovation 
of firms.  The results show that the spillovers influence specific geographical areas where 
universities and research laboratories are present.  This influence is positive and improves local 
innovation and hence productivity of the firms. In addition, Mansfield (1995) complements the 
former argument by arguing that research laboratories of universities provide source of greater 
innovation.  Also, Audretsch and Feldman (2005) add that universities behave as catalyst that 
boosts the knowledge spillover because they provide and facilitate linkages to external 
generating-knowledge produced in other states or countries.  Thus, it can be said that “location 
and geographic space become key factors in explaining the determinants of innovation and 
technological change” (Audretsch and Feldman (2005). 
 
5.2.3 Hypothesis 
Formally, the hypothesis of the current paper is that expenditure on physical public investment 
in the municipalities of Guatemala positively influences the economic performance of their 
locales and the neighboring municipalities. To test this hypothesis, the theoretical framework 
presented above motivated the current research to look for evidence that explains the effects of 
public investment on productivity and production in the firms of 78 municipalities of 
Guatemala during the period of 2001-2008.  By doing so, it analyzes the role of the three cited 
elements—R&D, human capital, and public infrastructure— in terms of their contributions to 
total factor productivity of the firms. 
 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1     Data 
The data information covers the period from 2001 to 2008 for which information regarding 
output, private capital, and labor were provided by firms in a series of surveys conducted by 
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DINEL (Central Bank of Guatemala and National Institute of Statistics program).  The 
information about output was measured using firms’ deflated sales.  The data regarding private 
capital were transformed into private capital stock using the perpetual inventory method, 
including a general rate of depreciation of five percent.  There are problems with this method; 
for example, it uses assumptions of both the initial capital stock at the beginning of the period 
and the rate of depreciation.   Nevertheless, given the problems involved in information 
gathering, the initial stock will be considered in terms of the first flow of capital reported by the 
firms; the rate of depreciation has been taken from previous papers by Pereira (1999) and Moran 
and Valle (2001).  Through such information, the Total Factor Productivity can be derived from 
a Cobb-Douglas production function, which will be explained in a later methodological section. 
Data on public investments are derived from the yearly budget of the 78 municipalities 
of Guatemala.  These data series have been deflated and normalized according to the 
population of each municipality, which is provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE); 
it is also transformed into public capital stock using the same method of perpetual inventory.  
Determining the human capital involved requires two sources.  The first is the 
Guatemala census 2002, from which the number of people with different levels of education can 
be obtained. They are divided into three levels: elementary school, middle school, and high 
school.  The second source is provided by the Ministry of Education, and consists of the number 
of graduated students from the three levels of education in each municipality. These data were 
used to construct a human capital index based on the methodology created by Loening (2002), 
who used the perpetual inventory methodology.  Census 2002 provides the education level of 
the people enrolled in the school, adding to every year the new number of students that 
enrolled in the schools per level net of dropouts. This figure is then applied to the rate of 
depreciation, representing demographic dynamics such as migration and mortality rate.  The 
data are also normalized by the population of each municipality. 
Finally, due to the limitations of existence and accessibility of R&D data at the regional level, 
this paper presents a construction comprising two sources of information. The first uses 
information of total national firms’ expenditures on capacitation and education that is estimated 
in the national accounts office of the Central Bank of Guatemala. This estimation is presented in 
monetary real terms at a national level yearly. The second source corresponds to the location of 
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the various universities and technological institutes located in the different municipalities in 
Guatemala.  The assumption is that firms use such centers of education to prepare their workers 
for the production process with knowledge transmitted by the education centers and through 
sharing information and experiences with participants from other firms. The rationale of the 
construction of the R&D data at regional level follows the argument discussed in the section of 
human capital and R&D, in which the number of centers of education and instruction 
mentioned above are collected to create a national structure based on their location. Then, the 
sum of the national expenditure on R&D (deflated by regional prices) is distributed on such 
structure to obtain the amount of money spent per municipality. This will provide a proxy for 
regional expenditure on R&D. 
 
 
Table 21. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
    log of deflated sales 13930 11.80914 2.042503 
log of labor as input 13930 4.265844 1.423447 
log of capital stock as input 14240 10.92422 2.329111 
log of TFP 13930 6.320823 1.048056 
log of public capital stock 14240 -0.518201 0.941267 
log of research and development 13760 -9.938221 0.639381 
Number of people with Elementary 
school (per capita) 
 
0.2331091 0.0572097 
Number of people with Middle 
school (per capita) 
 
0.3722351 0.137542 
Number of people with High School 
(per capita) 
 
0.3582439 0.1787336 
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 The following three graphs show the behavior of the data in the period 2001-2008:  
 
Figure 15. Illustration of dataset. 
 
 
5.3.2 The methodology 
5.3.2.1  The basic model 
The analysis is centered on the economic performance of firms located in the 78 municipalities. 
Measures of production and productivity of firms are needed but there no survey data for 
productivity exists.  In order to obtain such a variable, the most widely-used approach is the 
Cobb Douglas function (Romp et. al, 2007), which assumes constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition.  The Cobb-Douglas function is expressed using labor and physical capital as 
inputs, and total factor productivity as the technological catalyst that drives production Y in the 
firm i at time t, as expressed in equation (51): 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑟
𝛼 𝐾𝑖,𝑡,𝑟
𝛽
 (51)  
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The subscripts i = 1, 2, 3, …. N is the firm index; t = 2001, 2002, …, 2008 is the yearly 
index; and r = 1, …, 78 is the municipality index where firms belong.  Y is the output of firm i at 
time t belonging to region r; L is the labor input; K is the private capital input; 𝛼 is the labor 
income share; and β is the private capital income share.  
The mechanism for computing the TPF is to encompass output, employment and private 
capital as shown in equation (52): 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡,𝑟
𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑟
𝛼 𝐾𝑖,𝑡,𝑟
𝛽
= 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 (52)  
 
From these formulations, it is possible to estimate equation (53), which describes the 
endogenous growth model, where "A" is the unexplained technical progress; 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 is the total 
factor productivity that represents the technical change driven by human capital (HC) available 
in the municipality where the firm locates its plant, research and development (R&D) available 
in the municipality that lead to innovations, and public investment (PK) executed in the 
municipality r at the time t, as shown below:   
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑃𝐾𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 (53)  
 
Transformed into log terms, (53) may be re-written as: 
ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡,𝑟) = ln(𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑟) + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡,𝑟) + 𝛽2 ln(𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡,𝑟) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐾𝑖,𝑡,𝑟) + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 (54)  
 
Considering that the unexplained part of the TFP can be contained in two (time and 
region) fixed effects and derived from the form  ln(𝐴𝑖,𝑡) =   𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃 𝑡, equation (55) below presents 
the first baseline model to analyze the contribution of public investment in productivity.  In 
addition to the elements expressed in this equation and the fixed effects, the model will include 
some control variables for agglomeration, the economic sector, and the distinction between core 
and periphery regions.  For simplifying the notation, the log terms in the equation are presented 
in lowercase: 
𝑡𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 = 𝜃𝑟 + 𝜃 𝑡 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑐𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑘𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 +∑𝛾𝑛𝑧𝑖,𝑡,𝑟
𝑛
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 
(55)  
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One advantage of considering the fixed effects of time and region is that they can 
provide estimates per region and per year, avoiding the unnecessary imposition of 
homogeneous coefficients across regions.  At the same time, the fixed effects method offer a 
technique that can help to reduce endogeneity due to omitted variable bias problem. In other 
words, fixed effects on region help to capture time-invariant unobservable factors that do not 
change in each region, including the geography of the place. Fixed effects on time help to 
capture unobservable factors in the regions in average within each period of time, for instance 
an electoral year. 
 
5.3.2.2 The extended model: 
One purpose of this paper is to measure the spillover effects across municipalities; this will be 
accomplished using a spatial weight matrix (W).  It is important to recognize that the inclusion 
of this variable is not without criticism in terms of the role it plays and the form in which it is 
included in the analysis.  On the positive side, the inclusion of the estimation of economic 
linkages across the regions via distance based measures offers an opportunity to capture the 
effects of neighbors. On the other hand, there is concern about the degree to which bias might 
be introduced into the model, for instance a misspecification of the model (Anselin, 1988). 
Crespo and Feldkircher (2012) offer significant and critical empirical evidence about the 
importance of choosing a weight matrix. They handle spatial dependence among observations 
while taking care of uncertainty for choosing different spatial structures through a Bayesian 
model averaging. One of their goals is to evaluate how values of parameters changes with 
different W in a simulation study, and show that choosing the W matrix is critical for the 
estimation of the parameters of the covariates because W may lead to wrong conclusions. In 
spite of such efforts, there is still no consensus of how to determine the W, for instance, LeSage 
and Fischer (2008) argue that one way to choose the W is by using the “goodness of fit 
statistics”.  
For dealing with this potential problem, the present paper presents different weight 
matrices to apply in the extended model (equation 58) for comparing the results and obtaining 
robust conclusions. The present paper uses the time-distance inverse matrix, the Queen matrix, 
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the Euclidean matrix and the 6th-nearest neighbor matrix; all of which are row-standardized 
such that:  
𝑤𝑟,𝑠
∗ =
𝑤𝑟,𝑠
∑ 𝑤𝑟,𝑠𝑠
 (56)  
 
Therefore, equation (57) below expresses the weighted physical public investment of the 
region r according to distance with respect to region s (where r ≠ s).  Thus: 
𝑃𝐾𝑊𝑟,𝑠 =∑𝑤𝑟𝑠
∗𝑃𝐾𝑠
𝑠
 (57)  
 
In a similar manner to the basic model, the baseline extended model is expressed in log 
terms, 
𝑡𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 = 𝜃𝑟 + 𝜃 𝑡 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑐𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑘𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑘𝑤𝑖,𝑟,𝑠 +∑𝛾𝑛𝑧𝑖,𝑡,𝑟
𝑛
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 (58)  
 
5.3.2.3 The Multilevel Analysis: 
The third model studies the impact of public investment in infrastructure on firm’s production 
by using multilevel analysis.  The multilevel analysis is a hierarchical linear model that takes 
into account the spatial disaggregation of the economic and social units, i.e. in regional 
economics is common to observe nested regional information containing different level of 
aggregation: for instance, countries containing information of regions, regions containing 
information of cities, and cities containing information of individuals.  It allows breaking the 
assumption that all observations have identical distributions, while still considering 
independence.  Usually, the estimation of the multilevel analysis entails the estimation of the 
effect of the mean of a particular group of individuals, while estimating the effect of the mean of 
the region where the group of individuals belongs.  Indeed, Corrado and Fingleton (2011) state 
that many economic researches containing spatial econometric models don’t consider the 
hierarchical information of the space, which misleads the analysis of the spatial lags variables 
when failing to provide inference of the effects coming from different hierarchical levels.  This is 
because requiring the regression coefficients in all regions to be the same is generally too 
restrictive as each region has different economic and social characteristics. Chung and Hewings 
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(2013) demonstrate that when considering hierarchical models, is possible to achieve an 
accurate estimation of the influence of shocks with different levels of information.  For example, 
when considering a hierarchical model, they found that the dependency on national production 
has a weaker influence on regional economies than when considering a non-hierarchical model. 
 The following model is intended to provide estimates of the influence of public capital 
on production of the firms.  The model captures the effect of information coming from the firm 
and municipality level, and the goal is to examine the robustness of the influence of public 
investment on firms’ economic performance. Thus, the first step is to identify an equation that 
represents the random behavior on every level: 
𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑟𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡 (59)  
 
The production 𝑌 of the firm i nested in the region r during year t is equal to the average 
of the production in region r for every year t plus an individual random error 𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡.  In addition, 
there exists the possibility that all of the firms in a specific region can be affected by a common 
influence within the region 𝑢0𝑟𝑡.  Hence: 
𝛽0𝑟𝑡 = 𝛾00𝑡 + 𝑢0𝑟𝑡 (60)  
 
Therefore, taking into consideration the structural equation that comes from combining 
equations (59) and (60), the errors 𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡  and 𝑢0𝑟𝑡  are assumed to have a zero mean and variances 
of   𝜎𝑣
2 and 𝜎𝑢
2 , respectively.  Therefore, 𝜎𝜀
2 = 𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2 represents the sum of the within-group 
and between-group variances of production. Taking these into consideration, it is possible to 
calculate the intra-class correlation (𝜌), which is a measure of the proportion of the variance 
explained at the group level: 
𝜌 =
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2 (61)  
 
Equation (61) makes it possible to detect whether the local conditions of the region 
during a specific year influence the production of the firm located in that region.  When the rho 
value (𝜌) approaches zero, it is possible to assert that the production of the firm i is no longer 
attributable to regional influences r. 
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The next step consists of adding the fixed effects as represented in the equation (12).   
𝑦𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 = 𝛾0,0,𝑡 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑐𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑘𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 +∑𝛾𝑛𝑧𝑖,𝑡,𝑟
𝑛
+ 𝑢0,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑖,𝑟,𝑡
+ 𝛿2𝑘𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 
(62)  
 
In addition, an extended model (equation 63) will be used that includes the spatial 
effects from the other regions.    
𝑦𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 = 𝛾0,0,𝑡 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑐𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑘𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑝𝑘𝑖,𝑟,𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑊ℎ𝑐𝑖,𝑟,𝑠
+ 𝛽6𝑊𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑟,𝑠 +∑𝛾𝑛𝑧𝑖,𝑡,𝑟
𝑛
+ 𝑢0,𝑟,𝑠 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑘𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 
(63)  
 
The following specification (64) has two purposes.  First, it provides an elasticity of the 
private inputs for a proxy of productivity. Second, it allows us to control for a potential 
multicollinearity problem involving private capital and labor variables.  Indeed, the association 
between labor and private capital can be highly correlated in the sense that firms prepare their 
plan of production by considering the combination of both variables and not separately.  One 
way to solve this problem is by normalizing the Cobb-Douglas production function with respect 
to labor inputs as follows: 
(𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑡 − 𝑙𝑖𝑟𝑡) = 𝛾00𝑡 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑘𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑝𝑘𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑊ℎ𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑊𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑡 +∑𝛾𝑛𝑧𝑖,𝑡,𝑟
𝑛
+ 𝑢0𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿2(𝑘𝑖𝑟𝑡 − 𝑙𝑖𝑟𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡 (64)  
 
 
5.4   Results and Discussion 
The results and discussion in this section evaluate this paper’s hypothesis: expenditure on 
physical public investment in the municipalities of Guatemala positively influences the 
economic performance of their locales and that of the neighboring municipalities.  
The results are divided in two groups of tables.  The first group (Tables 22-25) contains 
the evaluation of the productivity of the firms through a panel data analysis with region and 
time fixed effects; while the second group (Tables 26-28) comprises the evaluation of the firms’ 
production with the hierarchical model of multi-level analysis.  The results include the local 
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public capital stock variable and the public capital stock of the neighboring regions.  
Corresponding to the endogenous growth model discussed earlier, the tables also contain the 
estimates of the explanatory variables of R&D and human capital; in addition, the estimations 
include other variables that control for agglomeration and for the economic sector 
(manufacturing or services) where they participate. In addition, the second group of tables 
includes the estimates of the inputs of labor and private capital stock used by the firms in their 
plan of production. At the end of the description of the results, it is provided a discussion of 
them. 
 
5.4.1  Effects on Productivity: 
Tables 22 and 23 refer to the specifications presented in equations (55) and (58), respectively, 
which differ according to their inclusion of the regional effects of public investment generated 
by the neighboring municipalities.  Table 24 contains the estimates of the equation (58), and it 
analyzes the economic performance by two groups of observations: one for the municipalities 
that belong to the metropolitan area, and another for municipalities belonging to the non-
metropolitan area.  The table 25 provides a robust test of the estimate of the parameter of the 
spatial weight matrix used in equation (58), in which three spatial structures are imposed in 
addition to the original time-distance weight matrix: the Euclidean matrix, the Queen matrix, 
and the 6th nearest matrix.  All estimations include time and region fixed effects, representing 
the manner in which firms adjusted their productivity for other events besides the variables 
under consideration. Discussions of the regional fixed-effect include the situation that firms 
faced in their operational locations in the period under analysis, such as the social and economic 
characteristics of the location, and other factors not considered in the research.  The year fixed-
effect concerns the events that influence the productivity of the firms during particular years, 
such as hurricane Stan in 2005, tropical Storm Barbara in 2007, river floods, volcanic activities, 
and other natural events that the model does not take into account in a specific year. 
Therefore, table 22 below reports that the estimates corresponding to the public 
investment variable support the hypothesis that public investment benefits the firms’ 
productivity in Guatemala.  All of the estimates in the table show that the elasticity of public 
investment is positive and statistically significant.  According to the findings in the estimate in 
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column nine, for every 1% increase in public investments normalized with respect the 
population of the municipality, TFP is enhanced by 0.09%.  Further, the normalized R&D 
variable reveals that for every Q.1.00 8 of increase in R&D expenditure, the firms’ productivity 
increases by 0.018%. This estimate is expected as those reported in many papers usually are in a 
range between 0.01%-0.98%. (For a summary of estimates, see Medda and Piga, 2014). The 
human capital levels do not exert a significant influence on firms’ productivity on average at the 
national level, excepting by elementary school, which is negative; this issue will be discussed 
later.  When controlling for public capital in the metropolitan area, it seems that it would have 
positive effect on the average productivity of the country; however, the estimate is not 
significant, and the analysis is left to be analyzed in the table 24. Also, the productivity of in the 
metropolitan area seems to be 39% lower than in the rest of the country, while the 
agglomeration measured by population density appears to have little influence over 
productivity.  Finally, the differentiation of productivity between manufacturing and service 
sectors is not distinguishable under this model as the estimate is not statistically significant. 
                                                     
8 Exchange rate in 2008: Q7.78 = US$1.00, so Q.1.00 is about US$0.129 
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The second case is presented in Table 23.  It adds the regional spillover effects generated 
by public investments in neighboring municipalities.  The baseline model is in column 9 and 
represents the results of equation 58 as proposed in the previous section.   As in the first case, 
the estimates are constructed based on region and time fixed effects.  The elasticity of the public 
capital stock is not much different from the previous tables as the estimate is 0.095, meaning 
that for every 1% of increase of the expenditure on public capital, the productivity of the firms 
would be 0.095% higher.  Concerning the neighboring public capital, the estimate is 
considerable higher than the effect from the local expenditure.  The elasticity is 0.42 with 10% of 
statistical significance.  This can be interpreted as follow: in a particular locale, the average 
productivity of the firms would be 0.42% higher for every 1% of increase of the average 
neighboring expenditure on public capital.  Such difference between the local and neighboring 
effect is expected because the construction of the neighboring public capital is an average of 
heterogeneous amounts of expenditure on public capital, i.e. it includes extreme poor 
expenditures per capita of small municipalities, and large amounts per capita expenditure from 
Table 22. Productivity and public investment within the municipality 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Public  0.0574* 0.0740** 0.0929** 0.0827** 0.0804** 0.0932** 0.0906** 0.0854** 0.0911** 
Investment (0.0284) (0.0286) (0.0289) (0.0288) (0.0296) (0.0289) (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0297) 
          
Metropolitan  0.1076*** 0.0607+ 0.0318 0.0409 0.0319 0.0298 0.0226 0.0229 0.0200 
PK (0.0304) (0.0320) (0.0327) (0.0327) (0.0336) (0.0329) (0.0337) (0.0338) (0.0338) 
          
Metropolitan -0.2660 -0.3326+ -0.3747+ -0.3610+ -0.3732+ -0.3775* -0.3872* -0.3863* -0.3908* 
Area (0.1912) (0.1916) (0.1917) (0.1918) (0.1921) (0.1918) (0.1921) (0.1922) (0.1921) 
          
Sector -0.0271 -0.0272 -0.0276 -0.0273 -0.0272 -0.0276 -0.0275 -0.0273 -0.0275 
 (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) 
          
Density 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0004** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
          
R&D  0.0249*** 0.0200*** 0.0219*** 0.0220*** 0.0197*** 0.0186*** 0.0197*** 0.0181*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
          
Human 
Capital 
  -3.5140***   -3.1937** -3.3222***  -2.7287* 
Elementary S.   (0.7995)   (0.9762) (0.9891)  (1.1390) 
          
Human 
Capital 
   -0.9823**  -0.2293  -1.0708** -0.5025 
Middle School    (0.3286)  (0.4011)  (0.4154) (0.4783) 
          
Human 
Capital 
    -0.3755**  -0.1020 -0.1144 -0.0283 
High School     (0.1434)  (0.1649) (0.1756) (0.1792) 
          
Constant 6.7985*** 4.7539*** 18.0650*** 7.1923*** 5.5574*** 17.4211*** 17.6430*** 7.7816*** 16.5279*** 
 (0.3937) (0.5886) (3.0851) (1.0059) (0.6444) (3.2843) (3.6555) (1.0769) (3.8064) 
N 13930 13930 13930 13930 13830 13930 13830 13830 13830 
F 96.2496 90.6565 85.6723 84.8675 83.1300 79.9787 78.3981 78.0628 73.5678 
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Note: In logarithm terms. 
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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other municipalities. As regards research and development, it has statistical importance overall 
with an elasticity of 0.018% in column 9.  On the other hand, human capital, as seen in the 
previous table, exhibits results that are not significant.  In addition, firms located in the 
metropolitan area are in average less productive than outside the region by 40%, while the 
population density is not statistical significant.  These results suggest a possible differentiation 
of productivity effects between the two aggregate areas: the metropolitan and the non-
metropolitan, which are covered in table 9. 
 
In order to provide a better interpretation of these results, the models in column nine of 
each table, 22 and 23, are provided again, but this time such models are differentiated by two 
groups that distinguish the location of the firms under analysis, metropolitan area and rest of 
the country. 
 
Table 23. Productivity and public investment with municipal spillover effects, time and region fixed effect 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Public  0.0585* 0.0753** 0.0955*** 0.0854** 0.0826** 0.0961*** 0.0939** 0.0884** 0.0946** 
Investment (0.0284) (0.0286) (0.0289) (0.0288) (0.0296) (0.0290) (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0297) 
          
Neighbor  0.2906 0.3179+ 0.3994* 0.4057* 0.3421+ 0.4159* 0.4060* 0.4002* 0.4226* 
Public K. (0.1825) (0.1824) (0.1832) (0.1843) (0.1871) (0.1843) (0.1879) (0.1882) (0.1884) 
          
Metropolitan  -0.2741 -0.3423+ -0.3888* -0.3764* -0.3853* -0.3934* -0.4024* -0.4016* -0.4073* 
Area (0.1912) (0.1916) (0.1918) (0.1919) (0.1922) (0.1919) (0.1922) (0.1923) (0.1923) 
          
Density -0.0000 0.0002+ -0.0000 0.0002+ 0.0003* -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002+ -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
          
R&D  0.0252*** 0.0201*** 0.0219*** 0.0223*** 0.0198*** 0.0188*** 0.0198*** 0.0182*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
          
Human Capital   -3.6838***   -3.2307*** -3.5278***  -2.8502* 
Elementary S.   (0.8032)   (0.9762) (0.9936)  (1.1402) 
          
Human Capital    -1.0885**  -0.3295  -1.1690** -0.5809 
Middle School    (0.3321)  (0.4035)  (0.4179) (0.4795) 
          
Human Capital     -0.3971**  -0.1107 -0.1157 -0.0259 
High School     (0.1439)  (0.1649) (0.1756) (0.1792) 
          
Constant 8.1042*** 6.1579*** 20.4722*** 9.2476*** 7.1124*** 19.6469*** 20.2370*** 9.8052*** 19.0543*** 
 (0.9094) (0.9978) (3.2763) (1.3724) (1.0672) (3.4287) (3.8471) (1.4370) (3.9690) 
N 13930 13930 13930 13930 13830 13930 13830 13830 13830 
F 89.0508 84.4103 80.2995 79.5546 77.8240 75.3206 73.8096 73.4852 69.5566 
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Note: In logarithm terms.  
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001  
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So, table 24 shows that there is strong evidence that public investment significantly 
influences the productivity of firms located in the same place where the investments were 
made.  In the table, columns two and four represent the full model described in table 23 for the 
metropolitan area and the rest of the country, respectively; for every 1% of increase of public 
capital stock in each of those regions, firm’s productivity will increase by 0.0953% and 0.1124%, 
respectively.  Firms in municipalities from the non-metropolitan area are more benefited by the 
public infrastructure than those in the metropolitan area. This might be true as the 
infrastructure in the metropolitan area is significantly more developed than in the rest of the 
country as discussed in chapter 4.  This result is expected due to the diminishing effects that the 
regions experience as it will be discusses later.  
 
Also, the model depicts the influence of the public investments made in the neighboring 
municipalities that acquire statistically significant influence on the firm's productivity.  That is, 
it is possible to appreciate how firms on the periphery are negatively affected (-1.38%) while 
firms in the metropolitan areas are positively influenced (1.34%) by public investments executed 
Table 24. Metropolitan and non-metropolitan area: Productivity and public 
investment with municipal spillover effects 
 Metropolitan Non-metropolitan 
 1 2 3 4 
Public  0.0761* 0.0953** 0.1038** 0.1124** 
Investment (0.0331) (0.0333) (0.0372) (0.0372) 
     
Sector -0.0333+ -0.0336+ 0.0259 0.0235 
 (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0639) (0.0638) 
     
Density 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0012* 0.0009 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
     
R&D 0.0367** 0.0432*** 0.0054 0.0017 
 (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0081) (0.0082) 
     
Human Capital -0.7809 -1.7847 -1.6925 -1.7785 
Elementary S. (1.9410) (1.9471) (1.7208) (1.7165) 
     
Human Capital -0.9337 -1.7084* 0.0854 -0.2745 
Middle School (0.7206) (0.7332) (0.9286) (0.9332) 
     
Human Capital 0.2403 0.5127 -0.0580 0.0968 
High School (0.3100) (0.3135) (0.2552) (0.2593) 
     
Neighbor   1.3361***  -1.3808** 
Public K.  (0.2410)  (0.4401) 
     
Constant 8.4635 19.4547** 11.3590* 9.6802+ 
 (6.7638) (7.0403) (5.6044) (5.6154) 
F 79.0010 75.9659 11.8905 11.8120 
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Note: In logarithm terms. 
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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in neighboring municipalities.  The R&D variable is still positively significant, but one can see 
that the impact is greater in the metropolitan than in the periphery area.  About human capital, 
the estimates continue to be non-significant for the productivity of firms. 
              Table 25. Robustness of the weight neighbor matrices: Metropolitan and non-metropolitan area 
 
 Metropolitan area Non-metropolitan area 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Public  0.0953** 0.1078** 0.0902** 0.1269*** 0.1124** 0.1190** 0.1369*** 0.1304*** 
Investment (0.0333) (0.0335) (0.0332) (0.0337) (0.0372) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0375) 
         
Neighbor  1.3361***    -1.3808**    
Public K. (0.2410)    (0.4401)    
         
Sector -0.0336+ -0.0338+ -0.0335+ -0.0341+ 0.0235 0.0217 0.0166 0.0184 
 (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0638) (0.0637) (0.0634) (0.0636) 
         
Density -0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0013* 0.0012+ 0.0012+ 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
         
R&D 0.0432*** 0.0444*** 0.0402*** 0.0422*** 0.0017 0.0163+ 0.0041 0.0001 
 (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0080) (0.0081) 
         
Human Capital -1.7847 0.7800 -0.9629 -7.4322*** -1.7785 -1.4579 0.6440 -0.1696 
Elementary S. (1.9471) (1.9543) (1.9393) (2.1262) (1.7165) (1.7151) (1.7544) (1.7439) 
         
Human Capital -1.7084* -1.8520* -1.9908** -1.4585* -0.2745 0.1195 -0.6981 -0.0997 
Middle School (0.7332) (0.7346) (0.7489) (0.7223) (0.9332) (0.9250) (0.9305) (0.9242) 
         
Human Capital 0.5127 0.7211* 0.6352* 0.7811* 0.0968 0.0613 0.0383 0.0178 
High School (0.3135) (0.3191) (0.3192) (0.3174) (0.2593) (0.2561) (0.2534) (0.2543) 
         
Euclidean PK  3.3078***    -1.4053***   
  (0.5331)    (0.3708)   
         
Queen PK   1.5121***    -1.9194***  
   (0.2954)    (0.3388)  
         
6th Near PK    1.6954***    -1.6753*** 
    (0.2238)    (0.3710) 
         
Constant 19.4547** 17.5260* 16.4016* 39.8167*** 9.6802+ 6.2111 0.2303 2.7345 
 (7.0403) (6.9094) (6.9324) (7.9158) (5.6154) (5.7454) (5.8910) (5.8909) 
N 12057 12057 12057 12057 1773 1772 1773 1773 
F 75.9659 76.5309 75.6352 77.9067 11.8120 12.1428 13.4404 12.5836 
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
                              Standard errors in parentheses 
                              Note: In logarithm terms. 
                              + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
 
As part of the validation process of the relationship between the variables under study, 
and as discussed in the methodology section, it is convenient to present a robustness check for 
the performance of the spatial weight matrix. Thus, in Table 25 is possible to see two aspects: 
first, all weight matrices conserve their significance and their sign as reported in the previous 
table. Second, even with the four different configurations of spatial matrices, all variables 
including public investment and neighboring public investment keep their consistency with 
respect to the previous results.  The matrices used in the model are: travel time distance, 
Euclidean distance, Queen-matrix, and 6th nearest-matrix. 
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5.4.2  Effects on Production: 
In checking the effects of public investment on production, the multilevel analysis method 
allows for an understanding of the interaction of the effects on two levels: the firm and 
municipality levels.  Table 26 shows where the stock of private capital and labor force represent 
the firm level effects, while the variables used to explain the regional effects --public 
investment, R&D and human capital— are the same as those used in previous cases.  The 
baseline model in table 26, in column 5, shows that it is possible to see that the elasticity 
provided by private capital and labor force are strongly significant: they have valuations of 
0.27% and 1.01%, respectively.  This demonstrates that the labor force is the most important 
factor of production in terms of inputs. Unlike the previous models, constant return to scale was 
not imposed to let all parameters free to vary.  Regarding the public capital, the estimates show 
that for every 1% increase in its investment, the output of firms report an increase of 0.087%. 
However, when public works are generated in neighboring municipalities, the effect is stronger 
and negative (-0.10%); this result will be discussed later.  In addition, when checking the R&D 
variable, no statistical evidence suggests that it has an influence on the decision of firms’ 
production.  Human capital reveals significant effects at 5% in all levels of education 
completion, where the elementary and middle school levels show negative effects on 
production, while high school level shows positive influence on production. The estimate for 
distinguishing the productivity of the metropolitan area is not significant, also for population 
density which measures the effect of agglomeration on productivity.  Finally, as regards the 
interclass parameter, the regional variables substantially explain the influence on the decision of 
production of the firms; that is, the part of the variance that comes from the municipal variables 
is reduced from 50% (in column 2) to 36% (in column 5).  
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Table 27 provides the estimates of equation 64, containing the baseline model in column 
5.  It shows that firms’ production levels are more responsive to public works within the 
municipality (0.28%). In similar fashion to Table 11, here the results reveal that production is 
negatively responsive to neighboring public investment (-0.03%), but that there is a problem of 
significance.  Finally, the interclass parameter confirms that the municipal variables have a 
strong incidence in the plan of production by reducing its coefficient from 24% to 7%.  
 
Table 26. Multilevel analysis Public investment effect and its spillovers effects 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Private 0.2611*** 0.2609*** 0.2614*** 0.2615*** 0.2661*** 
Capital (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0054) 
      
Labor 1.0133*** 1.0132*** 1.0128*** 1.0128*** 1.0094*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0072) 
      
Sector -0.1069*** -0.1075*** -0.1068*** -0.1065*** -0.1063*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0160) 
      
Public   0.0152 0.0641* 0.0640* 0.0871** 
Investment  (0.0205) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0283) 
      
Neighbor    -0.3250*** -0.3132*** -0.1070+ 
Public K.   (0.0480) (0.0529) (0.0608) 
      
Metropolitan    -0.0448 -0.0467 -0.0590 
PK   (0.0395) (0.0396) (0.0402) 
      
Metropolitan    -0.0250 0.0023 -0.0402 
Area   (0.1041) (0.1217) (0.1249) 
      
Density    -0.0000 0.0001 
    (0.0000) (0.0001) 
      
R&D    0.0011 0.0008 
    (0.0011) (0.0013) 
      
Human Capital     -1.1101** 
Elementary S.     (0.3486) 
      
Human Capital     -0.7187** 
Middle School     (0.2470) 
      
Human Capital     0.3069* 
High School     (0.1563) 
      
Constant 4.4765*** 4.4887*** 4.3108*** 4.2606*** 9.6063*** 
 (0.0651) (0.0676) (0.0743) (0.0920) (1.1819) 
Interclass      
Parameter 0.5002 0.5048 0.4775 0.4059 0.3611 
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ll -18310.18 -18312.89 -18296.24 -17752.23 -17724.65 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Note: In logarithm terms. 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
111 
 
Table 28 shows the same baseline model as in Table 27, but it differs according to the 
location of the firms—the metropolitan and periphery areas.  Public investments within the 
municipality register a more effective influence in the production decisions in the peripheral 
areas than in the metropolitan areas.  In columns 2 and 4, elasticities of 0.19% and 0.29% are 
reported, respectively.  When public works occur in neighboring municipalities, in both regions 
the effects of it are not statistical significant on the firms’ production.  
 
Table 27. Endogeneity: Multilevel analysis Public investment effect and its spillovers 
effects 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Private  0.2262*** 0.2261*** 0.2260*** 0.2260*** 0.2346*** 
Capital/labor (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) 
      
Sector 0.0491+ 0.0432 0.0440+ 0.0439 0.0489+ 
 (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) 
      
Public  0.1118*** 0.2021*** 0.2025*** 0.2820*** 
Investment  (0.0278) (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0391) 
      
Neighbor    -0.2617*** -0.2636*** -0.0353 
Public K.   (0.0480) (0.0508) (0.0460) 
      
Density   -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001+ 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
      
Metropolitan    -0.0852 -0.0847 -0.1418** 
PK   (0.0556) (0.0558) (0.0517) 
      
Metropolitan    0.1646 0.1631 0.1143 
Area   (0.1420) (0.1430) (0.1255) 
      
R&D    -0.0001 0.0002 
    (0.0011) (0.0011) 
      
Human Capital     -1.6974*** 
Elementary S.     (0.3047) 
      
Human Capital     -1.0649*** 
Middle School     (0.2269) 
      
Human Capital     0.3223* 
High School     (0.1414) 
      
Constant 5.5521*** 5.6327*** 5.4518*** 5.4569*** 13.8345*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0684) (0.0785) (0.0955) (1.0242) 
Interclass      
Parameter 0.1940 0.2378 0.2258 0.2040 0.0777 
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ll -12076.6450 -12072.4718 -12068.2585 -12074.1527 -11886.0742 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Note: In logarithm terms. 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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                           Table 28. Core-Periphery: Multilevel analysis Public investment effect and its spillover effects 
 
 Metropolitan Area  Non-metropolitan area 
 1 2 3 4 
     
Private  0.2446*** 0.2446*** 0.1669*** 0.1668*** 
Capital/labor (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0191) (0.0192) 
     
Public 0.1858*** 0.1891*** 0.2833*** 0.2858*** 
Investment (0.0452) (0.0463) (0.0392) (0.0399) 
     
R&D 0.0117*** 0.0122*** 0.0022+ 0.0022+ 
 (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
     
Human Capital -4.8158*** -4.7647*** -1.2878*** -1.2440*** 
Elementary S. (1.0557) (1.1029) (0.2985) (0.3502) 
     
Human Capital 1.7530+ 1.7273+ -1.3006*** -1.3080*** 
Middle School (0.9475) (0.9666) (0.2285) (0.2311) 
     
Human Capital 0.0945 0.0815 0.3750* 0.3751* 
High School (0.4294) (0.4350) (0.1482) (0.1485) 
     
Sector 0.0325 0.0325 0.2125** 0.2132** 
 (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0782) (0.0784) 
     
Density -0.0003* -0.0003* 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
     
Neighbor   -0.0212  -0.0152 
Public K.  (0.0880)  (0.0593) 
     
Constant 20.7684*** 20.6240*** 12.8670*** 12.7036*** 
 (2.6597) (2.7953) (1.0165) (1.2211) 
Interclass     
Parameter 0.0908 0.0950 0.0635 0.0625 
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ll -10380.5852 -10382.0710 -1496.9893 -1498.8663 
                                                                   Standard errors in parentheses 
                                                                   Note: In logarithm terms. 
                                                                   + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Regarding the effect of R&D on production, it is statistical significance at 10% with very 
small estimates, that is to say, for every Q1.00 of increase of expenditure on R&D, the 
production of firms is increased in average by 0.01%.  Considering the human capital variable, 
populations in municipalities of both regions with elementary school show negative influence 
in the average production of firms. Middle school shows significant and positive effect on the 
average production in metropolitan area and negative effect in the rest of the country. High 
school level is positive in both areas, but it is only statistically significant in the non-
metropolitan area with effect of 0.37% over the average production in these area.  Finally, the 
control variable for agglomeration does not have statistical significance on the average 
production in any area. 
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5.4.3 Marginal Effects of public capital on productivity of firms 
Below, figure 16 shows the yearly average marginal effect of public capital investment on the 
average productivity of firms located in the same municipality. It is important to recall that the 
analysis is based only on the 78 municipalities.  Based on the results, it is possible to discuss the 
existence of two groups of municipalities where firms leverage more efficiently the benefits of 
the public capital.  The first group is composed by those municipalities ranked in the top 5 most 
benefited, they are the Soloma (Region 7), Huehuetenango (Region 7), Ciudad de Flores (Region 
8), Poptún (Region 8), and San Andres (Region 8). In the second group, we find the 
municipalities that are geographically clustered with others that report similar marginal effects 
of public capital.  These municipalities are concentrated in the region 5 (Escuintla), and in the 
north coast (region 3). 
The implication for the top 5 is that those municipalities located in region 8 are 
characterized for having very low population density surrounded by great extension of jungle, 
and regarding their non-agriculture production, they mostly dedicate to provide services of 
tourism.  So that, it is expected that any kind of public investment favor significantly their 
economic development because firms depend strongly on adequate infrastructure for their 
production of services.  Those municipalities in region 7 are located in a very poor department 
(Huehuetenango); however, the effectiveness of the public capital is located in the capital city of 
the department, which is the one (within the department) that dedicates in part to 
manufacturing and services.  In the second group of municipalities, those clustered in the south 
side of the country belongs to the second most important area of the country that dedicates to 
manufacturing industry (light and semi heavy industries); the other cluster of municipalities 
located in the north coast (Izabal) are municipalities that depend on the two most important 
maritime ports of the country (Puerto Barrios and Santo Tomas de Castilla), they represent the 
most important entrances to the country’s imports. For that reason such municipalities depend 
strongly on proper infrastructure to produce the services of transportation and commerce. 
Figure 17 shows the marginal effect of the neighboring public capital.  The more 
benefited municipalities are located in the south of the country. In region I, we find Villa 
Canales, and from region V Escuintla, Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, La Gomera and Nueva 
Concepcion.  In the north side of the country, the most benefited are Puerto Barrios (region 3), 
Poptún, San Benito, and Ciudad Flores (region 8).  An extreme result is obtained from 
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municipalities of Alta Verapaz (region 2), which are affected negatively by the neighboring 
effects of public investment in infrastructure. 
For those municipalities reporting greater benefits, one would expect to observe such 
pattern as they belong to the geographic clustered municipalities discussed above.  The 
collective effort reported in this area supports the productivity of firms that dedicate mostly to 
non-durable manufacturing industries.  Puerto Barrios is another municipality that obtains 
benefits from the neighboring because the latter provides the road access to the most important 
commercial port in Guatemala.  That is to say, the most efficient way to transport merchandise 
to and from this port must be through the municipalities that surround the port, mainly from 
the south of Puerto Barrios.  Concerning those municipalities from the north of the country, it is 
expected to observe such pattern as the infrastructure development of such an area is very 
limited as explained before.  Finally, the municipalities reporting negative effect are locales 
from the highlands of Guatemala; their result is not expected, and must be addressed more in 
detail for future analysis. 
  
 
 
                                 Figure 16. Marginal effect of public capital by municipality 
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Figure 17. Marginal effect of neighboring public capital by municipality 
 
 
5.4.4  Discussion 
The results presented above suggest that the statistical evidence supports the hypothesis of this 
paper, in that public capital in infrastructure invested by municipalities positively influenced 
the economic performance of firms in Guatemala during 2001-2008.  
In this regard, it is important to note that there are two cases in which to analyze the 
influence of the public capital stock over the economic performance of the firms.  First, public 
capital stock has a positive and significant effect on productivity and on the production of firms 
that are located in the same municipality where the capital is invested. Based on the literature 
covered before, this result is expected because public capital increases or improves the local 
resources in infrastructure, which lead to reduced operational costs to the firms, or complement 
the production process of the firms (Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1992; Gomez and Fingleton, 
2011).  In addition to this result, it is found that the strength of influence of public capital varies 
depending on the location of the municipality; it was expected that the influence of public 
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capital in the non-metropolitan area should have greater effect on firms than municipalities in 
the metropolitan area because the marginal productivity of public capital has a diminishing 
behavior in which poorer municipalities may experience larger effects than do the richer ones.  
This situation may happen as poorer municipalities have more margin for improvement due to 
the lack of adequate infrastructure. (Pelaez, 2011)  In that sense, the top 5 most benefited 
municipalities by public capital belong to poor regions (regions 7 and 8). In addition, results 
show that firms located in the municipalities of region 3 and 5 are capable to leverage better the 
investment of public capital.  They show more homogeneous marginal effect across their 
regions, which implies better distribution of the economic benefits in their places. Although, I 
cannot prove it due to lack of documentation, this result can be an example of healthy policy 
coordination between such municipalities.  
Second, the public capital stock invested in neighboring municipalities has significant 
influence on the local firms’ productivity.  However, the influence will be positive or negative 
depending on where the firm is located; i.e., whether the firm belongs to a municipality in a 
metropolitan or non-metropolitan area.  In addition, neighboring public capital stock seems to 
have a bigger influence than local public investment. Two factors are important to 
understanding this finding. One is that the results in this paper do not capture the 
interconnectivity between municipalities (the infrastructure on highways), allowing us to focus 
on the local conditions. The other factor is that neighboring effects of public capital is a 
weighted average of the public capital stock of the neighboring municipalities, meaning that 
municipalities with higher levels of investment will exert more effect.  The influence of 
neighboring public capital, however, depends on the location of the municipality, whether it is 
in a metropolitan or a non-metropolitan area. In the metropolitan area, the influence of the 
neighboring public capital is positive.  It may respond to the case in which municipalities have 
better logistics and coordination, as in the case of the municipality of Guatemala City.  One 
expects to observe the most developed public infrastructure there, which in turn would act as a 
complementary factor of production by virtue of allowing a crowding-in effect.  Hence, firms in 
municipalities in close proximity to the capital city obtain benefits due to region-wide physical 
linkages, such as a better transportation system, electric system grids, and water system, among 
other factors. In the non-metropolitan area, the influence of the neighboring public capital is 
negative.  As mentioned above, firms and skilled workers will locate where there are more local 
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advantages for their production processes or more opportunities for obtaining a job, 
respectively.  In terms of infrastructure stock, the better the infrastructure conditions the more 
attractive the place to produce.  In Guatemala there is a large gap in terms of economic 
development between the metropolitan and the non-metropolitan areas (see Chapter 2 for a 
supporting argument); therefore, it is expected that many firms will prefer to settle in the first 
place, which would attract qualified productive factors, producing in turn a crowding-out effect 
in the non-metropolitan area.  Consequently, any improvement in public infrastructure in the 
metropolitan area will negatively affect the economic performance of the municipalities from 
the non-metropolitan areas.  
Local public capital stock has a positive influence on the production of the local firms.  
This result is expected because when firms’ productivity is enhanced by the new or improved 
public infrastructure, their potential production is increased, and in turn it may increase local 
incomes, which stimulate local markets.  This is confirmed by Pereira and Roca (2003), who 
argue that public capital affects output both directly and indirectly.  Directly, because public 
capital is a complementary input to the process of production of the firms, which represents a 
positive externality to private production. Thus, the greater public capital stock, ceteris paribus, 
the higher the output. Public capital affects output indirectly when it enhances the use of 
private inputs, such as capital and labor; for instance, with an efficient way of commuting, 
workers may decrease opportunity costs in terms of time and price. 
The public capital stock from the neighboring municipalities has a negative effect on the 
firms’ production of local municipalities (though it has no statistical significance effect).  Public 
capital from neighboring municipalities influences the relocations of local productive factors, 
but it does not necessarily imply a direct influence on local output, unless the municipalities 
compete for a common external market. Firms with lower marginal costs or firms with more 
efficient production process, due to better local public infrastructure, have the potential of 
increasing the production at lower prices, and hence these firms will have the opportunity of 
selling more of their product.  This argument is supported by Boarnet (1998), who states that 
public investment has the potential of enhancing the comparative advantages of one place over 
others, creating negative spillover effects.   
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As discussed above, local public investment influences positively firms’ output both 
directly and indirectly; therefore, proper investment in public infrastructure enhances the 
economic performance of municipalities, leading to increased prosperity.  It is necessary to 
recall two issues from earlier discussion regarding the monetary assignment for public capital; 
first, SEGEPLAN initially suggests a technical monetary distribution of funds to municipal 
projects that are prioritized on efficiency basis; second, the representatives of the congress of the 
republic of Guatemala modify such an original proposal for a new one based on political 
arguments.  So, in spite of the positive influence of the local investments on the economic 
performance of the municipality, the neighboring investments exert some negative influence on 
the municipalities of the non-metropolitan areas.  This concern arises because a poorly planned 
monetary assignment can induce qualified resources, such as skilled labor and private capital, 
to in-migrate to the metropolitan area.  As a result, the gap of the economic development 
between the big two regions may deteriorated further.  Therefore, representatives of the 
congress should be well-served to follow technical distributions of the monetary funds that 
consider such problems, while avoiding political redistributions.  
The expenditure on research and development aims to provide experimental and 
theoretical knowledge for enhancing the process of production of firms.  As mentioned above, 
the results of the estimations in this study show a high and positively-correlated effect on firms’ 
productivity. It is important to remark on two issues in the Guatemalan case.  First, the amount 
of money spent for R&D in the country represents, on average during 2005-2008, less than 
0.05% of the GDP (BANGUAT, 2010; SENACYT, 2009), or the equivalent of 48 million dollars in 
real terms.  Second, R&D is done mostly by universities and in a lower proportion by 
technological institutes of the government and NGO’s.  The location of such centers of 
capacitation are not evenly distributed across the country: 19% of them are located in 20 
municipalities of the metropolitan area, whereas the remaining 81% are distributed among the 
remaining 314 municipalities of the country; in other words, there are about 3 centers of 
capacitation per municipality in the metropolitan area, while almost 1 center per municipality 
for the rest of the country.  Also, R&D in Guatemala is characterized by diminishing returns, 
and because of the size of the investments on R&D one can argue that the country is at an early 
stage, where any monetary amount of investment in R&D leads to exert great effect on 
productivity of the firms. 
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Thus, this paper argues that the current influence of R&D on the production of the firms 
is, at the moment, insignificant.  In order to discuss such a result, it is convenient to recall that 
R&D is a long-term investment, where benefits are to be perceived only if firms’ workers are 
capable of applying the learned skills, and only if firms are capable of providing continuity in 
the R&D investing.  Scherer (1999) points out that most private R&D projects do not actually 
earn positive returns, although firms expect to obtain back such investments as an asset for 
future profits.  
It is important to remark that knowledge is a public good; thus, authorities should take 
the initiative of creating pools of knowledge that spill over to firms and workers.  This carries 
an important implication in that authorities must conciliate coordination that encompasses all 
kind of institutions and individuals capable of transmitting knowledge and technology.  This is 
by no means a new suggestion, because in Guatemala there is already a national plan of 
development that aims to promote a scientific network; nonetheless, its influence has not yet 
produced important results.  Since 2004, the expenditure on R&D with respect to the GDP has 
grown from 0.03% to 0.07%, as of 2008 (SENATYC, 2010).  Thus, it is imperative that the 
authorities provide significantly more financial support for this public program, in which more 
firms and people with limited resources can have access to appropriate capacitation. 
In the present study, human capital is interpreted as the education level that people 
have in the municipalities, and are available for hiring by the firms.  In theoretical terms of 
endogenous growth model, the role of human capital is to facilitate and adapt the technological 
advances into the process of production (Romer, 1990).  Thus, the transmission channel of the 
influence of human capital to firms’ productivity rests on education and on the ability of 
adapting technological advances into the production process. The results of the present research 
do not show significant influence on the productivity of the firms. Given the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the country, the results are not surprising.  The lack of well-educated people 
implies that the municipalities have limited ability to use or create new technology; in 2011, the 
national average of schooling years in Guatemala was reported to be 3.7 (INE, 2012), reaching 
barely the elementary school level.  Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) argue that education is 
essentially a prerequisite for adoption and innovation, which enhances the economic and 
productivity growth of a locale.  Also, when looking into human capital effects over firms’ 
production in Guatemala, it is possible to distinguish that people with elementary and middle 
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school level of education in the municipalities have negative impact, while people with high 
school reports positive impact.  Hua (2005) provides an argument to explain these results. The 
author claims that education should play positive effect in improving technological progress, 
but also in adapting foreign technology; thus, education level matters. Hua adds that if people 
with higher education exerts positive effect on technical progress through R&D, then people 
with basic education (such as elementary and middle school level) may not exert such effect, or 
worse off, they may exert negative influence due to inadequate use of technology. 
Furthermore, as discussed previously, R&D increases productivity only if human capital 
is capable of translating the knowledge and ideas into the process of production.  Therefore, 
authorities must pay careful attention to human capital.  Firms having access to human capital 
with mostly low education have to face some risks; for instance, workers might not be capable 
of assimilating new knowledge and technology into the production process, or may run the risk 
of not properly using advanced technology.  For these reasons, authorities must prioritize 
expenditures on education in the national budget, but such outlay must support meaningful 
and effective programs in which childhood and adult populations receive appropriate 
education.  In this regard, the Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies (ICEFI) argues that 
two issues are occurring systematically with education. While the government has increased the 
monetary assignment to education to hire more teachers, the initial enrollment of students has 
dropped; i.e. there are more teachers but relatively fewer students to teach.  If this situation 
continues, the capacity to adapt to new technology and knowledge will be poor; consequently, 
firms will be less productive, which could potentially lead to less economic growth in the long-
term.  
Finally, some issues are not discussed in the present paper.  First, this study did not seek 
to analyze the effects of public investment on the agricultural sector of the country.  Second, the 
paper did not consider the public investments in highways networks that the central 
government funded.  It is assumed that it did not change drastically during the period of this 
study.  Third, the study did not differentiate among the quality of the public works, which 
implies that there was no control over the big projects (white elephants) and their efficiency in 
different locations.  Fourth, the study used limited time series data.  This brings difficulty in 
evaluating the results over time that would allow for understanding the in-depth effects that 
public capital has over the long run. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
The results obtained in the present chapter confirm the proposed hypothesis.  This assertion 
comes by showing that the expenditure on physical public investment in the 78 municipalities 
of Guatemala during the period 2001-2008 positively influences the economic performance in 
their locales.  Regarding the neighboring public investment, it is not possible to either confirm 
or reject the idea that it enhances the local economic performance of firms of the municipalities.  
Although the results suggest different kinds of influences, depending on the region under 
analysis, it requires more detailed information and other econometrical tools to determine its 
direction and level of influence.    
The empirical literature about endogenous growth model and public investment is large, 
but the literature focused on developing countries is scarce. The role of the public capital stock 
in Guatemala is important because it provides better background conditions for the economic 
performance of the firms.  It is necessary to coordinate the planning systems of the 
municipalities in order to improve the benefits to society.  As discussed above, the 
municipalities that are adjacent to the capital city benefited from the centrifugal forces that the 
city spreads about, while the peripheral areas suffer from polarization effects.  Hence, it is 
possible to develop better coordination and to target efforts at stimulating an alternative growth 
poles that promote regional development. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
The high rate of urbanization in Guatemala is the key part to understand the nature of the 
research.  It means to denote both the polarized internal migration and the existing aggravated 
economic inequality in the country.  As mentioned there, such issues have incidences in the 
performance of the markets, income distribution, regional disparities, and hence on the regional 
economic growth, which condition the economic growth of a nation.  Clearly, such situation 
implies planning challenges that policy makers must address for improving the economic 
welfare of inhabitants of the locales in Guatemala.   
The results presented before dropped three considerations around the elements 
mentioned in the above paragraph, showing that the labor market in Guatemala is flawed by 
imperfections, such as monopolistic power by firms and persistent underemployment; also the 
considerations show that state intervention is necessary for balancing the current economic 
conditions in Guatemala, for instance, the investment in public capital.  Thus, the first 
consideration is that the economic prosperity represented by the market access is not associated 
to the spatial distribution of wages.  As most of the country is in relative precariousness with 
respect to the metropolitan area, one would expect, for instance, to observe that wages in the 
metropolitan area behave alongside with the improvement of its market access.  However, there 
is little empirical support of it, and such argument can be justified, in part, by assuming that the 
metropolitan area is not growing enough to absorb all labor supply in decent jobs, which is fed 
in good measure by the high rates of internal migration.  In this regard, ENCOVI (2006) shows 
that among the reasons for migrating the second most important is for labor opportunities.  This 
is a topic covered by Hagen (2008), who indicates that it is normal that individuals or groups of 
people may decide to move from one geographical location to another for employment 
possibilities.  So, given the size of the market access in the metropolitan area, it is expected an 
increase of the labor supply due largely to internal migration, which results in 
underemployment. This argument brings into discussion the second consideration, the labor 
market in Guatemala is not enough large for hiring all people for decent jobs in all regions in 
Guatemala.   
It was discussed in previous chapters that in Guatemala exists a large informal sector, 
meaning low incomes, fewer hours of working than the desired, and low productivity.  This is 
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an expression of the existent labor gap –between supply and demand- in Guatemala, a situation 
that firms take in advantage for determining wages under their contractual conditioning.  The 
labor gap in Guatemala forces people to accept jobs under poor conditions as there is not any 
policy of unemployment subsidy that economically supports their time of job search; this 
situation explains the low rate of unemployment as people do not have other ways for 
obtaining their income.  This condition highlights the importance of focusing in the modified 
wage curve, in which the effects of underemployment is more relevant than the effects of 
unemployment over wages in the country.  This is true even at interregional level, where the 
spillover effects of underemployment have negative effect on wages because the regions 
complement each other as extensions of their own market.  Ernst and Berg (2009) argue that the 
quality of employment and decent jobs are key characteristics of a labor market aimed to 
promote economic development.  Thus, underemployment is a perfect reflection of the 
economic reality of the country, and the fact that underemployment is not decreasing remarks 
the absence of short and medium terms solutions for inequality and poverty. 
The third consideration, public capital is necessary for boosting the economy in each 
region.  It was shown above that public capital has positive effect on firms’ productivity and 
production when invested in the same locale where firms operate.  Also, depending where the 
public capital is allocated and depending where the firms are located, the neighboring effect of 
the public capital can be either positive or negative.  When firms are located in the metropolitan 
area the effects of public capital allocated in any part of the country is generally positive, while 
if the firm is located in the non-metropolitan areas the effect is negative.  This result is 
analytically comparable with the previous considerations because public capital may incentive 
economic agents to migrate due to the quality or improvement of the public infrastructure.  The 
budgetary assignment of public capital in infrastructure has been historically biased toward the 
metropolitan area, which remark the existent economic inequality in the country in a 
geographical context.  Thus, public infrastructure also contributes to incentive the migration 
process that aims toward the metropolitan area.  By considering such argument, it was shown 
the existence of non-metropolitan regions where public capital is better used and where spatial 
spillovers are better conducted; thus, placing more public infrastructure in such places would 
improve productivity, incomes, and hence it would reduce poverty; all of them are elements 
that may alleviate the regional disparities in the country.       
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The three considerations are embedded by the effects of internal migration has caused, 
which can be said is a consequence of the economic inequality between economic agents and 
places, as it is motivated by people who decide to move for reducing their gap related to the 
difference between their own economic and social position and that of people in other wealthier 
places.  However, it is happening that economic conditions are getting worse in all regions of 
the country, including in the metropolitan area.  Wages are already low and are even decreasing 
in real terms because the labor markets in the regions in Guatemala are not competitive among 
them.  The lack of adequate planning, by the state authorities, which does not include the 
consideration of the internal migration as an issue to be addressed (SEGEPLAN, 2012) is 
fearfulness as the conditions are deteriorating, i.e., the number of migrants is considerable high 
and continuous in 2006 and 2011, which is inducing the creation of more workers in the 
informal sector each year, and hence lower wages.  The metropolitan area is significantly more 
prosperous than any other region in Guatemala, which makes it attractive to migrants, yet its 
economic performance is not enough to accommodate all them.  This raises labor-market 
implications as regard internal migration policies as it is assumed that the internal migration is 
pushing wages down.  It is important to encourage people, when deciding to move into another 
locale, to immigrate to non-metropolitan areas; this can be done by encouraging private capital 
to invest in other places rather the metropolitan area.  Also, the geographical distribution and 
assignation of public capital for investment in infrastructure is currently flawed by political 
actions not oriented by technical recommendations; then, it is imperative that legislators should 
follow the technical recommendations originally given by SEGEPLAN, which is oriented to be 
efficient under their considerations. 
As explained in chapter 2, the origin of the regional disparities in Guatemala has an 
historical context; however, it is possible to argue that such inequality has been fueled by 
unwise policy actions of public investment, including public education and health, and public 
infrastructure, among others.  This situation gave foundation, in consequence, to a monopolistic 
power  dominated by firms, in which excess of labor supply and poor human capital creates a 
system that deepen the economic disparities.  The informality in the economic system evidences 
such reality, in which it is needed the participation of the State to balance such conditions. 
Thus, authorities must focus on long term planning aimed to direct private and public 
investment into the different regions in Guatemala, designed to give more labor opportunities 
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to economic agents.  Using the argument provided by Hirschman (1958), this mechanism would 
incentive the forward linkages of the industries in Guatemala as better human capital and more 
infrastructures would support the production process of the firms through more and better 
inputs; also, it would support the backward industry when expanding their demand for inputs 
that involves national production, such as transportation, commerce, etc.  In addition, by 
considering the spatial spillovers, it would be incumbent on policy makers to know the size of 
the effects that such investment would exert in the locales and in the neighboring, which brings 
into the analysis the need of knowing the correct mix of investments in each region based on the 
entrepreneurial abilities of each place. 
Finally, Larrain (2006) mentions that “the effect of a major change in the institutional 
development of a country or region may exceed the cumulative effect of the implementation of 
economic policies.”  Hence, as regards the labor market in Guatemala, the public institutions of 
the State must be capable of providing labor protection to workers, like ensuring at least the 
minimum wage. Thus, the institutions in Guatemala most be strengthened to accomplish the 
basic roll of supervision and enforcement of the laws which would support the enhancement of 
the economic conditions of the country. 
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